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Gang membership has been labeled a snare in the life-course. Research has 
established gang members have greater odds of participating in crime, especially violent 
crime, and have a greater risk of violent victimization. Additionally, due to the 
criminogenic nature of gangs, gang members are often disconnected from prosocial 
peers and institutions. As such, gang members tend to be involved in the criminal justice 
system longer. Yet, what remains to be unclear is the role of personal networks on the 
criminal trajectories of gang members. The social structures individuals are embedded in 
are influential on their behaviors. A key criminological finding is the influence of peers on 
deviant behaviors. Gangs are first and foremost social groups made up of 
interconnected members. Therefore, ignoring the social world members embed 
themselves in, we are missing pieces of information to answer key questions regarding 
gang membership. In this dissertation, the personal networks of gang members are 
examined in order to determine whether the size and structure of their networks 
influence their criminal trajectories. Gang membership brings with it more opportunities 
to participate in criminal activities, co-offenders, and a “brotherhood”. As a result, there 
should be an increase in social capital associated with gang membership. Social capital 
is the resources obtained through social relations. The more social capital gang 
members have access to, the more advantageous their position within the network. 
Results revealed during active periods of gang membership, gang members’ networks 
did have a significant increase in social capital. How members built their networks was 
related to the length of their gang careers. In addition, by using networks, this 
dissertation moves beyond the gang label and examines how being embedded within a 
prison gang may influence the criminal careers of non-gang associates. It was found 
proximity to prison gang members increased the criminal career length for non-gang 
associates. Further, network measures were found to have a greater impact on the 
length of criminal careers than the label of gang member. These results were used to 
conceptually develop and propose a social capital theory of gang membership.  
Keywords:  personal networks; gang membership; criminal careers; social capital  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This dissertation is a complex journey that is premised in the idea that 
connections are influential on behaviors. Human relationships and social interactions are 
the common denominator for everything in life. Therefore, who you know is pivotal for 
accessing opportunities and resources that other individuals may not have access to. As 
a result, individuals who are able to access resources embedded through the 
connections within their networks have higher social capital. Social capital commonly 
refers to the resources that are obtained through social relations (Lin, 2001). The 
positions individuals occupy within their networks provide them with different 
opportunities. As such, how individuals invest in social relations and mobilize their 
interactions are going to directly influence the amount of social capital they gain.  
Criminologists have long been interested in the social aspect of crime. Some of 
the key criminological theories are premised in the role of social relations and learning 
through connections with others (Akers, 1985; Bandura, 1969; Sutherland, 1947). One of 
the most concrete findings within criminology has been the role of peers in explaining 
involvement in crime (Agnew, 1991; Haynie, 2001; Warr, 1996; 2002). Through 
associations with criminal peers, individuals are exposed to more co-offenders and 
opportunities to become involved in crime. This can increase their social capital. In fact, 
McCarthy and Hagan (1995) coined the term criminal capital. Criminal capital is often 
used to reference the resources that are gained through the social relations with 
individuals involved in illicit activities. Greater exposure to criminal opportunities and co-
offenders, individuals’ criminal capital is increased. Studies have found relationship 
dynamics (i.e. mentor - mentee) (Morselli et al., 2006), and an individual’s willingness to 
expand their networks through criminal collaborations (McCarthy & Hagan, 2001), to be 
influential on criminal achievement. Additionally, researchers have found individuals who 
have larger networks of co-offenders, have longer criminal careers (Piquero et al., 2007). 
The ways in which individuals build their networks is key to their success and longevity 
within the criminal justice system. As noted by McCarthy and Hagan (2001), criminal 
capital is almost exclusively gained through social relations. Therefore, how individuals 
build their networks and mobilize their positions will directly relate to their overall 
success. How successful criminals are may influence the length of their criminal careers.  
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Social capital is inherently a part of gangs because social relations are a central 
component of gangs. For instance, individuals cannot become gang members without 
usually having a connection with someone in the gang already. Also, breaking gangs 
down, they are social groups comprised of interconnected members. Gang members 
come together in time and space to perform collective actions for the gang 
(Papachristos, 2006). The majority of crimes committed by gang members involve two or 
more members, creating pockets of co-offending networks within the larger structure of 
the gang. These criminal opportunities are largely related to the positions and roles 
members occupy. This creates group cohesion and behavioral constraints on members. 
As such, the cooperation and commitment of members may be related to their position 
and role within the gang. In addition, gang membership may offer a mentor-mentee 
relationship between older or more experienced gang members and young gang 
members. If a new gang member has the opportunity to have a mentor, they will have 
differential access to resources compared to young members who do not have a mentor 
(Morselli et al., 2006).  
It seems intuitive then that gang members would have more social capital than 
non-gang criminals. Gang members are often glorified, within pop culture and the 
criminal world, but is this a representation of members’ lives once they become involved 
in gangs?  Are gang members personally gaining from their status as a gang member? 
And if so, does this influence their criminal trajectories? It appears gang members have 
plenty of opportunities to increase their social capital. Gang members are believed to 
have access to more criminal opportunities, co-offending relations, and the 
“brotherhood” of the gang, all contributes to the growth of their capital. But is this the 
case? Do all gang members experience this growth of capital? If so, then why would any 
gang member leave the gang? It has been reported that gang membership is in 
actuality, short lived, with the average member staying in the gang for a modal length of 
two years (Esbensen & Huizinga, 1993; Hill et al., 1999; Thornberry et al., 2003). 
Researchers have started to move away from simplistic characterizations of gang 
members (i.e. gang member/non-gang member, stable/transient) and examine the 
heterogeneity between members through the concept of gang embeddedness (Pyrooz et 
al., 2013). Findings from this line of research have revealed the more embedded 
members are, the longer they remain in the gang. This shows the social capital gained 
from membership may not equally distributed. Some members benefit more than others 
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which may be why we see differences in the length of gang careers. However, one gap 
within this line of research is examining the social relations of members. Gang members 
do not know who they do not know; therefore, their perception on their positon within the 
gang or overall importance to the gang may not be accurate. As stated, social relations 
make up gangs. Yet, research has failed to examine the personal networks of gang 
members. Knowing how gang members networks change over time can provide another 
layer of information on the heterogeneity between gang members and gang careers. 
Furthermore, gang membership has been labeled a snare in the life-course, but do the 
personal networks of gang members influence their residual criminal careers? In other 
words, if capital is gained from membership, does it impact involvement in the criminal 
justice system post-gang membership?  
The aim of the dissertation is to examine whether the personal networks of gang 
members do in fact influence their criminal careers. Mapping the networks of gang 
members, I am able to investigate whether the size and structure of their networks are 
associated with the length of their criminal careers. In addition, I examine if gang 
membership changes members networks. It is suspected when individuals become 
members they are exposed to more capital. I test this by examining network changes 
pre- to during-gang membership, and during- to post-gang membership. Looking at what 
happens to networks post-membership can provide insights into whether capital that was 
potentially gained during membership disappears with the gang label. If it does not, then 
this capital may be related to the length of their residual criminal careers. On top of 
measuring network changes, I examine whether networks influence the length of gang 
careers. Specifically, I examine if networks play a role in the time it takes individuals to 
become members. Then, once they are members, whether networks influence time 
spent in the gang. Determining whether personal networks play a role in shaping gang 
careers and residual criminal careers, may reveal a social capital theory of gang 
membership.  
It may be found that gang membership is associated with an increase in social 
capital that is a result of the gang label. How networks evolve pre- to during-gang 
membership will unveil if the label of gang member is associated with more social 
capital. For example, there may be an increase in network size that is a result of 
becoming a gang member. If so, this suggests that being a gang member does increase 
the number of criminal contacts and co-offenders. In addition, examining how the 
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structure of gang members’ networks change can also reveal whether gang membership 
is associated with more social capital. If the positions gang members occupy within their 
networks become more advantageous once they become members, will support the idea 
that there may be a social capital theory of gang membership. Additionally, looking at 
how networks change from during- to post-gang membership, I can examine whether the 
social capital that was gained during active periods of gang membership disappears or 
diminishes once members leave the gang. If a decrease does occur, then there is further 
evidence for a social capital theory of gang membership.  
In the dissertation, I refer to social capital that may be gained through gang 
membership as a positive. This may seem counter-intuitive. The notion of social capital 
is usually referred to as prosocial capital, but I am interested in criminal careers and how 
social capital may be related to longer criminal careers. The social capital gained from 
gang membership is through criminal opportunities, co-offending, and expanding one’s 
criminal network. Depending on the perspective (i.e. the point of view of the actor), these 
sources of capital can be a positive.  
Due to the group nature of gangs, many scholars and observers assume that 
gang members surround themselves with other gang members. While this is partially 
true – gang members do indeed tend to know many similar others - network studies 
have demonstrated that gang members associate with gang and non-gang members 
(McCuish et al., 2015; Reid & Maxson, 2016; Papachristos et al., 2012; 2015a). It is 
important to remember when an individual joins a gang their personal network also 
becomes part of the gang. Their non-gang family members and friends are now 
connected with the gang. This can create paths for their family members and friends to 
become involved in gang life (i.e. membership), or sadly, become victims of gang 
violence (Papachristos et al., 2015a). In addition to family and friends, individuals who 
become gang members usually have some criminal involvement prior to becoming a 
member. Therefore, their non-gang criminal associates are also connected to the gang. 
This is important as it can expand the boundaries of the gang through creating more co-
offending relations outside of the gang, but it also may increase the social capital of the 
gang member. The gang member acts a broker between the gang and their criminal 
associates; as a result, their position in the network is prestigious. However, often 
overlooked is the increase in capital for the non-gang associates. The non-gang 
associates expand their criminal networks due to being in close proximity with gang 
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members. What is not clear within research is whether these connections for the non-
gang associates influence their criminal trajectories. If these individuals are gaining 
social capital through exposure to gang members, then it could be reasonable to suspect 
that their involvement within the justice system may be prolonged.  
In the dissertation, I examine whether being embedded within a gang network 
impacts the criminal career length of non-gang associates. Specifically, using a case 
study of a prison gang, I map the networks of the prison gang members and measure 
the social distance of the non-gang associates to all of the gang members. It is 
hypothesized that the non-gang members who are closer in proximity to the prison gang 
members will be exposed to more social capital because of their position within the gang 
network. Determining if embeddedness within a prison gang network increases the 
criminal career length of non-gang members demonstrates the importance of using 
networks. Risk for gang membership and entrenchment within the criminal justice 
system is embedded within the networks individuals find themselves. This will also have 
important implications for prevention programs as individuals who are close to gang 
members could be at risk for prolonged involvement within the criminal justice system.  
The focus of the dissertation is primarily on the personal networks of gang 
members, not the networks of gangs. Gang networks are created by mapping the 
networks of the members of a particular gang. Typically, the gang itself is the research 
focus (i.e. understand the structure and organization of a gang, know where key players 
are positioned within a gang). As such, it can be thought of as a group-level of analysis. 
In contrast, personal networks or ego networks are the networks of an individual person 
and their connections. Ego networks are consistent with the individual-level analysis of 
the criminal career framework, and are the main line of inquiry into network redundancy 
and how redundancy is linked to individual characteristics and behaviors (McGloin & 
Piquero, 2010, p. 69). Mapping the ego networks of gang members allows for the 
examination into whether changes within an individual’s personal network lead to 
changes within their criminal trajectory.  
The data I use are a subset from the Incarcerated Serious and Violent Young 
Offender Study (ISVYOS) which is a longitudinal study. This provided me the opportunity 
to use a prison based sample and measure criminal career lengths. Important to note is 
that while I use prison data, the focus of the dissertation is not on prison gang members. 
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The gang members do spend time in prison which I have been able to capture. This 
gave me the chance to examine whether prison plays a role in increasing members’ 
social capital. Most research on gang members use community based data (i.e. Dong & 
Krohn, 2016; Gilman et al., 2014; Krohn et al., 2011; Pyrooz, 2014a; 2014b; Thornberry 
et al., 1993; 2003), with recent work looking at prison gangs and prison gang members 
(Pyrooz & Decker, 2019). Here, I am interested in how prison influences the networks of 
gang members. With the increased involvement in the criminal justice system, prison 
could be a place for gang members to grow their networks, but do they? And if they do, 
do the connections made in prison have an independent effect on criminal trajectories? 
This has yet to be examined. Learning whether prisons do play a role in the personal 
networks of gang members also has important implications for policy, and prevention 
and intervention programs.  
The dissertation examines how personal networks impact criminal trajectories. I 
use the term criminal trajectories because I use a variety of outcomes in the dissertation. 
Specifically, I look at criminal career length, time to gang membership, and length of 
gang membership. There are three main results chapters (Chapters 8, 9, 10). The first 
results chapter, Chapter 8 - Build it and they will come? Social networks and the 
dynamics of gang membership - I examine whether the networks of gang members 
influence their gang trajectories. How gang members establish themselves in their 
personal networks can provide different opportunities to invest in their connections. This 
in turn may increase or decrease the length of their gang career. The second results 
chapter, Chapter 9 – A gang network advantage? The role of personal networks in the 
criminal careers of gang and non-gang members - examines whether the personal 
networks of gang members are different from a matched sample of non-gang members. 
The goal of this chapter is to examine whether it is the label of gang member that is 
important or is it the networks that influence criminal trajectories. In the last results 
chapter, Chapter 10 - Is it who you know in prison that counts? Exposure to prison gang 
members and criminal careers – I test the assumption that the gang label is associated 
with an increase in social capital by examining a youth prison gang. I do this by 
calculating the social distance of the prison gang members to each other, as well as to 
all the other individuals within the gang network. I use social distance as opposed to 
gang member and test it against criminal career length. Throughout the dissertation, I 
am examining whether gang membership is associated with an increase in social capital 
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and whether the increase in capital impacts criminal trajectories. This provides me the 
opportunity to examine whether there is a social capital theory of gang membership.  
As stated previously, there is a reasonable assumption that gang membership is 
associated with an increase in social capital. By taking on the label of gang member, 
individuals are exposed to more criminal opportunities. Additionally, networks organically 
grow when an individual belongs to a group. As a result, during active periods of gang 
membership, the personal networks of gang members should change in size, as well as 
in structure. But these assumptions have yet to be tested empirically. This is what I am 
examining throughout the dissertation.  
The first two results chapters follow traditional research designs in the field by 
examining the role of various predictors in criminal justice outcomes: 1) time to gang 
membership (Chapter 8), 2) length of gang membership (Chapter 8), and 3) length of 
criminal career (Chapter 9). The major difference with my study is the reliance on social 
network measures as the main predictors of these outcomes. In Chapter 8, I focus solely 
on gang members and outcomes associated with gang membership. Using gang 
members only, I am able to examine if there are changes within members networks that 
occur alongside changes in membership status. More specifically, I split the members 
networks pre-, during-, and post-gang membership to see if there is an increase in social 
capital once individuals take on the label of gang member. I then examine whether the 
changes in networks impact the length of their gang careers. In Chapter 9, I use a 
matched control sample to examine if gang membership and/or the social context 
influence criminal career length. I hypothesize that it is both. Because of their networks, I 
expect gang members to have longer criminal careers compared to non-gang members.  
In the last analysis chapter, Chapter 10, I change the focus from individual gang 
members and their networks, to look inside the network of an actual prison gang. Doing 
this allows me to go further, challenging one of the main assumptions of the dissertation, 
namely that gang membership does come with an increase in social capital. By using a 
prison gang as a starting point for creating networks, I am able to see what happens in 
prison and capture the interconnectivity between gang and non-gang members. As a 
result, I have a “prison gang network” as opposed to “individual networks of gang 
members”. A prison gang network allows me the opportunity to 1) move away from 
comparing gang members to non-gang members and test social distance as a measure 
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of social capital, and 2) examine whether the connections made in prison do influence 
the length of residual criminal careers for everyone within the network (gang and non-
gang members). Of note, the prison gang was formed while the eight members were 
incarcerated together. The gang was not a community gang or a gang that was formed 
in the community and continued inside. The eight youth were incarcerated at the same 
time in the same correctional facility and formed the gang. Using a youth prison gang is 
a contrast from the majority of work on prison gangs that have focused on adults (i.e. 
Pyrooz & Decker, 2019; Skarbek, 2014). Having the opportunity to examine a youth 
prison gang, I am able to examine the long-term impact of exposure to a prison gang 
early in criminal trajectories. Does being a youth prison gang member impact the 
criminal careers of members? Does being connected to a youth prison gang influence 
the criminal careers for non-gang members? By using networks, I have the ability to 
move beyond the gang label and examine the group context of a gang, and whether the 
social proximity of connections impact criminal careers. My intent is to showcase the 
importance of using networks and how the different levels of analyses complement one 
another. 
The remainder of the dissertation is laid out as follows. The literature review is 
covered in Chapters 2-4. Chapter 2 outlines what social network analysis is and sets the 
theoretical background. Social capital theory is the backbone to the dissertation; 
therefore, I go through, in some detail, what social capital theory is, where it is derived 
from, and how it relates to gangs. Also in Chapter 2 is an overview of social contagion 
theory. Throughout the dissertation, I use social contagion in combination with social 
capital. Going through what social contagion theory is and how I use the concept of 
contagion will be discussed. Chapter 3 focuses on gangs and what we know about 
gangs. Specifically, I examine how gang membership may influence criminal career 
length, with a particular focus on gang embeddedness. Chapter 4, I go into prison. This 
dissertation has the unique opportunity to examine the connections made in prison to 
see if they are important for criminal careers. Understanding why prisons could be a 
place to grow networks is covered in this chapter, along with evidence to show 
connections in prisons may influence prolonged involvement in the criminal justice 
system. In Chapter 5, I outline the aim of the dissertation. Chapters 6-10 cover the data, 
sample, methods, and results. The dissertation finishes with a discussion (Chapter 11) 
that covers each results chapter, then, Chapter 12 is the conclusion. Here, I highlight the 
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main insights learned from the dissertation, and lay the groundwork for thinking about a 
gang-specific theory of social capital.  
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Chapter 2. Social Network Analysis 
2.1. What is social network analysis? 
Everyone is part of a social network. In most cases, individuals are linked to 
multiple people, groups and/or organizations making them involved in more than one 
network. Networks are a different way of thinking about the social systems and 
processes that encompasses everyone (Borgatti et al., 2009). Simply, social network 
analysis (SNA) is “a set of actors and the ties among them” (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
Within SNA, there are many theories, principles, and concepts. Taken as a whole they 
make up the network perspective. While there are individual theories under the umbrella 
of SNA, they all assert that it is the ties and interactions among people that are the main 
drivers of behaviors, not individuals themselves. One of the main assumptions of SNA is 
interdependence. This deviates from traditional social science which assumes 
independence. As stated by Papachristos (2011) “variables themselves do not act, 
people do” (p. 106). According to a network perspective, it is the interconnectedness 
between people that are the mechanisms of action (Perry et al., 2018, p. 5). The 
patterns of interactions between people are the central focus of network researchers. 
SNA provides us the ability to move beyond direct connections, which capture only who 
individuals know, to indirect connections (i.e. a friend of a friend). Indirect connections 
are just as important as direct connections on behavioral outcomes as the resources 
embedded within these connections flow through the network. Through the use of SNA, 
the position individuals occupy within the larger social structure can be determined. 
Knowing the position of individuals within the network, the amount of resources and 
opportunities they are exposed to is revealed.  
Social network analysis is not a new phenomenon. It has been traced back to the 
1930s with the work of Jacob Moreno and Helen Jennings1. In 1932, there was an 
increase in girls running away from a group home in New York. Moreno, a psychiatrist, 
and Jennings, a social psychologist, believed that the reason for this increase was less 
                                              
1
 Jennings has been labeled a pioneer of social network analysis by those who are familiar with her work. 
She was involved with the work done by Moreno, and together they developed quantitative methods used to 
develop sociometry. However, she is often not given credit for her work with Moreno. In 1938 there was one 
publication with Moreno and Jennings  
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to do with the individual characteristics of the girls and more to do with their position 
within the larger social structure (Moreno, 1937). Moreno and Jennings mapped the 
social structure of the group home using a “sociometry” which showcased the 
interconnectivity among the girls. It was determined that the location of the girls within 
the network did in fact explain who ran away (Moreno, 1937). This provided Moreno and 
Jennings a tangible understanding of the larger social structure in which the girls were 
embedded in and how influential behaviors and attitudes flowed through specific 
interactions. Moreno (1941; 1943; 1951) continued the advancement of SNA using 
graphical displays of data leading to the emergence of graph theory. Graph theory, the 
mathematical structure that studies the dynamics between nodes, has provided 
researchers the ability to analyze all the interactions within a network. This has allowed 
researchers to examine the structure and organization of groups as a whole, as well as 
the individual or ego networks of members (Barnes & Harary, 1983).    
While SNA is not new, the use of it within criminology has only taken place within 
the last twenty years. Yet, crime is an interaction between two people (e.g. 
victim/perpetrator, co-offenders) with offenders embedded within criminal networks 
(Warr, 2002). One of the most robust findings within criminology is the influence peers 
have on behavior (Haynie, 2001; Krohn et al., 1988; Thornberry & Krohn, 1997; 
Weerman, 2011), with the majority of offenders committing crime with at least one other 
individual (Reiss, 1988; Warr, 2002). Key criminological theories such as differential 
association theory which asserts criminal behavior is learned through social interactions 
(Sutherland, 1947), social control theory which posits that individuals with low self-
control are more likely to interact and form deviant networks (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 
1990), and others such as social learning (Akers, 1985), collective efficacy (Sampson & 
Groves, 1989) and opportunity perspectives (Osgood et al., 1996) are all centered 
around the social interactions among individuals. However, the mechanisms underlying 
why peers are influential on behavior are only beginning to be understood. Krohn (1986) 
argued that implementing a network approach is an important theoretical advancement 
as the networks in which individuals are embedded can help explain patterns of 
behavior. As noted by Bouchard (2020), through the use of network data, the main 
components of key criminology theories can be tested using more appropriate data and 
methods.  
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In previous research, gang membership has been used as an indicator of social 
capital. However, the dichotomous distinctions (gang member/non-gang member, 
transient/stable) simplify the complexity of gangs and networks. As stated previously, 
gangs are comprised of interconnected members. The network of the gang is built from 
the personal networks of each member. Therefore, knowing whether there are 
differences across the personal networks of gang members, we can unpack another 
reason as to why there is heterogeneity between gang careers. There has been 
excellent research on gangs and gang members using SNA,
 2 in this dissertation my 
overarching goal is to examine how gang membership is associated with criminal 
trajectories. I use two levels of analyses - individual and group. The first two results 
chapters (Chapters 8 and 9) I focus on the personal networks of gang members and 
examine if the personal networks of gang members impact criminal trajectories. In 
Chapter 10, I change the unit if analysis to the group and examine a prison gang. Of 
note, I do not focus too much on the structure of the gang or the role of the gang within 
the correctional facility (i.e. informal social control, control of contraband). I am interested 
in determining whether exposure to prison gang members and being embedded within a 
prison gang network influences criminal trajectories. While I look at various criminal 
outcomes (i.e. criminal career length, time to gang membership, length of gang 
membership) and use two levels of analyses, the aim of the dissertation is to examine 
whether gang membership (i.e. label of gang member) is associated with an increase in 
social capital, and if that social capital plays a role in criminal careers.  
2.2. Theoretical background 
2.2.1.  Social capital theory 
Social capital theory has become a popular theory in criminology, especially in 
studies looking at organized crime, drug trafficking, and delinquent peer networks (for 
examples see Bouchard & Nguyen, 2010; Bouhard & Ouellet, 2011; Bouchard & 
Spindler, 2010; Haynie, 2001; Malm, et al., 2017; Morselli, 2001; 2003; 2010; Spindler& 
Bouchard, 2011). Taken as a whole, these studies highlight the importance of structural 
                                              
2
 There have been a number of studies within criminology that have examined gangs using SNA. For a 
review of this literature, recommended reads are Papachristos (2009), Papachristos et al. (2012; 2015); 
Green et al., (2017); McGloin (2005), McCuish et al. (2015); Ouellet and Hashimi (2018); Bouchard (2020); 
Ouellet et al. (2019); and Bichler (2019) 
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connections within networks. They demonstrate the position individuals occupy in the 
network, who they are connected, and the structure and size of networks are key for 
obtaining social capital. Individuals who have access to more capital, have more 
advantageous outcomes (i.e. less risk of detection or arrest, higher levels of offending or 
delinquency, longer criminal career).  
Lin (2001) proposed a theory of social capital that was derived from a general 
theory of capital. The central theme to his theory is that resources are embedded in 
social relations. He states that capitalization is a process whereby capital is gained 
through the production, investment, and consumption processes. The idea of capital can 
be traced back to Marx and in the 19th century. In Marx’s analysis, capital is the surplus 
by the bourgeoisie who control the production, commodities, and the distribution of 
wealth. Capital encompasses the resources that an individual owns (i.e. commodities). 
Through the exchange of products and circulation of commodities, a capitalist obtains 
the excess wealth. The bourgeoisie control the distribution of wealth, basing Marxism on 
the “exploitive social relations between two classes” (Lin, 2001, p.7). There are two 
central elements of Marx’s theory concerning social capital: capital is a process rather 
than a commodity, and capital entails social processes. In order for goods to be bought 
and sold, there has to be social relations and agreements established; therefore, without 
social activity there could be no capital (Lin, 2001). According to Marx, capital is a 
process and an end result. Capital is passed through various social relations (i.e. 
production process, exchange process) and as a result of these processes, any leftover 
resources are added capital. With the evolution of society, the idea of capital has shifted 
to the neo-capital theory as class differential has been modified, and in some cases 
eliminated.  
There have been three neo-capital theories proposed: human, cultural, and 
social. The focus of this dissertation is on social capital, but before getting into social 
capital theory, I am going to explain human and cultural capital. These two theories were 
the foundation for the theory of social capital. By explaining these two forms of capital 
first, it sets the stage for a more in-depth discussion on social capital. The notion of 
human capital was first introduced in Adam Smith’s 1776 publication The Wealth of the 
Nations. Smith included the abilities, knowledge, and skills into the idea of capital. Due 
to laborers having a specific set of skills and training, they could demand higher 
payment. Human capital is the capital that is embedded within individuals, and is 
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measured by the training, experience, and education one has. By having higher levels of 
education and experience, an individual’s skills are specialized, making their work more 
valuable. Anyone is capable of gaining knowledge, skills, experience, and education; 
therefore, capital can be acquired by everyone. Consequently, the social structure and 
processes change. Human capital can be seen as an investment increasing the value of 
work carried out by actors. Not everyone agreed with the notion of human capital, and in 
1970’s the idea of cultural capital emerged.  
Some neo-capitalists disagreed with the idea that everyone had the ability to gain 
capital and move up in the status hierarchy. In response to those criticisms, Bourdieu in 
the 1970s developed cultural capital which is “a system of symbolism and meaning” (see 
Lin, 2001, p. 14).  Cultural capital is premised on the idea that the upper class imposes 
their cultural expectations through social processes such as education, which is then 
learned and internalized by the next generations. Consequently, the system remains to 
be dominated by the elite because their culture is reinforced through social practice (see 
Lin, 2001). Bourdieu labeled this ‘symbolic violence.’ The main premise for cultural 
capital is education. This can be argued to be a form of human capital as human capital 
is the skills, knowledge, and experience an individual gains to specialize their skillset. 
One of the main ways to gain human capital would be through education. Bourdieu, 
however, differentiated cultural from human capital. He states that it is the process of 
education and what is learned through education, not education itself. His idea of 
symbolic violence mirrors Marx’s theory more than human capital because the culture of 
the upper class is reinforced maintaining the two class system - the dominant and the 
dominated. Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s cultural capital does resemble human capital. 
Laborers gain education allowing them to develop their skills. This results in the laborers 
receiving higher compensation for their services which in turn can generate a surplus for 
them.  
Both human and cultural capital theories shift from the classical capital theory by 
focusing more on micro-level explanations. That is not to say these theories disregard 
macro-level explanations because they do not. The system-driven dominance of the elite 
is present in both theories, but theorists have shifted the focus onto individual actors. 
They both emphasize the importance of action taken by the actors, stressing the 
constant interplay between structural constraints and an actor’s decision to act. It is this 
interplay which is the process of capitalization (Lin, 2001). Lin (2001) conceptualizes 
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social capital as the resources that are embedded in structural positions which are 
accessible through social ties. According to Lin (2001), it is the structural position within 
the network, not the individual that holds the capital. In other words, the resources are 
embedded within specific structural positons in the network, not the individual actors. 
The individuals occupying specific positions obtain the capital associated with that 
position. So as individuals change from positions, the capital does not. Therefore, the 
resources that are embedded within the social structure of the network are different from 
the personal resources within individuals. For example, gang membership is fluid. It is 
well known that individuals are gang members for approximately one to two years 
(Thornberry, 1993; 2003). As members come and go, the capital that is gained from 
being part of the gang does not leave with each individual member. The capital is 
associated to the position each member occupies during their time in the gang. For 
members who become more embedded, they occupy new positions within the gang, 
giving them more capital. As long as the capital within the larger social structure 
remains, the network is stable. This helps explain why even with gang membership 
being fluid, gangs are durable.3  
There are two perspectives under the social capital umbrella. One focuses on the 
attainment of social capital for the group (Bourdieu, 1980; 1983; 1986; Coleman 1988; 
1990; Putman, 1993; 1995), the other focuses on the procurement of social capital for 
the individual (Burt, 1992; Flap, 1988; 1991; 1994; Lin, 1982; 2000). Briefly, the group 
perspective examines how social capital is gained and maintained by the group as 
collective assets, and how those assets enhance the status of the group. In contrast, the 
individual perspective focuses on how individuals invest in social relations, and then use 
the relations to obtain the resources to enhance their status (Lin, 2001). While these two 
perspectives describe social capital differently, they both stress that social capital is 
embedded within structural social relations which are mobilized by individuals when they 
want to take purposive action (Lin, 2001). Therefore, social capital is the process of 
investing in social relations in order to gain resources from other actors in the network. 
Additionally, the two perspectives are mutually beneficial. Whether the social capital is a 
collective asset for the group or an asset for the individuals, the capital benefits both the 
group and the individuals. For example, if a gang invests in social relations outside of the 
                                              
3
 Same rationale can apply to all groups—terrorist organizations, organized crime (i.e. mob, mafia, cartel), 
business organizations 
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gang in order to expand its boundaries, the gang has gained status and power, as well 
as created new positions for individual members. As discussed above, it is the position 
that holds the capital; therefore, how invested gang members were in their social 
relations within the gang may offer them access to the new positions acquired by the 
gang.  
There are three intersecting components to social capital: structure, opportunity, 
and action. First, structure links embeddedness of resources to positions within social 
structure. Recall, social capital is embedded within the position, not the individual 
holding the position. There are rules and expectations that are attached to each position 
which lead to “…uniform actions and interactions among social positions, so the value 
and resources is upheld and maintain and expanding such resources remain the 
purpose of collective actions” (Lin, 2001, p. 34). In other words, the position dictates the 
behavior and role of the individual occupying it. Second, opportunity is concerned with 
the location of the positions within the social structure. Some individuals are going to 
have access to greater amounts of capital because of the position they are in (Lin, 
2001). The resources that are embedded in the positions that surround individuals are 
going to spill over to them as social capital can be gained through direct and indirect ties. 
As a result, differential opportunity emerges because access to embedded resources 
within the social structure is not equally distributed throughout the network. Individuals 
who have social relations with individuals who occupy more prestigious positons or 
individuals who broker relations between actors may have access to more capital (Burt, 
1992; Lin, 2001).  
Lastly, is action. Central to social capital is accessing the resources embedded 
within the social structure and mobilize them for purposive action. As individuals gain 
more capital, the position they hold in the network is protected and may even increase 
their status. There are two types of action: instrumental and expressive. Instrumental 
action is action that is taken to achieve specific goals. Individuals who take instrumental 
action are more likely to connect to individuals who provide different knowledge and 
access creating heterophilous relations. Those taking instrumental action have a greater 
likelihood of acquiring advantageous resources because they are willing to interact with 
individuals who are dissimilar to them (Lin, 2001). In contrast, expressive action is taken 
for an individual’s own sake. The means and the ends are inseparable from each other. 
Individuals who take expressive action are more likely to seek out homophilous relations 
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because they are looking for connections that they can confide in, trust, and share their 
lifestyle with (Lin, 2001). Ultimately, individuals seeking instrumental action are more 
likely to achieve higher social capital because they are increasing their network diversity.  
Instrumental action complements Granovetter’s theory--strength of weak ties. 
The focus of this theory is on the position of the ties within the network. Granovetter 
(1973) argued that individuals who have more ties to multiple networks, have more 
social capital. These individuals are more valuable because individuals who have ties to 
multiple networks have the ability to access populations, information, and resources that 
would not be accessible through the use of strong ties. Individuals who only seek strong 
ties, or expressive action, are more likely to share homophilous traits. This in turn makes 
the information shared between individuals redundant. Due to everyone being similar 
and strongly connected, the resources that are embedded in the network are the same, 
giving positions relatively little capital. Granovetter (1973) proposed that individuals with 
weak ties have more opportunity for mobility and growth in their network, increasing their 
capital.  
The notion of redundant ties was further developed by Burt (1992) and his 
structural holes theory. Where Granovetter (1973) was focused on the position of ties, 
Burt’s perspective is focused on the location of the position within the network. 
Redundant ties are connections that lead to the same information. This limits the flow of 
new information and/or resources because everyone is connected to each other. In 
contrast, non-redundant ties are the ties that only one individual has, and without that 
individual, other connections would not be possible (Burt, 1992). Burt (1992) labeled the 
space between non-redundant contacts as a structural hole. A structural hole is “…a 
relationship of nonredundancy between two contacts. The hole is a buffer, like an 
insulator in an electric circuit” (p.18). With the hole being between two non-redundant 
contacts, there are resources being added into the network. Individuals who occupy the 
“empty” space connect actors who would otherwise be disconnected. By branching out 
and creating new opportunities, an individual may accumulate more ties as they become 
connected to more networks. The more networks one is connected to, the more 
structural holes they fill, increasing their social capital. This relates back to Granovetter 
(1973) and the strength of weak ties. When an individual is connected to multiple 
networks, they are taking instrumental action resulting in more weak ties. This increases 
the individual’s social capital (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973; Lin, 2001). Gang members 
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who are willing to co-offend with individuals outside of their gang increase their social 
capital. They are exposed to more offenders and offending opportunities which expands 
their criminal network. As a result, they become more versatile in offending as they 
increase their criminal knowledge and skillset.  
Social capital is the backbone to the current dissertation. It is important to 
understand why the capital embedded within the structural position is more powerful 
than the capital possessed by each individual actor. The concept of human capital is the 
knowledge and skills that individuals possess. Human capital is largely gained through 
education. In contrast, social capital is the process of investing in social relations in order 
to gain resources embedded within the network (Lin, 2001). While individuals bring their 
human capital with them into the positions they occupy, the amount of social capital an 
individual possesses extends as far as their network. In other words, the resources that 
an individual can access through their direct connections make up only a small 
percentage of the individual’s social capital. It is the chain of indirect connections that 
makes up an individual’s social capital (Lin, 2001). This is important because the 
position individuals occupy provides them with resources, but they can also access 
resources beyond their position. Knowing where individuals are located and their social 
distance to everyone else in the network, their overall level of social capital can be 
known. It can and has been argued that human capital provides people access to certain 
individuals and positions. Therefore, without human capital, the accumulation of social 
capital could not happen. There have been studies looking at the various forms of 
capital, and it has been found that human capital supplements social capital. 
Specifically, it was found that when social capital was high, status attainment was high, 
regardless of the level of human capital (high or low). Only when social capital was low 
did human capital have a stronger effect on status (Boxman et al., 1991; Flap & 
Boxman, 1998). These studies demonstrate that when an individual has a higher level of 
social capital, human capital has little to no effect.  
Research within criminology has measured social capital in a myriad of ways 
examining many different outcomes. Research has used network size (Bouchard & 
Ouellet, 2011), network composition (Bouchard & Nguyen, 2010) betweenness centrality 
(Morselli 2001; 2003; 2010), organizational structure (Bouchard & Spindler, 2010; 
Haynie, 2001; Malm et al., 2017; Spindler & Bouchard, 2011), and network redundancy 
(i.e. density) (McGloin & Piquero, 2010) as measures of social capital. While the goal of 
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these studies may not have been to examine social capital directly, they each show how 
individuals who have access to more capital, are more successful or have greater 
criminal achievement (i.e. less risk of arrest or detection, greater offending versatility). 
The findings from these studies indicate that social capital should have an association 
with criminal career length. For example, Morselli (2001; 2003) noted a link between 
brokerage and criminal success. In both of these studies, Morselli mapped the personal 
network of a successful criminal (i.e. Donald Marks and Sammy the Bull) and found most 
of their criminal success was based on their ability to broker relationships. They both 
were able to position themselves in their networks and use their connections to access 
more resources. This resulted in longer and more successful careers. Similarly, Morselli 
(2010) found members of the Hells Angels who occupied more brokerage positions, 
were less likely to be arrested. Bouchard and Nguyen (2010) found youth who were 
embedded within the networks of older cannabis cultivators were less likely to be 
arrested or detected than youth embedded in younger networks. Youth who had the 
opportunity to learn from more experienced cannabis cultivators were able to gain more 
knowledge and skills. This increased their chances of success because of their position 
in the specific networks. Examining the link between network size and time to arrest, 
Bouchard and Ouellet (2011) noted that the size of a dealer’s network influenced 
survival times, with larger networks decreasing time to failure. In other words, dealers 
with larger networks took longer to be arrested. These studies show social capital does 
increase criminal success which can translate to longer careers. However, research has 
yet to examine if there is a link between criminal length and the personal networks of 
gang members.  
As I touched on in the introduction, gang members should have plenty of 
opportunities to gain social capital. Gang members have more access to co-offenders 
and criminal opportunities. In addition, by becoming a gang member, personal networks 
naturally grow in size. Once individuals are labeled a gang member, they have an 
increase in status which can translate to more capital. In the dissertation, I want to know, 
from a network perspective, if gang membership increases social capital, and if so, does 
that impact criminal trajectories. I use social capital in a couple of ways. 
For Chapters 8 and 9, I quantify social capital through the use of network 
measures (i.e. network size, betweenness centrality, constraint, and density). 
Specifically, for Chapter 8, I examine whether there are changes in betweenness 
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centrality and network size that occurs with changes in gang membership status. I 
suspect both betweenness centrality and network size to influence gang careers. I 
examine if there is a significant increase in both of these measures from pre- to during-
gang membership. If so, then this shows that when individuals become gang members, 
there is an increase in capital. I then examine whether the network measures are 
associated to the overall length of their gang careers (time it takes to become a member 
and length of membership). In Chapter 8, I combine social capital with social contagion 
to examine whether social capital influences the changes in gang membership status. 
For Chapter 9, I use all four network measures and examine how they relate to criminal 
career length. However, in this analysis, I include a matched control sample of non-gang 
members to examine whether connectivity and/or gang membership impact criminal 
careers. In Chapter 10, I do not measure social capital directly. I hypothesize it is the 
close exposure to a prison gang that increases the length of residual criminal careers. 
Through their connections within the network, individuals acquire social capital. By being 
embedded within a prison gang network, individuals may have access to opportunities or 
resources that others within the prison do not have. The individuals use the capital 
gained to their advantage (i.e. expand their criminal networks) prolonging their 
involvement in the criminal justice system. Similar to Chapter 8, the concept of contagion 
is used along with social capital to determine if capital can flow through connections 
influencing behaviors. 
2.2.2. Social contagion theory  
While social contagion theory did not originate as a criminological theory or even 
a network theory, it has been adapted to both. The underlying concepts and principles 
are based on the social relations between individuals, with a particular emphasis on the 
social proximity between individuals. Furthermore, social contagion theory is a way to 
understand the flow of diffusion through networks. Social contagion theory postulates 
that human behavior flows across networks through social ties (i.e. influenza, drug use, 
obesity, political mobilization) (Christakis & Fowler, 2007; 2008; 2010; 2012; Jones et al., 
2017). This research has shown that human behavior is a network process which 
reinforces the importance of structural connections that is central to social capital theory.  
Social contagion theory and social capital theory complement one another. Both 
theories highlight the importance of structural connections with the positions individuals 
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occupy exposing them to opportunities and resources. Social contagion focuses more on 
the flow of resources and how the resources lead to a change in status; whereas, social 
capital theory is mainly concerned with the positions individuals occupy. Resources flow 
across the networks through social relations, making the positions individuals occupy 
directly related to the amount of resources they are exposed to. In the dissertation, 
social contagion and social capital are used in combination with one another. The idea 
that behaviors flow through connections in a contagious process has been used within 
criminology, with and without a network perspective.  
Research has continuously shown that gang members commit higher rates of 
violent crimes than non-gang members. Gang members also commit higher rates of 
violent crimes during periods of active gang membership than pre- or post-gang 
membership (Thornberry et al., 1993; 2003). As a result, the mechanism(s) underlying 
the increase in violence has been a hot topic within criminology. Thornberry et al. (1993) 
proposed three models to explain why there is an increase in violence with gang 
membership, commonly known as the selection, facilitation, or enhancement 
hypotheses. There have been multiple studies testing the three models, with studies 
finding support for the facilitation and enhancement hypotheses (Lacourse et al., 2003; 
Gatti et al., 2005; Thornberry et al., 1993; 2003; Wong et al., 2013). The facilitation 
hypothesis is rooted in the group processes of the gang that accounts for the increase in 
violence. There is something about the group nature of gangs that facilitate violence 
above and beyond the individual characteristics of gang members (Thornberry et al., 
1993; 2003). The enhancement hypothesis is a combination of the selection and 
facilitation hypotheses. While the model posits that gang members have a predisposition 
to commit crime, the increase in crime during periods of gang membership is because of 
the group nature of the gang. Taken as a whole, it may be that the collective behaviors 
characteristic of gangs influence and reinforce violent behaviors. Decker (1996) 
expanded on the idea of collective behavior and examined the role of contagion that 
could account for gang violence. Loftin (1984) stated that gang violence has elements of 
contagion as violence, even the threat of it, spreads continuously between gangs. 
According to this perspective, the spike of violence that is associated with gang 
membership is a result of the contagion of violence (Loftin, 1984). The reciprocal nature 
of gang violence leads to an ongoing battle for dominance and respect causing the 
threat of violence to always be present. This in turn increases the solidarity to the gang. 
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Using Loftin’s idea of contagion, Decker (1996) concluded that gang violence is an 
organizational feature of gangs, with the spread of violence representative of a 
contagion. In other words, gang violence works its way through interconnected 
individuals.  
The conclusion that gang violence is a structural component of gangs that flows 
between individuals is perfect for the application of SNA. Papachristos and colleagues 
have taken the concept of social contagion applying a network approach, with a specific 
focus on gunshot victimization. The social contagion model put forth by Papachristos 
and colleagues is adapted from the health sciences proposing violence spreads through 
networks in the same way as infectious diseases. Diseases spread through networks via 
social ties—individuals get sick from other individuals. Using that same idea, 
Papachristos and colleagues hypothesized that the diffusion of gun violence will spread 
through networks the same way as an epidemiological process spreads through 
networks (Green et al., 2017, p. 327). Due to the reciprocal nature of gang violence, 
social contagion is the mechanism of diffusion that occurs through a network spreading 
the violence. Mapping the spread of violence by focusing on the victims, researchers are 
able to systematically examine gang violence and the risk of victimization. Using social 
distance to operationalize contagion, research has found individuals who are closer to 
gunshot victims are at an increased risk of becoming victims (Green et al., 2017; 
Papachristos et al., 2015a; 2015b). As such, gang violence is not random. It flows 
through the social networks of gang members. Importantly, findings from this body of 
research have also found that indirect connections contribute to victimization risk. In 
other words, not only do an individual’s criminal associates increase risk of victimization, 
so do associates of one’s criminal associates (Papachristos et al., 2015b). It is being 
part of the larger social structure that increases risk of victimization.  
As described above, social contagion research within criminology has mainly 
focused on violence and victimization that is associated with gang membership. In the 
current dissertation, I expand the operationalization of social contagion. Specifically, I 
use it in two ways, both in combination with social capital theory. First, in Chapter 8, I am 
capturing a change in status. However, I do not have information on all of the alters in 
the gang members networks, so gang membership as a contagion cannot be measured. 
This is something I would like to do in the future. I would like to expand the personal 
networks of the gang members by two or three handshakes. Doing this, I would be able 
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to examine in more detail the direct connections, but also the indirect connections. In 
addition, I would gather attribute information on the alters to know who is a gang 
member and who is not in order to examine if there is a “contagion of gang 
membership”. But for this dissertation, I am examining how networks change alongside 
changes in gang membership status. It is the combination of contagion and capitalization 
that guides this analysis. 
Second, in Chapter 10, I use the concept of social proximity as a measure of 
contagion. While social contagion requires a change in status for a true contagious 
effect, I do not examine a change in status. I am using residual criminal career length as 
my outcome of interest. It is through the process of contagion in which the capital is 
gained. By being embedded within a prison gang network, the flow of capital is believed 
to be passed through the connections. As such, it is the concept of contagion I am using, 
more than a true test of contagion. The idea is the more embedded individuals are within 
the gang network, the more capital they will receive which will lead to longer residual 
criminal careers. The same rationale as being closer to an infector or a gunshot victim, 
the greater the chances of being sick or shot, is applied here. 
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Chapter 3. Gang Membership: A Turning Point in 
the Life Course 
The dissertation focuses on the personal networks of gang members and how 
they may influence various criminogenic outcomes. As noted in the previous chapter, the 
position gang members occupy in the network has a direct role in the amount of social 
capital they have access to. Therefore, the structural connections gang members have 
may influence not only their gang career, but their criminal career as well. Yet, no 
research to date has examined whether the personal networks of gang members 
influence these outcomes. It has been well established that gangs are social groups and 
membership increases the number of consequences for gang members, I want to know 
if the networks of gang members play a role in these consequences. There is reason to 
believe that they will. 
Over the years since Thrasher’s (1927) seminal work on gangs in Chicago, we 
have learned a lot about the collective behaviors of gangs, risk factors for gang 
membership, and how gang membership is a turning point in the life course. Gang 
researchers have adapted a developmental and life-course (DLC) perspective to gang 
membership which has taught us about the long-term consequences of gang 
membership (i.e. Dong et al., 2015; Krohn & Thornberry, 2008; Krohn et al., 2011; Moule 
et al., 2012 ; Pyrooz et al., 2013; Pyrooz, 2014b; Thornberry et al., 1993; 2003). A DLC 
perspective recognizes that human behavior is not static. It is constantly changing over 
time as individuals enter and exit various developmental stages throughout the life-
course. As individuals age, they move along various trajectories gaining the necessary 
social and human capital to successfully transition into the next developmental stage. 
Transitions are normative, taking place in sequential order as individuals’ progress 
through life. However, when these transitional sequences are disrupted, negative 
consequences can occur. Gang membership has been labeled as a disruption or snare 
in the transitional sequences of developmental stages. As noted by Thornberry et al. 
(2003), gang membership is a turning point in the life-course because membership has 
the ability to “redirect a person’s life” (p. 7).  
Gangs can be described as “dense social networks that restrict the flow of 
conventional information, ideas, and knowledge in favor of criminal alternatives” (Pyrooz, 
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2014a, pg. 61). The criminal and violent nature of gangs increases the cohesion among 
members strengthening their commitment and bond to the gang, while simultaneously 
decreasing connections to prosocial institutions and influences. Through the adaption of 
DLC to gang research, researchers have gained a deeper understanding on the age-
graded risk factors for gang membership, and the spillover effect it has across multiple 
developmental domains (Gilman et al., 2014; Melde & Esbensen, 2011; Pyrooz et al., 
2013; Pyrooz, 2014a; Sweeten et al., 2013; Thornberry et al., 2003). Specifically, 
research has found gang members have higher rates of incarceration, victimization, 
school dropout, teenage parenthood, substance dependency, and lack of employment 
skills (Gilman et al., 2014; Krohn et al., 2011; Thornberry et al., 2003). Due to the 
comorbidity of consequences, gang members often continue their involvement within the 
criminal justice system even after they leave the gang. However, what is less clear is 
whether gang membership influences criminal careers as a whole, including post-gang 
membership. The negative consequences of gang membership across various 
developmental domains hinder gang members’ ability to acquire the appropriate 
prosocial and human capital to transition successfully into the next stages of life. 
Additionally, for most gang members, their networks become largely comprised of gang 
members and non-gang criminals providing ongoing access to criminal activities. As a 
result, gang membership may influence the length of residual criminal careers.  
3.1.  Gang membership and residual criminal careers 
The dissertation treats the length of the criminal career as an outcome of 
particular interest. A criminal career, as defined by Blumstein et al. (1986) is “the 
longitudinal sequence of crimes committed by an individual offender” (p. 12). The 
criminal career perspective examines the participation in criminal behaviors (i.e. those 
who partake in offending vs. those who do not), the frequency of participation, and 
seriousness of crimes committed (Blumstein et al., 1986). The criminal career 
perspective emphasizes the need to examine the onset, continuation, escalation, and 
desistance from offending and the factors that are associated with a longer career. In 
other words, what variables increase the length of time individuals spend offending. In 
addition, what factors play a role in the escalation of offending. Examining longitudinal 
patterns of offending, researchers have learned how within-individual changes play a 
role in the continuation of offending. Certain life events (i.e. marriage, trauma), individual 
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characteristics (i.e. impulsivity, low IQ), neighborhood (i.e. low SES), and familial 
relations (i.e. parental supervision, family ties) have been shown to be influential in the 
stability and change of offending patterns over the life-course (Farrington, 2000; 
Sampson & Laub, 1993).  
The dissertation is not focused so much in changes in criminal careers over the 
life-course. Rather, I examine how social networks may be associated to the length of 
criminal careers. Also, I do not associate criminal career length with criminal 
achievement. My primary concern is the length of time gang members spend involved in 
the criminal justice system. Noted by Melde and Esbensen (2011) simply leaving the 
gang may not be adequate to negate the long-term consequences associated with 
membership. Due to the criminogenic nature of gangs, gang members experience many 
hardships which disrupt the age-graded transitions causing behavioral repercussions. As 
a result, gang members have an increased risk of being involved in the criminal justice 
longer, even after they leave the gang. Moore (1991) found over 60% of former gang 
members remained in the criminal justice system into adulthood. In his ethnographic 
study Hagedorn (1998) found adolescent gang membership was related to incarceration 
in adulthood. He noted 63% of gang members in adolescence had been incarcerated in 
adulthood. In the study by Levitt and Venkatesh (2001), gang members had higher rates 
of arrest and incarceration in adulthood, were significantly more likely to have been shot, 
and were more likely to make their living illegally. Similarly, Gilman et al. (2014) reported 
that adolescent gang members were 3.0 times more likely to have committed crimes, 2.4 
times more likely to have been incarcerated, and 3.7 times more likely to obtain their 
money illegally in adulthood.  
Dong and Krohn (2016) examined whether gang membership in adolescence 
influenced the continuation of offending post-membership above and beyond the 
influence of associating with delinquent peers. The authors found that gang membership 
in adolescence does increase the risk of continued violence and increases the 
probability of arrest for former members in adulthood. This effect was found over and 
above peer delinquent associations (Dong & Krohn, 2016). The authors noted a negative 
relationship with age of onset - the younger youth were when they became involved in 
gangs, the greater the odds of being arrested in adulthood. These lasting effects are 
seen even for individuals who were members for less than a year. Thornberry et al. 
(2003) found the risk of arrest for transient gang members in adulthood increased by 1.7 
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times, while the risk of arrest for stable members increased by 4.0 times. Moreover, it 
was found that the more precocious role exits experienced in adolescence, the risk for 
arrest in adulthood increased by 50% (Thornberry et al., 2003). While the negative 
effects are more pronounced the longer individuals remain in a gang, any time spent in a 
gang can interrupt trajectories leading to hardships later in life. Melde and Esbensen 
(2013) examined within-individual changes of gang and non-gang members. The 
authors found gang membership was associated with a 21% increase in violence. More 
importantly, it was found that levels of offending were found to be higher post-gang than 
pre-gang. In a more recent study, Pyrooz et al. (2017) examined the relationship 
between incarceration and gang membership. In this study they proposed three models 
to describe the relationship between incarceration rates among gang members. They 
found overwhelming support for the intensification model. Simply, the intensification 
model is based on gang members entering prison as gang members, remain gang 
members in custody, and when they are released from prison they continue on as gang 
members. While this study is not examining the link between gang membership and 
criminal careers exactly, the authors did conclude that gang membership increased 
involvement within the criminal justice system. This supports the research described 
above which has shown gang membership especially during adolescence increases the 
rate of offending and arrest in adulthood.  
The relationship between gang membership and offending is robust. There is a 
significant increase in the rate of offending during periods of gang membership. As such 
Thornberry et al. (1993) developed the selection, facilitation, and enhancement 
hypotheses to try and explain the relationship between gang membership and offending. 
While there has been very little evidence for a pure selection hypothesis, some research 
has found support for the facilitation hypothesis, with the majority of research finding 
evidence for the enhancement hypothesis (for an overview see Pyrooz et al., 2016). This 
suggests two things. One, gang members may have a stronger susceptibility for criminal 
behaviors. Gang members may have been on a path for prolonged involvement in the 
criminal justice system naturally. Two, as a result of the group processes of the gang 
and the criminal opportunities that are a by-product of gang membership, gang members 
utilize their time in the gang to increase their social capital. In other words, gang 
members have a natural predisposition for offending, plus the added social capital from 
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gang membership may set them up for longer criminal careers, even after they leave the 
gang. 
A more recent area of gang research has focused on prison gangs and gang 
members (Mitchell et al., 2018; Pyrooz & Decker, 2019; Pyrooz et al., 2020). Recall, the 
primary focus of the dissertation is not on prison gang members. While I do capture time 
spent in prison, the majority of gang members were not active gang members while in 
prison. Therefore, looking at how prison experiences especially prisoner re-entry and the 
role gang membership plays on recidivism can provide more information as to why gang 
members may be more at risk for longer criminal careers. Pyrooz et al. (2020) examined 
the relationship between gang affiliation and recidivism using data from the LoneStar 
Project. In this study, the authors used a discrete-time survival analysis in order to 
capture changes in gang status and time to recidivism after release from prison. 
Examining across three gang affiliations - current gang members, former gang 
members, and non-gang members - the authors found current, former, and non-gang 
members followed different recidivism pathways (Pyrooz et al., 2020). Unsurprisingly, 
current members had the shortest survival times, followed by former members, then 
non-gang members. In addition, using survey data, the authors found gang members 
had a 1.63 greater risk of arrest post-release, and former members had a 1.48 greater 
risk of being arrested compared to non-gang members. Of note, there was no significant 
difference between current and former members. While no differences were found 
between former and non-gang members for risk of conviction or incarceration, the 
results from the study suggests that gang membership can prolong involvement in the 
criminal justice system. Self-identified former members were still at the same level of risk 
of being arrested as current members.  
Taken as whole, these studies demonstrate the consequences of gang 
membership are not confined to active periods of gang membership. The consequences 
go beyond the gang label. As stated by Krohn et al. (2011) “gang involvement in 
adolescence ultimately contributes to offending in adulthood via an indirect process that 
unfolds over the life course through its effects on the transition to adulthood and 
subsequent impact on life chances in economic and family areas” (p. 1015). The myriad 
of consequences that are associated with gang membership (criminogenic and non-
criminogenic) contribute to prolonging members criminal trajectories. Yet, what we still 
do not know is whether networks matter or play a role in facilitating longer criminal 
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careers. There has been advancement in research to move beyond simplistic 
characterizations of gang membership in order to capture the heterogeneity within gang 
careers. Using gang embeddedness, we have learned how the position gang members 
occupy influences the length of time spent in gangs. Yet, researchers have not used 
network methods to examine this. Using network methods to measure gang 
embeddedness, researchers can quantify the position gang members have within the 
gang network and whether their position within the network influence the length of their 
gang careers. In addition, using networks, the location of non-gang members within the 
network can be identified. Expanding gang embeddedness to incorporate a network 
approach the larger social structure in which individuals are immersed is captured. This 
extends the operationalization to include direct and indirect connections.   
3.2. Expanding gang embeddedness with network methods 
Until recently, research has relied on individual-level studies of gang membership 
using a gang member/non-gang member dichotomy. This dichotomy, however, assumes 
gang members are a homogenous group. Yet no two gang members are the same. 
Every gang member has a different level of involvement within the gang, identification to 
the gang, and their role within the gang. As pointed out by Thrasher (1927), “no two 
gangs are just alike”. Thus, members’ experiences, their length of membership, their 
commitment to the gang, and the lasting consequences of gang membership are 
different. To capture the heterogeneity across gangs and between gang members, 
research has examined how gang embeddedness is linked to the continuity and 
changes of gang membership (Pyrooz et al., 2013).  
Granovetter (1985) proposed the concept of social embeddedness which is the 
idea that behaviors are embedded within networks of social relations. He stressed that 
actions are embedded within overlapping networks, with each network providing different 
opportunities, resources, and restrictions that are influential on behavior. Granovetter 
(1985) noted that economic theories with under-socialized and over-socialized concepts 
of human behavior caused a “grievous misunderstanding” (p. 482). He emphasized that 
actions are socially embedded within networks of social interactions, with behaviors 
being constrained by the social relations that exist within the networks. He further noted 
that individuals do not behave as atoms outside of social contexts nor do they mindlessly 
adhere to particular behaviors within certain social contexts. Rather, both relational and 
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structural components of individuals’ social networks are influential on behavior 
(Granovetter, 1985, p. 487). Therefore, social embeddedness requires a social context 
within which individuals behave, but individuals have the power to decide how to embed 
themselves within their networks. The ways in which individuals embed themselves and 
in what networks will in turn influence their behaviors.  
While there has been movement toward understanding the social worlds of gang 
members through concepts such as gang embeddedness (Pyrooz et al., 2013), the use 
of network methods have not been used. Gang embeddedness as operationalized by 
Pyooz et al. (2013) is “the adhesion of the gang member to the gang” (p. 243). Gang 
embeddedness accounts for the heterogeneity within gangs as it captures the 
differences in members’ status within the gang, their level of commitment to the gang, 
and their identification as a gang member. Gang membership is fluid with members’ 
adherence to the gang consistently evolving. This is associated with continuity and 
change in membership status. Gang embeddedness moves gang research beyond 
simple dichotomous characterizations such as transient vs stable members, capturing 
greater variability within gang membership (Pyrooz et al., 2013). This includes the length 
and consequences of gang membership. The effects of gang membership are not going 
to be experienced equally among members; therefore, knowing how embedded 
members are can help distinguish why the negative effects of membership are worse for 
some members. Gangs reduce members’ exposure to prosocial institutions causing 
lower levels of educational attainment, inability to secure stable employment and 
relationships while increasing their exposure to violent crime and victimization. 
Consequently, the more embedded members are, the fewer opportunities to obtain 
prosocial capital. This is especially detrimental for adolescents transitioning into 
adulthood. Research has shown the more embedded members are, the longer time 
spent in a gang (Pyrooz et al., 2013). Thornberry et al. (2003) found being involved in a 
gang for less than one year increased the negative consequences; therefore, members 
who are more embedded are more at risk of suffering from multiple consequences 
throughout their life-course.  
The concept of gang embeddedness appears to be inspired from a network 
perspective, but existing research on it haven’t used network methods. While network 
data is not needed to answer questions on individual member’s embeddedness within 
the gang as measured by Pyrooz et al. (2013), it is required if we want to study the 
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larger social structure in which gang members are embedded. Research using surveys 
has the ability to ask youth how many friends they have, how many friends are gang 
members, how many friends are involved in delinquent activities etc., but youth do not 
know who they don’t know. In other words, youth may not know how many friends of 
their friends are involved in gangs, or how many friends their friends have. Furthermore, 
most youth are not connected to every gang member in their gang. As a result, they 
cannot know their level of embeddedness. Using network methods is more of a direct 
measure of embeddedness as the larger social structure surrounding youth is known. 
This is important because indirect connections are just as important as direct 
connections (Lin, 2001). Recall from Chapter 2, the resources embedded within the 
network are accessible to everyone in the network. Depending on the location of an 
individual’s position and the social ties they have, there is differential opportunity in 
accessing these resources (Lin, 2001).  
In the dissertation (Chapter 10) I use social distance as my measure of gang 
embeddedness. Using social distance captures how close, or how many handshakes 
away, individuals are to all gang members within the network. Doing this, I am able to 
quantify how close the gang members are to each other. Not all gang members are 
directly connected. Therefore, using social distance, I am able to examine if the gang 
members who are closer to all the other gang members in the network have longer 
criminal careers. In addition, using network methods, I am able to quantify where non-
gang members are located within the network. Individuals may not need to identify as 
gang members to receive the potential effects. Therefore, using networks to understand 
how entrenched non-members are within the network is important because of how 
influential peers are on criminal behaviors. We know social proximity is an important 
indicator for negative outcomes (Papachristos et al., 2012), and the more embedded 
individuals are within gangs, the greater the negative consequences (Pyrooz et al., 
2013). Thus, the more embedded (i.e. close in proximity) non-gang members are within 
the prison gang network the more social capital they will have access to. It is 
hypothesized that social distance will be related to length of residual criminal careers. 
The closer or more embedded individuals are within the gang network will result in more 
capital which will contribute to longer criminal careers.  
By expanding gang research to include a prison gang network and measure 
embeddedness through social distance, I am able to move away from the gang label and 
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comparisons of gang and non-gang members and focus on the group context of gangs. 
Using a network approach, I am able to capture the social context around the gang 
members above and beyond the people they know about. This is how I am able to 
extend the analysis to the non-gang members and examine how being embedded 
impacts their criminal careers. It is important to note that I am not directly measuring 
social capital. In other words, I do not capture social capital through the use of specific 
variables. I propose that being embedded exposes individuals to more opportunities and 
resources which could be why there is an increase in criminal career length. I am 
measuring proximity of connections and whether that influences criminal trajectories. I 
first have to establish that networks are important, then I can start to uncover the 
mechanisms underlying why.  
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Chapter 4. The Role of Prisons in Building 
Personal Networks 
4.1. Prison - A place to grow networks? 
There has been discussion surrounding offenders’ abilities to form relationships 
in prison. The total institution (Goffman, 1961) of prisons impedes inmates’ freedom to 
select their friends or people they connect with. Rather, who inmates connect with is 
largely based on the decisions made by correctional staff and who is in the prison at the 
same time. Additionally, the fluidity of the prison environment can further hinder inmates’ 
ability to form connections with each other. The criminogenic environment of prison can 
also make it hard to form relationships as many inmates have violent histories. 
Therefore, connecting with the wrong person can lead to victimization. The uncertainty of 
who to trust and the need to always “watch your back” can make the prison environment 
more anxiety provoking. This can cause inmates to isolate themselves. For young 
offenders, the prison environment may be especially difficult to navigate, making it 
harder for them to develop connections with other inmates. Hautaluoma and Scott 
(1973) found the length of time spent incarcerated was influential on young offenders. 
The longer youth were incarcerated, the more they became “prisonized”. Yet, it was 
found the closer young offenders were to being released, the more time they spent 
socializing with correctional staff than other inmates. Cairns and Cairns (1994) found 
adolescents in prison have limited resources for friendship formation. The authors noted 
that the population and structure of a prison blocks adolescents’ abilities to form 
friendships. However, Clarke-Mclean (1996) used social-cognitive mapping and found 
youth were able to build friendships and clusters of friend groups were identifiable within 
the custody center. While the clusters do not show group intimacy, they do show that 
youth in prison are able to form friendship networks. Additionally, Clarke-Mclean (1996) 
found there to be stability among the clusters even with the fluidity of youth coming in 
and out of the correctional facility.  
Using egocentric networks with adolescent offenders, Reid (2017) and Reid and 
Maxson (2016) found that juvenile offenders were able to form connections, growing 
their personal networks while in prison. Reid (2017) found incarcerated adolescents 
were capable of building friendship networks. While there were indications of homophily 
34 
in terms of race, it was found that the racial lines were fluid. Additionally, she noted gang 
members have gang and non-gang friends within their networks. This was also found for 
non-gang youth - they nominated gang involved youth as part of their friendship groups. 
The study found adolescents who had larger networks had higher rates of institutional 
misconduct (Reid, 2017). Of note, larger networks are an indication of higher social 
capital - youth who have more social capital are involved in higher rates of institutional 
misconduct. Reid and Maxson (2016) compared the friendship composition of gang and 
non-gang adolescents and found no differences in the structural composition of the 
networks. The authors did find higher rates of homophily within gang members’ networks 
- gang members had more friends of the same race, and had a higher proportion of gang 
members. Further, gang members had a greater number of friends who were younger 
than 18 years of age (Reid & Maxson, 2016).  
Schaefer et al. (2017) focused on the social structure of a “good behavior” unit 
with a particular focus on the relationships between inmates. Focusing on the 
relationships between inmates, the authors were able to examine whether inmates were 
able to form meaningful relationships. The results revealed the unit was comprised of 8 
communities and 12 subgroups. The subgroup analysis highlighted how some inmates 
were part of multiple communities. By using the two analyses together, the authors were 
able to find a subgroup of brokers who connected or bridged the communities’ together 
(Schaefer et al., 2017). On average, inmates nominated four “friends” or other inmates 
who they got along with. This finding is consistent with school-based friendship 
networks. The authors did note that the level of reciprocity was not as high as found in 
school networks indicating that the relationships between inmates may be a bit weaker. 
Overall, this study found the prison network to be structurally similar to school-based 
networks and the prison unit to be fairly cohesive with all inmates having connections to 
other inmates (Schaefer et al., 2017). The results from these studies show that while the 
prison environment is unconventional, inmates are able to meet new people and form 
relationships. However, what is unclear from these studies is whether the connections 
made in prison impact criminal trajectories; do the connections made in prison influence 
residual careers? By connecting with other inmates, it seems intuitive that inmates would 
gain social capital that could translate to longer criminal careers. In other words, through 
the connections with other criminals, inmates have access to more criminogenic 
resources such exposure to more co-offenders, criminal knowledge, and/or skills. As 
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such, there is reason to believe that prisons are a place where inmates can grow their 
criminal social capital.  
4.2. Prison – School of crime?  
Prisons are total institutions that dictate when and what inmates can eat, where 
they can go, when they can go outside, and what activities they can participate in. 
Importantly, prisons force inmates to interact within a closed environment. This limits an 
inmate’s choice on who to associate with, but it also pushes inmates together who may 
have not connected on the outside. It is the connections between inmates and the type 
of connections that have been argued to be the cause of prison peer effects (Bentham, 
1830). This laid the foundation for the argument that prisons are a school of crime rather 
than a place of reform or rehabilitation (Bayer et al., 2009; Bentham, 1830; Clemmer, 
1950; Nguyen et al., 2017). It has been argued that prison peer effects are a by-product 
of social learning mechanisms. In Sutherland’s (1947) differential association theory, he 
postulates that through interactions with others, individuals learn criminal behaviors, 
skills, and attitudes. Consequently, criminality is learned, developed, and passed on 
through continuous interactions. Clemmer (1950) applied Sutherland’s (1947) differential 
association theory to prisons. He noted through connections with other inmates, 
especially those who are more experienced, inmates become “prisonized”. As a result of 
prisonization, there is a greater adherence to antisocial behaviors because “the process 
of acculturation occurs” causing inmates to exchange skills, knowledge, traditions, and 
assets (Clemmer, 1950, p. 315). Through the connections made in prison, inmates grow 
their criminal network accumulating more criminal social capital. 
In this dissertation, what is most of interest to me is the potential link between 
social connections made in prison, and the residual criminal careers of gang members 
post-incarceration. There have been a few studies that have examined how connections 
made in prison can increase recidivism (Bayer et al., 2009; Damm & Gorinas, 2020; 
Harris et al., 2017; Roxell, 2011). Roxell (2011) examined the co-offending networks 
among prison inmates who were incarcerated together. This study analyzed whether 
relationships that are formed in prison result in new co-offending relationships once 
released. The study found 70 participants, or 2% of the study population co-offended 
together post release. Further, results showed the 70 individuals were a part of 36 co-
offending relationships committing a total of 48 offences (Roxell, 2011). However, six 
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individuals had co-offended prior to incarceration, meaning 64 individuals co-offended 
post prison release. Interestingly, the 64 individuals had larger criminal networks than 
the rest of the study population, showing an increase in criminal social capital. These 
results indicate that these 64 individuals leveraged their connections in prison, and used 
them to expand their networks increasing their pool of co-offenders ultimately giving 
them more criminal social capital. 
Bayer et al. (2009) examined the prison peer effect on recidivism in a sample of 
adolescent offenders from Florida. In total, the study had 8,216 adolescents who were 
17 years or younger at the time of release from custody. In addition to re-offending 
information, data included criminal histories, correctional facility assignment, personal 
characteristics, and home neighborhood (Bayer et al., 2009, p. 110). The results support 
a prison peer effect especially for adolescents who associated with peers inside prison 
with similar patterns of offending. Specifically, this effect was found for felony sex 
crimes, petty larceny, burglary, felony drug offences, misdemeanor drug offences, and 
aggravated assault. Adolescents who had a history of committing those offences and 
associated with peers within the prison, who had also committed those offences, were 
more likely to recidivate. Additionally, reinforcing peer effects were found for felony drug 
offences and auto theft for adolescents who were not in correctional facilities (Bayer et 
al., 2009). Similarly, Damm and Gorinas (2020) examined crime-specific recidivism and 
found for certain types of crimes prison did increase criminal social capital. While they 
found no support for “introductory peer effects” or connections with inmates who 
specialize in other types of crimes, they did find strong support for “reinforcing peer 
effects” (Damm & Gorinas, 2020). Inmates who interacted with more experienced 
offenders who committed the same types of crimes, increased the risk of recidivism. 
However, this was only found for certain offenses - drugs, threats, and vandalism and 
arson. Of note, for sex and violent offenses, the effect was opposite. Inmates who had 
exposure to other inmates, who also committed sex or violent offenses, had a decrease 
in recidivism.  
Harris et al. (2017) examined the impact of cellmates on recidivism. Data for this 
study included 10,116 males matched to their longest cellmate who were first-time 
released from prisons in Pennsylvania. Results do not support the school of crime 
hypothesis. The authors found the longest cellmate’s criminal experience was negatively 
associated with recidivism. Nonetheless, within the four-year post release outcome, 51% 
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of the sample had been re-arrested, and 46% had been re-incarcerated (Harris et al., 
2017). This study looked at the quantity of time spent with one cellmate hypothesizing 
that length of time has an influential effect on recidivism. However, the quality of the 
association or relationship may be a better measure of the school of crime hypothesis. 
The importance of a relationship is more likely to influence behavior.  
Nguyen et al. (2017) tested the school of crime hypothesis. Rather than looking 
at recidivism, the authors used criminal earnings as their dependent variable. Through 
associating with prisoners, inmates increase their criminal social capital which should 
result in them earning more from crime. Using a sample of 615 young offenders, the 
authors examined the prevalence of friends who had committed crimes that generate 
income within the correctional facility and the sentence length (Nguyen et al., 2017). 
Results found both sentence length and exposure to peers to be significant predictors of 
illegal earnings post-release. Inmates who had more associates who engaged in 
income-generating crimes had higher criminal earnings. Interestingly, when the authors 
examined sentence length, they found shorter sentences to be just as rewarding as 
longer sentences. The results suggest that through access to new opportunities and 
association with more experienced offenders, inmates can increase their criminal social 
capital leading to greater criminal rewards once released. The school of crime 
hypothesis demonstrates how influential prison can be on offending trajectories. 
Associating with, and learning from other inmates can increase an inmate’s criminal 
social capital. However, we still know very little on whether these connections impact 
criminal career length.  
Not only can associating with inmates increase criminal social capital because of 
the social relations between two criminals, there may be a mentor-mentee relationship. 
Younger or less experienced inmates could connect with older or more experienced 
inmates. This relationship dynamic can further increase inmates’ criminal social capital. 
Mentees gain capital by establishing relationships with their mentors. Recall social 
capital is gained through relationships when action is taken to gain resources through 
the relationships. Additionally, the mentor signals to others in the network that the 
mentee should be given opportunity and support. The mentor “vouches” for the mentee 
which increases their position within the network. Inmates with mentors will learn more 
quickly who holds the powerful positions and may learn how to develop relations with 
individuals within those positions.  
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Most research on mentorship has taken place in conventional settings which has 
found individuals with mentors have more career growth and success (Long, 1990; Long 
& McGinnis, 1985; Tenner, 2004). Mentorship provides security to mentees in a sense 
that mentees may feel more confident to expand their networks and explore “weaker 
ties”. Weaker ties are usually less trustworthy than strong ties so they are riskier, but the 
potential to gain more opportunities and resources is greater (Granovetter, 1973). 
Therefore, having the support of a mentor, mentees may be more willing to branch out 
and make these riskier moves. As noted by Morselli et al. (2006) “mentorship addresses 
the need for security that strong ties offer, while opening doors to more efficient 
extensions that emerge from weak ties” (p. 20).  
Examining the networks of long-term offenders, Morselli (2005) noted that the 
majority of these offenders were embedded in the established networks of one or two 
mentors. Research has also shown that offenders who are willing to collaborate with 
other offenders have more criminal earnings (McCarthy & Hagan, 2001; Tremblay & 
Morselli, 2000). Morselli et al. (2006) examined the relationship between mentorship and 
criminal careers. They found that one-third of their sample had a mentor who introduced 
them into criminal offending. Importantly, on average, participants reported they first 
committed crime with their mentor at 15 years of age. Of note, 37.1% met their mentor in 
a criminal context, including prison. For the participants who had a mentor, they reported 
earnings of almost nine times greater compared to participants without a mentor. The 
authors also noted that mentors had a lasting impact on their mentees criminal careers. 
The authors stated “…our findings suggest strong foundations in crime offer an 
advantageous position for continuous achievement and the presence of a criminal 
mentor is pivotal for achievement over one’s criminal career” (p. 36). Altogether, this 
study shows the majority of participants met their mentors during mid-adolescence and 
the relationships did have an impact on the length of their criminal careers. Furthermore, 
a third of the sample met their mentor in a criminal context. While this study is a cross-
sectional design, it had limitations in terms of measuring criminal careers, it does show 
that the connections made, especially early on, can have lasting impact on criminal 
trajectories.  
Examining the association between the structure of peer networks within prison 
and behavior is important as it adds another layer of insight into the relationship between 
peers and behavior. Prison is a unique opportunity for individuals to grow their personal 
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networks through the addition of new criminal connections. These connections may offer 
new skills, accepted norms of behavior, and resources that can further entrench 
individuals in the criminal justice system. In the current dissertation, I examine whether 
prison connections do have an independent effect on criminal trajectories. Specifically, I 
measure prison ties as a proportion. I calculated the total number of unique connections 
for every gang member. I then separated them into community and prison connections. 
By dividing the total number of prison ties by the total number of ties, I was able to get a 
proportion of prison ties. It is believed that the ties made in prison will have an 
independent effect on criminal career lengths. By expanding their networks, gang 
members have access to more capital through new contacts. As mentioned in Chapter 2 
is the importance of indirect connections. By taking instrumental action and growing their 
networks, gang members have access to more people who they can gain social capital 
from. As they mobilize within their networks and invest in social relations, the positions 
they occupy become more advantageous. By connecting with other offenders, especially 
older and more experienced offenders, gang members have a chance to use their time 
in prison to expand their networks, enhance their criminal skillset, and grow their criminal 
social capital. Consequently, their involvement with the criminal justice system may be 
lengthened.   
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Chapter 5. Aim of the Dissertation 
In this dissertation I am, in some way, proposing the need to get serious about 
the networks of gang members, and their potential consequences on criminal careers. I 
use network measures as the main independent variables to see whether and how they 
impact trajectories. The dissertation is comprised of three results chapters (Chapters 8, 
9, 10; Chapter 7 provides a description of each chapter). While the three results 
chapters examine networks from a different perspective, the underlying objective of each 
analysis is to examine whether gang membership is associated with an increase in 
social capital and if the increase in social capital influences criminal trajectories. 
It is well accepted that gang members have more risk factors across multiple 
developmental domains than non-gang members, and that gang membership acts as a 
snare in the life-course. Gang membership increases exposure to crime, especially 
violent crime, victimization, and criminal justice system involvement. It also decreases 
educational attainment, while increasing risk of teenage parenthood, substance use, and 
unstable employment. Furthermore, the more embedded members are the fewer 
connections to prosocial institutions and peers. As a result, criminal careers are 
extended. Yet, few studies have included the personal networks of gang members. The 
role peers play in deviant behavior is one of the most concrete findings in criminology. 
The social structure youth are embedded in is influential on their behavior. Therefore, 
ignoring how youth build their networks, we are missing pieces of information to answer 
key question regarding gang membership. 
Most gang research to date has examined the risk factors associated with gang 
membership and the consequences of gang membership. I extend the risk factors 
beyond the traditional ones used in developmental and life-course criminology and 
include network measures. Doing so, I am able to analyze how the personal networks of 
gang members impact not only their gang career, but their overall criminal career. 
Furthermore, one of the main goals of this dissertation is to expand gang research to 
non-gang members. Gang members associate with non-gang members, meaning that 
non-gang members are in the networks of gang members. With gang violence spilling 
through networks like a social contagion, other consequences of gang membership 
should as well. This dissertation examines how being a contemporary of a prison gang 
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influences their criminal trajectory. Furthermore, the networks of gang and non-gang 
members are compared to determine whether gang members’ networks are 
fundamentally different than non-gang members. Gangs are known to facilitate the 
increase in violence and criminality that accompanies membership, but what is the 
mechanism behind this facilitation? Research has talked about the group processes of 
gang membership that leads to the facilitation effect. In this dissertation, I take a step 
toward answering this question by examining whether gang members have different 
networks than non-gang members. If they do, then gang membership does facilitate a 
change in the ways in which gang members establish themselves in the larger social 
structure than non-gang members. Importantly, the data used for this dissertation is a 
prison based sample, meaning the non-gang members are just as criminally entrenched 
as the gang members. The effect of gang membership is more isolated than using a 
community based sample, as the risk/protective profiles between the two groups are 
matched. Extending gang research into prison, I am able to uncover if youth continue to 
develop their networks in prison and how that may have long-term consequences.  
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Chapter 6. Data  
The data for the current dissertation is a subsample from the Incarcerated 
Serious Violent Young Offender Study (ISVYOS). The ISVYOS is a longitudinal study 
which includes interviews with approximately 1700 male and female youth who were 
incarcerated in secure or open facilities within British Columbia, Canada. The ISVYOS is 
divided into Cohort I (1998-2001) and Cohort II (2005-2011), with the division based on 
whether youth were interviewed before or after the implementation of a new youth justice 
act. In 2001, Canada introduced the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) which replaced 
the Young Offenders Act (YOA)4. The YCJA represented almost a complete overhaul in 
juvenile justice within Canada, especially sentencing provisions. The YCJA moved 
sentencing provisions to mirror adult sentences for youth who commit serious and 
violent offences, but provided new avenues for diversion and alternatives to 
incarceration for youth who commit less serious and violent offences (Roberts, 2003). 
Therefore, the youth in the study are separated by the legislation in which they were 
sentenced ensuring consistency in the guidelines and provisions used when they were 
sentenced. In addition to the interviews, official records, accessed through British 
Columbia Corrections’ computerized database Corrections Network (CORNET), were 
used to obtain information on each offender’s movements in and out of custody. 
CORNET provides information pertaining to the criminal offence for each movement, 
date of conviction, and the type of sentence received. Additionally, each offender has a 
case management file containing participants’ pre-sentence report(s), criminal record, 
and information regarding their behavior while in the institution which is accessed 
through CORNET. CORNET makes it possible to study the participants from 
adolescence through to adulthood. For the current dissertation, data was collected from 
the date information was first available (i.e. participants date of first CJS contact) until 
March, 27th, 2019. March 27th was the last date of coding, giving me approximately 11 
years of data (age of first contact M = 15.14; SD = 1.61, age of last contact M = 26.20; 
SD = 2.65). Coding started in September, 2017, taking approximately 18 months to 
complete.  
                                              
4
 In Canada, offenders are considered to be young offenders between the ages of 12-17, and adults when 
they turn 18. Youth who commit specific offenses, labelled as serious and violent, can be sentenced as an 
adult. The decision to try a young offender as a youth or an adult is dependent on the prosecutor  
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With 26 being the average age of last contact, for nine years of the study period, 
youth were involved in the adult system.5 Important to understand are the two 
correctional streams for adults within Canada - the federal system and the provincial 
system (see Figure 1). Where offenders are placed is dependent on their sentence. If 
offenders receive a sentence that is two years plus one day or more, they receive a 
federal sentence. In contrast, offenders who receive a sentence that is two years less 
one day, they receive a provincial sentence. Provincial correctional centers also house 
offenders who are on remand. In other words, offenders who did not get released on bail 
and are awaiting trial or sentencing are placed in provincial correctional centers. The 
ISVYOS only has access to CORNET, which is British Columbia’s provincial correctional 
database. Put another way, offenders who receive a federal sentence, their files cannot 
be accessed for the time they are in the federal system. Even though the ISVYOS does 
not have the ability to track federal sentences, does not mean there are not federal 
offenders within the sample. There are many instances when offenders receive a three 
to four year sentence, then once they are released from federal custody they re-appear 
in CORNET because they have resumed their criminal activities. CORNET does list the 
length of federal sentence received and the date sent to federal custody, so we are able 
to track offenders who are in the federal system and when they are expected to be 
released. For offenders who have received a life-sentence or were still in custody at the 
time of coding, their last date of contact was last date of coding (March 27 th, 2019).  
 
Figure 1. Breakdown of the Two Correctional Streams in Canada 
                                              
5
 While the term youth is used throughout the dissertation, they are all adults now. I use the term youth 




Two years plus one day 
Provincial System: 
 Two years less one day 
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The British Columbia Ministry of Child and Family Development (MCFD) acts as 
the legal representative for all incarcerated youth and gave the ISVYOS consent to 
recruit youth incarcerated in centers throughout the province. Youth were recruited for 
interviews if they were English-speaking, capable of understanding interview questions 
(i.e., lower functioning youth were excluded), and were willing to provide accurate 
information. Regarding the latter criterion, two youth were permanently removed from 
the interview schedule because they continued to purposefully provide research 
assistants (RAs) with false information about themselves. Before beginning the 
interview, individuals approached for recruitment were informed that their involvement in 
the study would not affect their stay at the custody centre. Participants were also 
informed that information they provided would be kept confidential, except in 
circumstances where they made a direct threat to harm themselves or someone else. 
Approximately five percent of youth declined to participate in the study when approached 
by RAs. Youth assented to participate by signing a form indicating that they understood 
the details of the study as described in the information sheet. To help ensure 
confidentiality, participants were interviewed in an isolated room away from other youth 
and staff. 
Within the ISVYOS are data based on a subsample within Cohort II. Cohort II 
interviews were conducted in two youth correctional facilities in British Columbia. In total, 
there were 963 youth interviewed during this phase of the study. The dissertation uses a 
subsample from Cohort II (N = 260) that was collected at one of the correctional facilities 
between November, 2009-December, 2011. This sample was collected with a specific 
focus on adolescent gang members, and is comprised of two distinct groups. One group 
is defined by their involvement in gangs (current or former gang members), and the 
other defined by no involvement with gangs. In order to determine gang membership, 
youth who indicated gang involvement during their intake interview were approached to 
undergo a second interview, referred to as the “gang interview”. This was done in order 
to confirm gang membership. Questions asked in the gang interview were specific to 
gang activity. Examples of questions include “was the fight part of a gang fight?”, “what 
colours do you wear?”, “what gang are you in?”, “how old were you when you joined the 
gang?”, “were you initiated into the gang?” Youth who answered yes to the questions 
were labeled as gang members. These have been consistent indicators of gang 
membership and what constitutes a gang (Curry & Decker, 1998), and previous research 
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has validated self-reported measures of gang membership (Curry, 2000; Curry & 
Decker, 1998; Decker et al., 2014a). There were 69 (65 male, 4 female) gang members 
confirmed. Due to the small number of female gang members, they were excluded from 
the current dissertation bringing the number of gang members to 65. Upon further 
examination, two males did not have a correctional service number,6 and five males had 
sealed records, bringing the total number of former and current gang members to 58.  
While, the foundation of the dissertation is the networks of the gang members, 
they are not the sole focus. Non-gang members (n = 69) are used in addition to the gang 
members in two of the results chapters (Chapters 9 and 10). I will provide explanations 
on each subsample later in this chapter, but it is important to know that the sample is not 
only comprised of the 58 gang members. The figure below outlines a brief overview of 
the samples in each of the results chapter. More details to follow.  
 
Figure 2. Breakdown of the Dissertation Subsamples 
6.1. Procedure: How the networks were created 
The personal networks of the gang members were mapped using three sources 
of information - community logs, prison logs, and alerts. All three sources of information 
were accessed through CORNET. Community logs are completed by probation officers 
and are updated to reflect an arrest, the issuance of a warrant, missed appointment, 
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 Everyone inmate in a provincial institution British Columbia is given a correctional service number. This 
number is used to access their documents on CORNET. Without a number, their records cannot be 
searched  
58 Original GM  41 GM 
Chapter 8:  
41 GM 
Chapter 9: 
41 GM, 28 Non-GM 
Chapter 10:  
8 GM, 41 Non-GM 
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what occurred in an appointment, and/or any police contact. All information regarding the 
youth while in the community that concerns their probation or sentence conditions, law 
enforcement, traveling, and/or moving get entered into the community logs. These logs 
also contain information on the youth’s common associates, co-offenders, victims, and 
any ongoing conflicts with peers or family members. Community logs also provide insight 
into the youth’s home life as information on their parents, siblings, mental health, 
substance dependencies, and living situation are included.  
Prison logs are entered daily by the correctional staff. Prison logs are a synopsis 
of what the inmate did that day (see Appendix A for a two-day example of a prison log). 
For example, information about who the youth ate with, who they hung out with during 
yard time, what they did during yard time, their general behavior on the unit, how tidy 
their cell is, cellmates, time spent in segregation, and any interactions with staff are all 
provided within these logs. Prison logs provide an insight into inmate behavior and their 
associates, as well as inmate’s position within the unit (i.e. does he eat at the back table, 
is he being manipulated by the “heavies” on the unit)7. Prison logs also contain 
information regarding gang membership or gang association. Every time an individual 
enters the correctional facility, their intake assessment provides information on the 
inmate’s current gang membership status, or affiliations. Also noted in the logs are no 
contact orders or contact concerns with other inmates within the facility due to gang 
conflicts or alliances. All information is time stamped giving me the ability to estimate 
length of gang membership.  
The alerts section do not contain the same level of detail as the prison and 
community logs, but provide additional information on no contact (NC) or contact 
concerns (CC) that the youth have. In addition, alerts provide the reason for the NC or 
CC order. Commonly, NC or CC orders are conditions placed on co-offenders, or when 
there is a victim, a NC or CC order is imposed on the perpetrator. On some occasions, 
there may be NC or CC order if there is an ongoing conflict between two individuals. 
This is more common to occur in custody than in the community. If there is a conflict 
between two inmates, it will be noted and a CC order will be put in place to limit the 
interaction between the two offenders to reduce the chances of an altercation. 
                                              
7
 Heavies are inmates that control the unit. These inmates have the power and prestige inside 
47 
Any interaction that occurred between the gang members and at least one other 
individual was coded as a relation (see Appendix B for an example of an edgelist).  For 
Chapters 8 and 9, the personal networks are comprised of community and prison ties; 
whereas for Chapter 10, the gang network includes prison ties only. Of note, the majority 
of ties did occur in prison highlighting the level of interconnectivity within prison, but also 
the amount of time that each gang member spent in prison during the study period.  
6.2. Sample 
For the current dissertation, there are three results chapters (Chapters 8, 9, and 
10) with each having a unique sample. All three samples were built off of the 58 gang 
members. Each subsample is explained in further detail below. 
6.2.1. Gang Members 
The first analysis for the dissertation (Chapter 8) focuses solely on gang 
members and outcomes only associated with gang membership. Recall, the initial 
identification of gang members came from the gang interview that was conducted after 
youth indicated some gang involvement in their intake interview. Important to note, youth 
were not interviewed after the gang interview was conducted. Therefore, the majority of 
the information on gang membership was self-reported by youth either to their probation 
officer and/or to correctional staff. Meaning information regarding gang membership 
status was largely derived from community and/or prison logs. At some point during the 
study period, all of the youth were active gang members in the community. However, 
membership did not end when they entered prison. For many gang members, they 
continued to identify as a member of their gang within the community while in custody. 
Then once released, they went back to being active members of their gang.  
Specifically for this chapter I am interested in two outcomes: the time it takes 
youth to become gang members, and then once they are gang members, how long are 
they members. Researchers have established common risk factors associated with gang 
membership, but the role networks play has been neglected. It is known that peers play 
a critical role in the development of behaviors and attitudes. Thus, knowing how gang 
members set up their personal networks and who they connect with can further our 
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understanding on why some youth become gang members faster and why some remain 
involved in gangs longer.  
The research questions for Chapter 8 require two time periods: 1) time to gang 
membership, and 2) length of gang membership. Time to gang membership was 
calculated using the date of first CJS involvement and the date of first gang involvement. 
Length of gang membership was calculated using the date of first gang involvement and 
the date of last gang involvement or date of coding for those who were current members 
at the time of coding. For the majority of youth, their last date of gang involvement was 
taken from their prison logs. That being said, prison entry did not equate to end of gang 
membership. On intake, correctional officers inquire about gang membership status. As 
such, within their prison logs, youth have time stamped gang status information. This 
makes calculating length of gang membership possible. The first time youth noted no 
gang involvement on intake was used as their last date of gang membership. There 
were instances of intermittent periods of membership status. In other words, at one 
intake, youth would report no gang involvement, but at their next intake they would 
report gang involvement. Therefore, youth needed to have consistent reporting of no 
gang involvement in both community and prison logs.8 When this was achieved, the date 
of no gang involvement that was first reported was used as the youths last date of gang 
involvement.  
When the two time periods were calculated, it was noted that 17 gang members 
did not have information on their date of last gang involvement. Further, there was very 
little gang information contained in their records making an “estimated end date” not 
feasible. The only date regarding gang membership for these 17 youth was the date of 
their gang interview. Other than this date, there was no information about gang 
membership status. As a result of not having reliable information as to when these 17 
youth ended their gang involvement, I had to drop them from the analysis. This gave me 
a final sample of 41 gang members.  
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 There were a few instances when youth would report to their probation officer that they were gang 
involved, but on prison intake they would report no gang involvement or vice versa. So I used both logs in 
conjunction with each other to be as confident as possible on gang status given the limitations of the data 
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Within their CORNET records, each of the 41 gang members had specific 
information in regards to gang membership9, as well as the youth themselves had to 
confirm membership. Of note, having gang ties or associates who were gang members 
was not enough to be coded as a gang member. The youth had to self-report gang 
involvement before I considered them as members. Therefore, the majority of self-report 
information came through official records. For example, youth who flashed gang colours, 
had gang tattoos, and/or reported to correctional staff and/or probation officers they were 
a gang member was considered self-reported gang membership. In the instances where 
the youth admitted to being a gang member, to be coded as an active member, they had 
to name the gang they were a member of. In some cases, youth would note the gang(s) 
and/or individual(s) they were in conflict with, giving an indication of which gang they 
belonged to. There were also instances where youth would discuss, mostly to their 
probation officers, about being kidnapped or jumped because of gang conflicts. 
Additionally, a few youth mentioned to their probation officer about having drug debts 
and owing money to their gang. It was also common after youth left gang life, but 
remained in the criminal justice system, to request a contact concern or a no-contact 
order against the gang. This was done if the youth was afraid for their safety due to 
potential backlash from leaving the gang. Through these various sources of information, 
I am as confident as I can be that the 41 youth were gang members, and the length of 
time they were active members. Of the 41 gang members, 35 are former members and 6 
are current members.  
6.2.2. Gang Members and Non-Gang Members 
The goal of Chapter 9 is to begin to uncover the network dynamics of gang 
members and the role they may have in facilitating further entrenchment within the 
criminal justice system. Previous research has found the larger social context in which 
gang members embed themselves to be more important than the label of gang member 
for the risk of victimization (Green et al., 2017; Papachristos et al., 2012; 2015b) and 
offending versatility (Bouchard & Spindler, 2010). This raises the question, are the 
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 Sometimes the correctional staff would note if the youth was welcomed onto the unit, and who they were 
welcomed by. If they were gang members who welcomed the youth, they would note something along the 
lines as “members of the RS welcomed the inmate”. Or in a probation report, the officer would note if the 
youth was seen by police hanging around with certain associates who were known members. This provided 
supplemental information to youths gang involvement, but was not used as a sole indicator of gang 
membership. 
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personal networks of gang members structurally different than non-gang members? If 
so, it may not be the label of gang member that increases the involvement within the 
criminal justice system. Instead, it may be the social context that surrounds gang 
members that facilitates this entrenchment.  
I follow the criminal trajectories of gang members and a matched control sample 
of non-gang members to examine the role gang membership plays on the entrenchment 
within the criminal justice system. The gang members are the same 41 gang members 
as described above. The non-gang members are a matched sample. The non-gang 
members were selected from a larger SNA study using data from Cohort II of the 
ISVYOS that was completed for Public Safety Canada in 2019.10 In total, there were 44 
non-gang members that were identified from the project. To be labeled a non-gang 
member, these youth gave no indication during their intake interview they were gang 
involved and there was no information in CORNET about gang membership at the time 
of coding for the project. Recall, the intake interviews for Cohort II took place between 
2005-2011 so information contained in their records up to the date coding started was 
used to check whether they had any gang involvement. Of the 44 non-gang members, 
eight were females and excluded from this dissertation. An additional eight males were 
excluded because they did not have any follow-up information. Of the eight males, three 
died during adolescence and five had sealed records so the information on these eight 
was very limited. To ensure the samples were matched, it was decided it was best they 
be eliminated. This brought the sample to 28 non-gang members. The 28 non-gang 
members were then compared to the 41 gang members on the number and type of risk 
factors (i.e. family, individual, school), length of involvement in the criminal justice 
system, types of convictions received (i.e. violent, drug, property), and the number of 
convictions received. This was done to ensure, as best as I could, the only difference 
between the two groups was gang membership. Upon review, all 28 non-gang members 
matched the 41 gang members, giving me a final sample of 69 (28 non-gang members 
and 41 gang members). 
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 For more information about this project, please see Altering Pathways to Gang Involvement and Violence: 
Building a Foundation for Evidence-Based Policy  
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6.2.3. The CS Gang and Associates 
During the coding of the gang members, information about a youth prison gang 
that had formed in one correctional center kept coming up. Looking into this, it was noted 
that there were eight youth who were incarcerated together at the same time in the same 
youth correctional facility who formed a prison gang, known as the CS gang. Of these 
eight, four were part of the original gang members identified from the gang dataset.11 Of 
note, the CS gang was the only active prison gang in the correctional center at this time. 
The sample for Chapter 10 was generated from the ego networks of the eight youth who 
formed the CS gang while incarcerated together. From examining the network, I was 
able to identify who the eight CS members were connecting with and when the 
connections took place.  
The objective behind Chapter 10 is to challenge the assumption that gang 
membership is associated with an increase in social capital by shifting the focus from the 
personal networks of gang members to a prison gang network. By doing this, I am able 
to move away from the gang label and use social distance as a measure of social 
capital. Using social distance, everyone in the network (gang and non-gang members) 
are included in the analysis. This gives me the opportunity to examine 1) whether being 
embedded within the network of an active prison gang has an impact on the criminal 
careers of the CS members and non-gang associates, and 2) whether prison 
experiences (i.e. connections made in prison) are influential on criminal career length. 
To determine who was connected to the CS gang during the time it was active, I 
distinguished between ties that were formed during or after the CS gang’s somewhat 
short-lived operation. The CS gang was active for approximately ten months (October 
2008-August 2009). All connections within that timeframe are counted towards the 
during-CS network (i.e., direct exposure), whereas ties formed after this timeframe are 
counted towards the post-CS network. Figure 3 visualizes the breakdown of these 
subsamples and networks.  
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 Four did not identify as gang involved during their intake interview as their first noted gang involvement 
was with the CS gang 
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Figure 3. Breakdown of Sample and Networks 
After the networks were split into the two time periods, only alters who were part 
of the larger ISVYOS were kept. By doing this, I was able to measure the criminal 
histories of the alters in the network12. The during-CS network has 20 nodes (8 CS 
members + 12 alters) and 86 ties. The post-CS network includes all prison ties that 
occurred five years from when the CS gang disbanded.13 Custody records on CORNET 
indicated that a conflict resulted between two CS members; one CS member was friends 
with an individual that had a “street beef” with the other CS member. This created a rift 
throughout the CS gang. Also, the suspected leader of the gang was moved to another 
correctional facility to limit his ability to recruit new members. He was also known for 
causing conflicts between youth. The last documentation of the CS gang was August 
2009; therefore, the post-CS network includes all connections between 2009-09-01 to 
2014-09-01. The post-CS network has 37 nodes (8 CS members + 29 alters), and 116 
ties.14 In total, the final sample size for the study is 49: 8 CS members, 12 alters in the 
during-CS network, and 29 alters in the post-CS network (see Figure 3). Figure 4 shows 
the full network (n = 49) with node color differentiating the three groups - grey nodes are 
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 Ethical stipulations required that the study investigators were only able to access CORNET data for 
individuals that were already participants from the ISVYOS  
13
 Five years was selected because the main objective is to determine whether exposure to prison gang 
members impacts the length of residual criminal careers, so I wanted to make sure the timeframe was not 
too far removed from the time the CS gang was active 
14
 There were six alters in the during- and post- CS networks which we placed in the during-CS network as 
that is when the first connection occurred 
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Alters in Post-CS 
Network  
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n = 8 
Sample of Alters Only  
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CS members, white nodes are alters in the during-CS network, black nodes are alters in 
the post-CS network -, and size by social distance - larger the node, the shorter the 
social distance. As seen in Figure 4, the alters in the during-CS network are more 
interconnected with CS members, while there are a larger number of alters in the post-
CS network located on the periphery of the network in dyadic relations with CS 
members.  
 
Figure 4. CS Prison Network (n = 49) 
Note 1: Grey Nodes = CS Members 
Note 2: White Notes = During CS Alters 
Note 3: Black Nodes = Post CS Alters 
Note 4: GM6 = Suspected CS Leader 
Note 5. Node size by social distance; larger nodes, shorter social distance 
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Chapter 7. Method and Measures 
The three results chapters have different research objectives that shaped the 
direction of each chapter. The literature review gave an overview on the current state of 
research, while highlighting the gaps this dissertation aims to fill. The results chapter 
aims to address the gaps in different ways. As a result, each chapter has different 
research questions, variables, and methods. These are described below. 
7.1. Build it and they will come? Social networks and the 
dynamics of gang membership 
7.1.1. Overview of research objectives 
Researchers have established common risk factors associated with gang 
membership, but the role networks play has been neglected. It is known that peers play 
a critical role in the development of behaviors and attitudes. Thus, knowing how gang 
members set up their personal networks and who they connect with can further our 
understanding on why some youth become gang members faster and why some remain 
involved in gangs longer. I move beyond the traditional risk factors and examine if 
network structure and social capital are influential to gang membership. 
A theoretical underpinning for this analysis is social contagion. Contagion 
requires a change in status. The objective of this analysis is to examine if networks play 
a role in gang membership status. Therefore, I am interested in whether networks 
influence an individual’s status from non-gang member to gang member, then gang 
member to non-gang member. Of note, I do not test social contagion directly. It is the 
change in gang membership status that is the contagion captured in this chapter. As I 
am not examining the people around the gang members, I cannot directly measure a 
“contagion effect”. I am examining how changes in networks may facilitate the changes 
in status through a social capital lens.  
Understanding how gang members build their networks pre-gang membership 
may influence how quickly they become gang members. For example, if a youth has a 
larger network, the more capital they bring into gang because all of their connections 
come with them. This capital is even greater if most of their connections are co-offenders 
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or individuals also involved in the criminal justice system. These connections can 
expand the gang’s boundaries creating more criminal opportunities. Once youth become 
gang members, how they establish themselves can impact the length of time they spend 
in the gang. By establish themselves I mean how they take advantage or use the label of 
“gang member” to grow their own network and broker relations. This not only increases 
their social capital, it also increases the gang’s capital. Recall, social capital can be 
examined at the group or individual level, but the two are not independent from each 
other. The amount of capital gained through membership, may influence the length of 
time spent in a gang. For the youth that leave the gang, what happens to their networks? 
If there is an increase in social capital that is associated with gang membership, do 
individuals lose these benefits once they leave the gang? Using networks to examine 
these changes combines capitalization and social contagion. Overall, I am looking at 
how networks pre-, during-, and post-gang membership facilitate these changes in 
status. Gang membership is not a homogenous experience, as such, some individuals 
may gain access to more capital once they become a gang member, while others do not. 
Does this influence the length of time spent as a gang member? It is part of the network 
process of becoming one with your environment, and I am curious if networks play a role 
in these decisions. 
7.1.2. Measures 
Dependent Variables 
Time to gang membership captures the time it takes a youth to become a gang 
member from the time they are first involved within the criminal justice system. To 
calculate time to gang membership, the date of first gang involvement was subtracted 
from the date of first CJS contact. There were four youth who were gang members prior 
to becoming involved in the CJS, but for the remaining 37 youth, it took on average 
906.00 (SD = 750.78) days (approximately 2.5 years) to become gang members (see 
Table 3).  
Length of gang membership is the amount of time youth were active gang 
members. To capture length of gang membership, I subtracted the date of last known 
gang involvement with the date of first gang involvement. There were six youth who 
were current members at the time of coding, so the last date of coding was used as their 
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“end” date. The average length of gang membership was 2000.70 (SD = 990.62) days or 
about 5.5 years. 
 
Figure 5. Histogram of Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables 
The overarching goal of this study is to understand how networks may impact the 
length of gang careers. Therefore, I use two network variables as the independent 
variables. Recall the networks used for this chapter are the personal networks of 41 
gang members, so the network variables are egocentric (i.e. relate to each individual, 
not the network as a whole). The two measures capture the structure of each gang 
member’s network as well as the amount of social capital the gang members have. Each 
network was separated into pre-, during-, and post-gang membership so I can capture 
changes in networks that occurred alongside changes in gang membership status.  
The first independent variable, network size, is the total number of unique alters 
in an individual’s network. Network size was captured by calculating the number of new 
alters that appeared in each egos network for every year they were involved in the 
criminal justice system. Network size can be an indication of social capital thus knowing 
the size of a person’s network before they become a gang member can possibly provide 
information as to why some members become gang involved faster. Theoretically, 
individuals with larger networks have more to offer the gang in terms of resources and 
criminal opportunities which may be a reason for becoming members more quickly. 











criminal opportunities and co-offenders which can increase the size of their networks. If 
this is the case we will see a growth in network size from pre-gang membership 
suggesting that members are expanding their criminal networks by taking advantage of 
the opportunities that are associated with gang membership. This should mean longer 
time spent in the gang. Examining how youth build their networks can be informative as 
to why some youth become involved in gangs faster, and why some remain in the gang 
longer. For example, an ego in this sample, Ice Pick, had a network size of 24 before 
gang membership. Of those 24 contacts, 20 of them were co-offenders, while 4 were 
conflict ties. Once he became a gang member, he only added 4 new contacts into this 
network. Two of the contacts were co-offenders and two were a result of a beef. For Ice 
Pick, being in a gang did not increase his social capital, which may be why he was only 
a gang member for a short time (less than one year). In comparison, Bruiser had a 
network size of 17 before gang membership (see Figure 6). Once he became a gang 
member, his network grew 3.5 times to a size of 62. Furthermore, before gang 
membership, Bruiser’s network was largely built around negative ties. Yet, when he 
became a gang member, his network was mostly comprised of co-offending and social 
ties. Bruiser was a gang member for almost five years. Gang membership clearly 




Pre-Gang Membership During-Gang Membership 
 
Post-Gang Membership 
Figure 6. The Changes in Network Size and Structure Pre-, During-, and Post-
Gang Membership 
Note 1  Bruiser is the ego in all three networks
15
  
Note 2. Large grey node is Bruiser, black nodes are the alters 
Note 3. Five alters appear in two networks, but there is no alter that appears in all three networks. 
Of the five, 4 alters are in the during- and post-gang membership networks (larger black nodes), 
while 1 is in the pre- and during –gang membership networks (larger grey node) 
The second network variable used was ego betweenness. Simply, betweenness 
captures the ego’s ability to broker relationships between two people who are not directly 
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 Bruiser first entered the CJS at age 13. He became a gang member at age 17, and was a gang member 
until he was 22. He remained in the CJS for three years after he left gang life as his last age of contact was 
25 
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connected. Having a high ego betweenness score can indicate higher social capital 
because two people are dependent on the ego to be connected to one another. There 
have been multiple network studies that have shown individuals who are able to broker 
relationships and position themselves strategically to be more successful within the 
larger organization (Morselli 2001; 2003; 2010). It is hypothesized that gang members 
who are able to establish themselves as brokers and position themselves strategically 
will take less time to become a gang member and stay in the gang for longer.  
Control Variables 
The control variables selected for this analysis are known risk factors for gang 
membership. The number of convictions youth received while they were involved in the 
criminal justice system. Similar to network size, the number of convictions per year youth 
were involved in the CJS was calculated. Using a prison based sample, I am able to 
capture changes in the number of convictions within a criminally entrenched sample. 
This allows me the opportunity to see if the changes in the level of criminality found 
using community based samples are mirrored with a prison based sample. I calculated 
the number of convictions pre-, during, and post-gang membership as I did for the 
network measures so I am able to see how the number of convictions changed as gang 
membership status changed. The proportion of prison ties controls for the connections 
gang members made while in prison. I wanted to determine if connections made in 
prison are quantitatively different than ties made in the community. The school of crime 
hypothesis asserts prisons are a school not a place of reform (Bentham 1830; Clemmer, 
1950). Therefore, examining whether connections in prison have an independent effect 
on gang membership from overall network size is important for policy and intervention 
and prevention programs. Similar to the number of convictions and the two network 
variables, I split the variable into pre-, during-, and post-gang membership in order to 
determine if there are differences in the number and type of ties made in prison with 
gang membership status.  
The remaining control variables are either static risk factors or were asked to 
youth during their intake interview; as a result, they cannot be broken into pre-, during, 
and post- gang. Age of first contact into the criminal justice system is the age at which 
youth first entered the CJS. In Canada, the age of responsibility begins at age 12. For 
the current sample, the average age of first CJS contact was 14.08 (SD = 1.30). 
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Race/ethnicity is categorized into Whites, Indigenous, and Other16. As seen in Table 3, 
31.7% of the sample is Indigenous demonstrating the overrepresentation of Indigenous 
individuals within the CJS. In British Columbia, 6.2% of the general population is 
Indigenous (Statistics Canada, 2013). Foster care is a dichotomous variable capturing 
youth who had been placed into foster care at some point in their life. Almost half of the 
current sample (48.8%) was placed into foster care (see Table 3). Early involvement in 
physical fighting measures youth who were involved in fighting before the age of 12. As 
seen in Table 6, 70.7% of youth were involved in fighting during childhood. Lastly, family 
criminal record captures youth who have family members involved in the criminal justice 
system. Nearly three quarters (73.2%) of the youth involved in the study have family 
members who have had criminal justice system involvement.  
7.1.3. Analytic strategy 
The first section of the analysis examines the changes across gang membership 
status. Descriptive statistics are used to capture the changes in the network measures 
and the number of convictions and prison ties that occurs with changes in gang 
membership status. The second section examines time to gang membership, and the 
third section examines length of gang membership. Both dependent variables are 
analyzed at the univariate and multivariate level. Due to the dependent variables being 
time variables, I use Cox proportional hazard model. Cox proportional hazard model is 
semi-parametric as it does not require a baseline hazard rate to be specified (Allison, 
2014). The model estimates the hazard or probably of an event occurring within a 
specified time period. I use a continuous-time Cox regression with both dependent 
variables calculated in days as smaller time units gives more power to the model 
(Allison, 2014). There were four youth who were gang members before the start of the 
time period. This is known as left-censored observations, and they were excluded from 
this analysis. 
                                              
16
 Other race/ethnicity includes Black, Asian, and Middle Eastern youth 
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7.2. A gang network advantage? The role of personal 
networks in the criminal careers of gang and non-gang 
members 
7.2.1. Overview of research objectives 
The goal of this analysis is to understand the network dynamics of gang 
members. I follow the criminal trajectories of gang members and a matched control 
sample of non-gang members to examine the role gang membership plays on the 
entrenchment within the criminal justice system. Previous research has found gang 
members have higher levels of involvement within the criminal justice system. Gang 
members have higher rates of arrests and incarceration than non-gang members 
(Gilman et al., 2014; Levitt & Venkatesh, 2001), as well as higher rates of victimization 
(Melde & Esbensen 2013; 2014; Krohn et al., 2011; Pyrooz et al., 2014a; Taylor et al., 
2008). While these studies have provided insight into the group processes of gang 
membership that facilitate the involvement within the criminal justice system, few studies 
have examined if the personal networks of gang members matter. Papachristos and 
colleagues found the social distance to gang members was more important than gang 
status for risk of victimization. Also, Bouchard and Spindler (2010) noted it was the 
organization of the gang that increases crime variety not gang membership. These 
studies suggest that it is not gang membership that necessarily matters. Rather, it is the 
ways in which gang members embed themselves within the larger social context. The 
results of these studies indicate that the networks of gang members may be structurally 
different. If so, it may not be the label of gang member that increases the involvement 
within the criminal justice system. Instead, it may be the social context that surrounds 
gang members that facilitate this entrenchment. Research has yet to examine this in 
relation to criminal career length.  
In this chapter, I examine if it is the social context and/or the label of gang 
member that influences the length of criminal careers. There is reason to believe that it 
is a combination of gang membership and social context. It is known that gang members 
have an elevated status within the criminal world (Augustyn et al., 2019). This may 
provide them with more opportunities to expand their criminal networks. Not only are 
gang members exposed to more criminal opportunities through their gang, but the status 
of gang member may result in non-gang criminals wanting to associate and/or co-offend 
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with them. This provides gang members with access to social capital that non-gang 
criminals do not possess. As a result, the social context that surrounds gang members 
should benefit them, ultimately increasing their criminal careers. Importantly, the non-
gang members in this study are as criminally entrenched as the gang members. Majority 
of studies to date have used community based samples which may inflate the effects of 
gang membership. Using a prison based sample provides me the ability to isolate the 
effects of gang membership more so than using a community based sample. 
7.2.2. Measures 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable for this study is criminal career length. Criminal career 
length was calculated by subtracting the last date in the CJS from the first date of CJS 
contact. The average criminal career length is 11.06 years (SD = 2.94) (see Table 1). 
Breaking it down by gang membership status, gang members average criminal career 
length is 10.77 years (SD = 2.41); whereas, the control group average length is 11.50 
years (SD = 3.60).  
Independent Variables 
In addition to network size and ego betweenness used in Chapter 8, density and 
constraint are added as independent variables. Density measures the amount of 
connectedness among the alters. In other words, the more the alters are connected to 
one another, the more dense or cohesive the network. Density can be an indication of a 
network that has strong social support or social bonds as the higher the level of 
interconnectivity among the alters, the more the network resembles a tight-knit group. 
While being in a dense network can have benefits (see McGloin & Piquero, 2010), there 
have been arguments made that being in a cohesive network can be a disadvantage. 
Granovetter’s (1973) strength of weak ties argument along with Burt’s (1992) structural 
holes theory have demonstrated that being part of many loosely connected networks can 
be more advantageous as individuals are exposed to a greater number of unique 
opportunities increasing their social capital. Yet, how density relates to gang 
membership is not as well-known. Gang members who have denser networks may have 
higher levels of trust with their alters which could translate into taking higher risks. For 
example, gang members who only co-offend with individuals they trust may traffic larger 
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quantities of drugs, or commit more violent offenses such as extortion or murder. 
However, gang members who limit themselves from new opportunities may not be as 
successful. While there is logic to co-offend with only those who one trusts, the benefits 
to expand one’s criminal network are also apparent. As a gang member, increasing the 
number of co-offenders increases the opportunities received. As a result, social capital 
increases which in turn increases members overall value to the gang. There is evidence 
to support both sides of the argument. Network studies have found the cohesion of a 
gang to be important for the survival of the gang, but the way in which cohesion helps a 
gang survival is dependent on how well the gang is established and its size (Ouellet et 
al., 2019). Overall, the density of a gang member’s personal network can impact the 
exposure to co-offenders and the number of criminal opportunities.  
Constraint is a measure of Burt’s (1992) structural holes. Constraint is an inverse 
measure with higher values indicating fewer structural holes in the network (Perry et al., 
2018). Constraint captures the degree to which the alters in the network are not 
independent from one another. This is why higher constraint values indicate fewer holes 
as it means there are more alters connected to one another. Gang members who have 
high constraint scores may not be exposed to new opportunities or co-offenders as they 
are receiving greater amounts of redundant information. Previous research has found 
criminals who are more successful in monetary earnings are loosely associated to 
organizations and operated as autonomous parties rather than being connected to fixed 
organizations (Morselli & Tremblay, 2004). Gang members with lower constraint scores 
is indicative of individuals having looser connections with more people which may help 
expand their criminal network. In addition to the two new network variables, gang 
membership is used an independent variable. Gang membership is a binary (yes/no) 
variable and includes current and former members.  
Control Variables 
The control variables for this analysis include the same variables used in Chapter 
8: proportion of prison ties, age of first criminal justice system contact, race/ethnicity, 
foster care, early involvement in fighting, and family members involved in the criminal 
justice system. The average proportion of prison ties is 0.57 (SD = 0.32). The average 
age of first CJS contact for this sample is 15.14 (SD = 1.61). Of the 69 youth, 38 (55.1%) 
were placed in foster care, 51 (73.9%) were involved in physical fights before the age of 
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12, 50 (72.5%) had family members involved in the CJS, and 41 (59.4%) are White. Due 
to the sample size being larger, I added in two additional control variables. Hard drug 
use (heroin, cocaine, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine) is a scale variable from 0-4 
on how many of the noted drugs youth had used. On average, youth tired 2/4 drugs (SD 
= 1.40). Lastly, the number of convictions as a youth offender is the number of 
convictions each offender received between the ages of 12-17. The average number of 
convictions was 4.5 (SD = 3.44).  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (n = 69) 
 M (SD)/ n (%) 
Dependent Variable  
Criminal Career Length 11.06 (2.94) 
Independent Variables  
Network Size 57.12 (44.81) 
Constraint 0.06 (0.08) 
Density 0.04 (0.11) 
Betweenness 5338.41 (11067.80) 
Gang Member 41 (59.4%) 
Control Variables   
Ethnicity  
White 41 (59.4%) 
Indigenous 19 (27.5%) 
Other 9 (13.0%) 
Age First CJS Contact 15.14 (1.61) 
Nb of Youth Convictions 4.51 (3.44) 
Proportion of Prison Ties 0.57 (0.32) 
Foster Care 38 (55.1%) 
Early Physical Fighting  51 (73.9%) 
Family Criminal Record 50 (72.5%) 
Drug Use 1.83 (1.40) 
7.2.3. Analytic strategy 
First, gang members and non-gang members are going to be compared 
descriptively across all variables. This will provide insight into differences between the 
two groups. Second, I am going to examine what covariates influence criminal career 
length. Criminal career length is a continuous variable, so an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression will be carried out (skewness = -0.51, kurtosis = 0.26). 
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7.3. Is it who you know in prison that counts? Exposure to 
prison gang members and criminal careers 
7.3.1. Overview of research objectives 
Chapter 10 seeks to examine whether being embedded within a prison gang 
network is important in the length of residual criminal careers. In Chapter 10, I want to 
begin to unpack the black box of gang activity and focus on a prison gang and how 
exposure to a prison gang may have long-term consequences. This analysis is a case 
study focused on the CS gang described above. The overarching goal of this study is to 
challenge the idea of the gang label and the assumption that gang membership is 
associated with an increase in social capital. In addition, by going inside and focusing on 
a prison gang, I have the chance to examine if the connections made in prison have an 
impact on the length of residual criminal careers. While no research to date has focused 
on gang members specifically, the school of crime hypothesis is premised on 
correctional facilities providing opportunities for individuals to socialize and learn from 
each other, increasing their criminal capital (Bayer et al., 2009; Clemmer, 1950; Damm & 
Gronias, 2020; Harris et al., 2017; Nguyen et al., 2017). A few studies that have 
examined prison experiences have found connections made in prison can increase 
recidivism (Damm & Gorinas, 2020; Roxell, 2011). In addition, network studies on 
delinquency have found the structural properties of peer networks to be influential on 
behaviors (Haynie, 2011; Krohn 1986; Korhn et al., 1988; Krohn & Thornberry, 1997; 
Weerman, 2011). Therefore, the connections made while in prison may have long-term 
ramifications on criminal careers. 
By focusing on the network of the CS gang, I have the unique opportunity to 
examine if there are consequences associated with exposure to a prison gang. It has 
been established that non-gang members are intertwined within the networks of gang 
members (McCuish et al., 2015; Reid & Maxson, 2016). Yet, little research to date has 
examined whether these connections are important for the criminal trajectories of non-
gang members. Researchers have established that being involved with or associating 
with gang members’ increases susceptibility of criminal involvement. However, research 
is less developed on whether the proximity of these connections is important. Previous 
research has shown the risk of gunshot victimization increases with proximity to the 
gunshot victim (Green et al., 2017; Papachristos et al., 2012; 2015a; 2015b). This 
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rationale is used as a building block for this chapter. Using the concept of social 
contagion, I hypothesize the closer individuals are to the eight CS members, the longer 
their criminal careers. Through the proximity to gang members, non-gang members are 
exposed to similar resources as the gang members. I recognize connectivity is not solely 
responsible for criminal career length; social proximity is part of a chain reaction. While I 
cannot directly test if social proximity is responsible for criminal career length, it does 
have a role in the outcomes that do (i.e. peer influence). Researchers have argued that 
social connections are essential for the accumulation of criminal capital (McCarthy & 
Hagan, 1995; 2001; McCarthy et al., 1998). Through connections, individuals are 
exposed to new criminal skills, knowledge, and resources which can prolong their 
criminal career. Being connected to an active prison gang, the CS members and those 
who are more closely associated to them are potentially exposed to different 
opportunities and skills that others are not. As a result, these connections may play a 
key role in expanding criminal networks through the accumulation of social capital. This 
analysis is unable to study the mechanisms underlying the flow of information and 
opportunities that that may be a result of the connections, but I am able to take step in 
assessing whether social proximity could play a role in criminal careers. 
7.3.2. Measures 
Dependent Variable 
Criminal career length is defined as the number of years between a person’s first 
contact with a CS member and their last known date of CJS involvement or date of 
coding for those still in custody. The purpose of Chapter 10 is to examine if being 
embedded within a prison network impacts criminal career length, so I used the age of 
first contact with a CS member as the starting point of the calculation. By doing this, I 
have excluded any contact with the CJS before exposure to CS to control for temporal 
ordering (M = 7.98; SD = 2.76; see Table 2).  
Independent Variables 
Connecting with a person involved in a prison gang during the gang’s operation 
may be qualitatively different from connecting with a person associated with a defunct 
prison gang. Splitting the network into two, during-CS and post-CS, I am able to extract 
when alters were connected to CS members. Timing of connectivity is a binary variable 
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(during-CS/post-CS) capturing when an individual was connected to CS. Twelve (24.5%) 
individuals were connected to CS members during the time the gang was active and 29 
(59.2%) were connected to CS members within five years after the CS gang. Five years 
was selected as a cut off time because I wanted to ensure I was capturing a prison gang 
association, or the potential consequences of connecting with a prison gang member, so 
the time of connectivity could not be too far past the time the gang was active. 
Additionally, 87.5% of the CS members remained gang members up to five years post-
CS. Therefore, I am still capturing connectivity when CS members were gang members, 
just no longer active prison gang members.  
The second analysis examines gang embeddedness based on the hypothesis 
that the closer individuals are to gang members, the more influential connections are 
(i.e., in this case, a longer criminal career). Social distance is used to measure gang 
embeddedness and was calculated as the mean geodesic distance (e.g. the shortest 
distance) between each individual in the sample to the eight CS members. I then added 
the distance scores and divided by eight.17 As seen in Table 2, the mean social distance 
is 2.11 (SD = 0.46). That is, individuals in this network are, on average, two handshakes 
away from all eight CS gang members. 
Control Variables 
My models control for various characteristics that have been shown to be 
associated with criminal career length in prior research. Age of first criminal justice 
system contact was coded from CORNET data and was included based on its negative 
association with criminal career length (Loeber & Le Blanc, 1990). The average age of 
first CJS contact for this sample is 15.12 years old (SD = 1.25) (see Table 2). Criminal 
justice contact pre-CS is the amount of time spent in the criminal justice system prior to 
any contact with a CS member. Exposure to the criminal justice system prior to CS 
contact could play a role in determining residual career so I control for it. On average, 
individuals spend 2.71 (SD = 2.43) years in the CJS before contact with a CS 
member(s). Number of convictions pre-CS contact was calculated by summing the total 
number of convictions participants had received between the age of 12 and the age they 
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 To calculate the mean distance between the eight CS members, the geodesic distances between the CS 
members were divided by seven not eight to ensure there wasn’t any bias  to the CS members  
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first became connected to a CS member(s).18 Including the number of prior convictions 
before contact with a CS member(s) controls for each individual’s level of criminal 
involvement and potential selection effects. This helped assess if being in contact with 
gang members amplifies an individual’s criminal trajectory or if this was a path they were 
already headed down. The average number of convictions pre CS contact as shown in 
Table 2 is 13.14 (SD = 11.13). 
Gang member is a binary (yes/no) variable and includes previous and current 
membership. Gang member is a self-report measure. This information was gained 
through official records, but the members self-reported to either correctional staff and/or 
probation officers that they were gang involved. Over half of the individuals (62.7%) in 
this sample are gang members (see Table 2).Violent offender captures anyone who has 
a conviction for a violent offense. Note violent offenses for the purpose of this study 
include aggravated assault, assault causing bodily harm, extortion, robbery with a 
firearm, manslaughter, and/or murder. Due to the sample being comprised of serious 
and violent offenders, almost everyone had multiple convictions for assault and weapon 
offenses. As seen in Table 2, 34 (69.4%) had a conviction for a violent offense. Lastly, 
race/ethnicity is White, Indigenous, and Other. Over half of the sample is White (59.2%).  
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 Age 12 was selected as the starting age because that is the first age of criminal responsibility in Canada 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (n = 49) 
 Mean (SD)/ n (%)  
Criminal Career Length 7.98 (2.76) 
Social Distance 2.11 (0.46) 
Age of First CJS Involvement 15.12 (1.25) 
Number of Convictions Pre CS Contact 13.14 (11.13) 
CJS Contact Pre CS Contact 2.71 (2.43) 
Violent Offender 34 (69.4%) 
Ethnicity  
White 29 (59.2%) 
Indigenous 10 (20.4%) 
Other 10 (20.4%) 
Gang Member 32 (62.7%) 
Gang Member Pre CSa 4 (7.8%) 
Gang Member Post CSb 31 (60.8%) 
Current Gang Memberc 11 (21.6%) 
a Pre-CS GM is anyone who was a gang member prior to the CS gang being active progressive soft tissue 
rehabilitative program. 
b Post-CS GM is anyone who was a gang member after the CS gang. There was one CS member who was only a 
gang member for the time the CS gang was active—not before or after 
c Current GM is anyone who was still gang involved within the last year of coding 
7.3.3. Analytic strategy 
I begin the analysis by first examining if there is a prison gang association. This 
was done by splitting the sample into three categories: CS members (n = 8), alters in the 
during-CS network (n = 12), and alters exclusively in the post-CS network (n = 29). 
Splitting the sample into three groups I was able to examine whether being an active 
prison gang member has a greater impact on criminal careers compared to the alters, 
and if the prison gang association was dependent on when alters were connected to CS 
members (i.e. during the time was active vs. after the dissolvement of the gang). The 
three groups were also compared across a variety of variables that could impact criminal 
career length. The second stage of the analysis examined whether embeddedness 
within the prison gang network influenced criminal career length. Using the mean social 
distance to every CS member as the measure of gang embeddedness and examined its 
relationship with criminal career length. For both stages of the analysis, criminal career 
length is the dependent variable. As per skewness (-0.98) and kurtosis (0.40) values, it 
is a normally distributed variable, making ordinary least squares (OLS) regression the 
best fit. 
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Chapter 8. The Social Capital of Gang Membership 
and the Length of Gang Careers  
Gang research to date has focused on traditional risk factors, but the networks of 
gang members have been largely overlooked. The role peers play in the participation of 
deviant behaviors is a concrete finding in criminology; therefore, ignoring the network 
dynamics of gang members, we are missing a piece of the puzzle. The objective of this 
analysis is to examine whether the personal networks of gang members play a role in 
the length of their gang careers. Examining the social capital embedded within the 
networks of gang members may help us better understand the heterogeneity between 
members. The chapter starts by looking at changes across gang membership before I 
turn my attention to the dependent variables. To keep things in temporal order, time to 
gang membership is analyzed first followed by length of gang membership.  
8.1. Changes across gang membership 
First, I want to examine whether gang membership is attributed to an increase in 
social capital, and if so, does the social capital disappear once individuals leave the 
gang. I start by examining variables across membership status. Specifically, I compare 
the two network measures, proportion of prison ties, and the number of convictions. 
Doing so provides me the ability to determine how each measure changes with gang 
membership status. As seen in Table 3, during active periods of gang membership, 
there is a significant increase in network size. Network size increases almost six times 
during periods of gang membership (see Table 3). Previous research has shown that 
gang membership increases exposure to criminal opportunities and co-offenders 
(Bouchard & Spindler, 2010); therefore, having larger networks during periods of gang 
membership is in line with prior studies. The increase in network size can be visualized 
in Bruiser’s network (Figure 6) presented earlier. Looking at his networks pre-gang 
membership to during-gang membership, the significant increase in the number of 
connections can be seen (also see Figure 7). Things reverse after gang membership 
ends. Network size decreases by almost three times after individuals are no longer gang 
members. During active periods of gang membership, members add on average seven 
new individuals to their networks, whereas, after gang membership, individuals on 
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average add only four new people to their network per year. In terms of size alone, the 
post-membership network are almost (but not quite) back to pre-membership levels (see 
Figure 7). This suggests that the size of networks after gang membership may overtime 
more closely resemble networks pre-gang membership.  
 
Figure 7. Changes in Network Size and Number of Convictions Across GM 
Status 
Betweenness centrality follows the same pattern as network size. As youth 
become gang members, they occupy more strategic positions within their networks than 
pre-gang membership. As networks increase in size, gang members are able to broker 
more relations between individuals within their network. Looking at Figure 6, Bruiser has 
very few alters who are connected to one another, showing how he has set himself to 
broker relations between the majority of alters in his network. While betweenness does 
decrease after individuals leave the gang, it is still six times higher than pre-gang 
membership (see Figure 8). This suggests that even after periods of gang membership, 
individuals still benefit from the social capital acquired during gang membership. Looking 
at the proportion of prison ties, gang members have a significant increase pre- to during-
gang membership indicating gang members may be utilizing their time spent in prison to 
expand their networks increasing their criminal social capital (see Table 3). Similar to the 
pattern seen with betweenness, the proportion of prison ties is significantly higher post-
gang membership than pre-gang membership. This shows that the network changes that 
occur during gang membership remain even after individuals leave the gang. Lastly, 
during active periods of gang membership, gang members have three times the number 
of convictions. Interestingly, there are no significant differences in the number of 














suggest during periods of active gang membership, gang members in this sample are 
being exposed to new opportunities and resources.  
 
 
Figure 8. Changes in Betweenness Centrality and Proportion of Prison Ties 





















Table 3. Descriptives Comparing Pre-, During-, and Post-Gang Membership  
(n = 41) 
 Pre-GM (906 Days) During-GM (2001 Days) Post-GM (1268 Days) 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Network Measures    
Sizebc 6.70 (1.32) 37.51 (4.89) 13.10 (3.49) 
Betweennessbcd 106.56 (32.17) 2361.47 (538.04) 656.20 (252.27) 
Race/Ethnicity    
White 21 (51.2%)   
Indigenous 13 (31.7%)   
Other 7 (17.1%)   
Risk Factors     
Number of Convictionsbc 5.80 (7.20) 15.15 (13.14) 4.90 (8.80) 
Proportion of Prison Tiesbcd 0.12 (0.04) 0.57 (0.05) 0.40 (0.07) 
Age of First CJS Contact 14.08 (1.30)   
Foster Carea 20 (48.8%)   
Physical Fightinga 29 (70.7%)   
Family Crim Recorda 30 (73.2%)   
a = yes: percentages are reported for youth who were in foster care, involved in early childhood physical fighting, and 
had family involved in the CJS 
b = Repeated measures ANOVA: significant difference between pre- and during-gang membership 
c = Repeated measures ANOVA: significant difference between during– and post-gang membership 
d = Repeated measures ANOVA: significant difference between pre- and post-gang membership 
8.2. Time to gang membership 
One of the main objectives of this chapter is to begin to uncover how a person’s 
network could impact the time it takes to become a gang member. The Kaplan-Meier 
curve shows the pattern of survival rates for the overall sample. Results show the risk of 
becoming a gang member is greatest in the first couple years after initial involvement 
within the criminal justice system. Of note, 19% of the sample did join a gang within the 
first year involved within the criminal justice system. Using the median as the cut-off 
point, I split the networks by size. As seen in Figure 9, youth who have smaller networks 
before gang membership, become gang members faster.  
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Figure 9. Kaplan-Meier Survival Curve for Time to Gang Membership x 
Network Size 
Note 1. Shaded area is the confidence intervals 
Note 2. Red is small network, green is large network 
Table 4 includes the variables that contribute to survival times. First, the static 
risk factors. Race/ethnicity, foster care, fighting before 12 years old, and family members 
involved in the criminal justice system are not associated with time to membership at the 
univariate level. Age of first contact with the CJS is significantly related with the time it 
takes to become a gang member (see Table 4, Model 1). The older youth are when they 
first enter CJS, the quicker they become gang members. The average age of first CJS 
involvement was 14; whereas, the average age of first gang indication was 16. The 
younger youth in this sample took on average two years to become a gang member. 
This finding reveals there may be a transition period before becoming a gang member. 
In contrast, youth who are older when they first enter the criminal justice system do not 
necessarily require the same transitionary period. These youth have an accelerated 
timeline. The number of convictions and the proportion of prison ties are also 
significantly associated with the time to gang membership. As shown in Model 1 of Table 
4, the more convictions youth have (b = -0.05, p < 0.05) and the higher proportion of 
prison ties (b = -1.64, p < 0.05), the longer it takes to become a gang member.  
To examine this further, I conducted a multivariate Cox regression. Given the 
small sample size and some issues of multicollinearity I could only include one network 
75 
measure as a covariate. Based on model fit, I selected network size. Starting with the 
control variables in Model 2, age of first contact in the CJS and proportion of prison ties 
remain significantly associated with time it takes to become a gang member, while the 
number of convictions loses its effect. Adding in network size (Model 3), age continues 
to be significant, but proportion of prison ties is no longer. Network size is significant. 
The negative co-efficient indicates that youth who have larger networks before gang 
membership take longer to become a gang member (b = -0.10, p < 0.01). This finding 
supports what was seen in the at the univariate level, visualized in the Kaplan-Meier 
curve.  
The size of an individual’s network and the number of convictions are not 
independent from one another. The more convictions youth receive the more co-
offenders youth are possibly exposed to. With more co-offenders come potentially more 
opportunities to commit crime. In order to examine how these two variables co-vary, I 
created an interaction term with number of convictions and network size. As seen in 
Model 4, with the addition of the interaction term, the stand alone effect for network size 
remains; youth who have larger networks, take longer to become gang members (b = -
0.14, p < 0.001). Of note, the interaction term is positive and significant (b = 0.52, p < 
0.01). Neither network size nor the number of convictions, independently, had a positive 
effect on time to gang membership – both were negative effects. This finding suggests 
that youth who built their networks through multiple convictions (i.e. more co-offenders) 
became gang members more quickly.  
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Table 4. Univariate and Multivariate Analysis Examining Time to Gang Membership (n = 41) 




Model 3  
Full Model  
Model 4 
Interaction  
Network Measures     
Size -0.11 (0.03)*** - -0.10 (0.03)** -0.14 (0.04)*** 
Betweenness -0.01 (0.00)* - - - 
Demographics     
Ethnicity 0.26 (0.22) - - - 
Risk Factors     
Nb of Convictions -0.05 (0.03)* -0.05 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03) 
Age First CJS Contact 0.34 (0.16)* 0.32 (0.16)* 0.32 (0.16)* 0.33 (0.16)* 
Foster Care -0.22 (0.34) - - - 
Early Physical Fighting -0.38 (0.36) - - - 
Family Crim Record 0.02 (0.37) - - - 
Proportion of Prison Ties -1.64 (0.82)* -1.98 (0.82)** -0.90 (0.75) -0.45 (0.73) 
Interaction     
Network Size x Nb of Convictions - - - 0.52 (0.20)** 
Log Rank Score - 12.92** 20.96*** 28.18*** 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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8.3. Length of gang membership 
The second objective of this chapter is to examine how a gang member’s 
network may impact the length of gang membership. I wanted to look at this in two ways: 
1) does the structure of one’s network pre-gang membership impact the length of gang 
membership? and 2) does the structure of one’s network during gang membership effect 
the length of gang membership? Analogous to risk factors increasing the length of gang 
membership, I wanted to examine whether having certain network features before gang 
membership are advantageous for a longer gang career.  
Results from the Kaplan-Meier show the risk for leaving a gang is greatest 
around five years (approximately 1800 days) after becoming a gang member. After this 
time period, there is a steady decline in survival rates. Figure 10 visualizes the survival 
times by network size for pre- and during-gang membership. Again, using the median as 
a cut-off point, youth who have larger networks before gang membership, are gang 
members for less time. More specifically, for youth who had large networks, the first 
gang member to leave occurred less than one year after joining. In contrast, youth who 
had smaller networks pre-gang membership, it took over two years before the first gang 
member left. This finding supports what was seen when time to gang membership was 
examined. Youth who had larger networks pre-gang membership, took longer to become 
gang members. This suggests that youth who are able to build their networks prior to 
gang membership have shorter gang careers. In contrast, youth who have larger 
networks during active periods of gang membership, they are involved in gangs for 




Figure 10. Kaplan-Meier Survival Curve for Length of Gang Membership x 
Network Size 
Note 1. Shaded area is the confidence intervals 
Note 2. Figure on top = network size Pre-GM 
Note 3. Red = small network, green = large network 
Table 5 displays the variables associated with survival rates. As seen in Model 1, 
youth in foster care (b = -0.78, p < 0.05) and youth with more convictions during gang 
membership (b = -0.03, p < 0.05) have significantly longer gang careers. In contrast, 
youth who have a larger proportion of prison ties pre-gang membership, have shorter 
gang careers (b = 2.42, p < 0.001). Network size is significant for both pre-gang 
membership and during-gang membership, but the coefficients are in the opposite 
direction. Youth who have larger networks before gang members (b = 0.07, p < 0.01) are 
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members for less time; whereas, youth who build their networks during gang 
membership (b = -0.03, p < 0.01) are gang members for longer. Of note, betweenness 
centrality is associated with less time spent in a gang. Youth who are strategically 
located in their positive network pre- and –during gang membership, are gang members 
for less time.  
Model 2 is the multivariate regression. Beginning with the control variables, youth 
in foster care and youth who have a higher proportion of prison ties during-gang 
membership, have longer gang careers. Whereas, youth who have a higher number of 
convictions (b = 0.09, p < 0.01) and proportion of prison ties pre-gang membership (b = 
3.55, p < 0.001) spend less time as gang members. Model 3 examines the full network. 
Again, due to issues of multicollinearity, I had to choose one network measure. Results 
of the nested model comparison revealed network size was the better fitting model; 
therefore, network size was selected over betweenness. When network size was added 
into the model, the number of convictions pre-gang membership and the proportion of 
prison ties during-gang membership lose their effect. The proportion of prison ties pre-
gang membership and foster care remain significant. Network size is not significant. 
Interaction variables with size and convictions were added in Model 4 to determine 
whether the social context of connections influences the length of time spent in a gang. 
As it can be seen, social context does seem to matter. In Model 5, the interaction with 
size during-gang membership and the main effect for size during-gang membership are 
significant, but the co-efficients are opposite. This suggests that how youth build their 
networks matter. For youth who build their networks through convictions, they exit the 
gang sooner (b = 0.83, p < 0.001). Yet, for youth who build their networks without 
convictions, are gang members for longer (b = -0.04, p < 0.01). The proportion of prison 
ties pre-gang membership is still significant-youth who have a higher proportion of prison 
ties before gang membership, exit the gang sooner (b = 3.10, p < 0.01). The combined 
results from time to membership and length of membership suggest that when 
connections are created and where they are created are influential on gang 
membership. 
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Network Measures     
Size Pre-GM 0.07 (0.02)** - 0.05 (0.03) 0.07 (0.04) 
Size During-GM -0.03 (0.01)** - -0.02 (0.02) -0.04 (0.01)** 
Betweenness Pre-GM 0.02 (0.01)* - - - 
Betweenness During-GM 0.00 (0.00)* - - - 
Demographics     
Ethnicity -0.04 (0.24) - - - 
Risk Factors     
Nb of Convictions Pre-GM 0.03 (0.02) 0.09 (0.03)** 0.05 (0.03) 0.02 (0.04) 
Nb of Convictions During-GM -0.03 (0.02)* -0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
Age First CJS Contact 0.02 (0.14) - - - 
Foster Care -0.78 (0.36)* - 1.44 (0.43)*** -0.98 (0.49)* -0.67 (0.48) 
Early Physical Fighting 0.23 (0.40) - - - 
Family Crim Record -0.13 (0.38) - - - 
Proportion of Prison Ties Pre-GM 2.42 (0.85)** 3.55 (0.96)*** 2.68 (1.16)* 3.10 (1.23)** 
Proportion of Prison Ties During-GM -1.12 (0.70) -1.89 (0.88)* -1.26 (1.01) 0.06 (1.03) 
Interaction     
Size x Nb of Convictions Pre-GM - - - 0.27 (0.24) 
Size x Nb of Convictions During-GM - - - 0.83 (0.25)*** 
Log Rank Score - 27.95*** 29.28*** 44.52*** 




8.4. The strength of networks: Does type matter? 
The results from the survival analysis show that network size is one of the most 
important predictors for gang careers. When looking at the results as a whole, they show 
that size matters, but it is when youth build their networks that have a different effect. 
Could this be a by-product of how youth are growing their networks? In other words, is 
the quality of ties the reason for these discrepancies? Additional analyses are necessary 
to break down this finding further. I split network the network into positive and negative 
networks. Positive networks are comprised of social and co-offending ties, and negative 
networks include conflict and victimization ties.19 In order to determine whether the type 
of network matters, I focus on network size. I select size because I am able to examine it 
in both the positive and negative networks, as well as it was a main finding from the 
analysis above. Due to the small sample size, I keep this analysis at the bivariate level.  
First, I look at changes across gang membership status. It is known that gang 
members are exposed to more co-offenders and opportunities to commit crime, is this 
represented in their networks? If so, there should be an increase in the size of positive 
networks during gang membership. However, research has also established that gang 
membership increases risk of victimization and conflicts. The tit for tat acts of violence 
that is characteristic of gangs increases the number of negative connections. How does 
this relate to the personal networks of gang members? As seen in Table 6 and Figure 
11, during active periods of gang membership, there is a significant increase in size for 
both positive and negative networks. In the positive network, the number of connections 
increases by a factor of 8 during periods of gang membership from pre-gang 
membership. This finding does support previous research which had found gang 
membership to increase exposure to criminal opportunities (Bouchard & Spindler, 2010). 
In comparison, there is an increase by a factor of 5 in size for the negative network. This 
supports the finding from previous research that there is an increase in violence and 
victimization that is associated with gang membership (Decker & Pyrooz, 2010; Krohn et 
al., 2011; Pyrooz et al., 2014a; Taylor et al., 2008). As seen in Table 3, during active 
periods of gang membership, members add six new ties to their networks. By breaking 
down the networks into positive and negative, it is revealed that gang members add four 
                                              
19
 Victimization can be the gang member victimized the alter or the alter victimized the gang member. The 
other three types of ties were not directional, so I made victimization also non-directional  
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positive and two negative connections. In contrast, after gang membership, individuals 
on average add four new people to their network per year - three positive and one 
negative. 
 
Figure 11. Type of Network x Size Across Gang Membership Status 
 
Table 6. Comparisons by Type of Network Size x Gang Membership Status  
(n = 41) 
 Pre-GM (906 Days) During-GM (2001 Days) Post-GM (1268 Days) 
                            M (SD)       M (SD)       M (SD) 
 Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Network 
Sizeab 
2.80 (4.51) 3.80 (4.76) 22.30 (22.14) 15.10 (10.91) 7.98 (15.34) 5.10 (8.62) 
a = Repeated measures ANOVA: Significant difference between pre- and during-gang membership 
b = Repeated measures ANOVA: Significant difference between during- and post-gang membership 
The question still remains - do the types of ties that are associated with gang 
membership influence their gang careers? Again, due to sample size I keep it simple, 
looking at bivariate associations. Both positive and negative connections are related to 
the time it takes to become a gang member. The larger the networks, the longer it takes 
to become gang members (Table 7). This finding mirrors what was seen in the original 
analysis. This is visualized using Kaplan-Meier curves. Using the median as a cut-off, in 
both figures, it can be seen that individuals with smaller networks, no matter the type of 
network, become gang members faster than individuals with larger networks (see Figure 
12). Moving to length of gang membership, the size of the networks again matters. 












networks, the only difference is gang membership status (pre- or during-gang 
membership). Youth who have larger negative networks before becoming gang 
members, are members for less time; whereas, youth who build their networks during 
gang membership have longer gang careers (Table 7). This is also seen using a Kaplan-
Meier curve (Figure 13).  
 
 
Figure 12. Kaplan-Meier Survival Curve for Time to GM x Network Size 
Note 1. KM curve on the top = positive network 
Note 2. Red = small network 
Note 3. Shaded area is the confidence intervals 
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Table 7. Correlations Examining Time to Gang Membership and Length of 
Gang Membership by Network Size (n = 41) 
 Time to Gang Membership Length of Gang Membership 
Network Size   
Positive Pre-GM 0.76*** -0.40 
Negative Pre-GM 0.74*** -0.42** 
Positive During-GM -  0.64*** 
Negative During-GM - 0.63*** 
Note. Correlation co-efficient = spearmans rho 
 
Pre-Gang Membership Positive Network 
 
Pre-Gang Membership Negative Networks 
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During Gang Membership Positive Network 
 
During Gang Membership Negative Network 
Figure 13. Kaplan-Meier Survival Curves for Length of GM x Network Size 
Note 1. Red = small network 
Note 2. Shaded area is the confidence intervals 
The results from this analysis reveal that it is not necessarily the type of network 
that impact gang careers. Rather, it is when youth build their networks. Positive and 
negative networks had similar associations with the only difference being gang 
membership status. As such, understanding how youth are able to build their networks 
and whether they need the assistance from the gang to grow their criminal capital seems 
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to be what influences gang careers. This is the same finding from the survival analysis; 
network size matters, but when it matters differs. 
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Chapter 9. What’s in a label? The role of social 
networks in the criminal careers of gang and non-
gang youth 
The goal of this chapter is to examine whether the social context and/or label of 
gang member influence criminal career length. I use a matched control sample that is 
entrenched within the criminal justice system. Using a criminally embedded control 
group may isolate the effects of gang membership more so than community based 
samples. Examining the social worlds of these two groups, I am able to determine 
whether gang members do have a criminal advantage that provides them with the 
criminal opportunities to have longer criminal careers. Similar to Chapter 8, I first 
compare the gang members and non-gang members to see if there are any differences 
between the two groups beside membership status. I then move onto the multivariate 
analysis examining criminal career length.  
9.1. Comparison of gang and non-gang members 
As seen in Table 8, there is only one significant difference between gang 
members and non-gang members for the characteristics included: gang members are 
significantly younger than others (M = 14.8 years vs M = 15.6 years) when they first 
enter the CJS. Gang members are almost one full year younger when they first enter the 
CJS than non-gang members. Of the characteristics that were not shown to be 
significant, a few are relatively unexpected given what we know on gang members. For 
instance, it is somewhat surprising to see there is no significant difference between gang 
and non-gang members on criminal career length. Gang membership has been labeled 
a snare in the life-course increasing length of residual criminal careers, but for this 
sample, there is no significant difference between gang and non-gang members. Gang 
membership is known to increase offending opportunities and criminal versatility, yet for 
this sample, there are no differences between gang and non-gang members on any of 
the network variables. While these findings are unexpected, remember the control group 
is a criminally entrenched sample of non-gang members. Therefore, it is not a bad sign 
per se given the objectives of the chapter. The 28 non-gang members were selected 
because they resembled the gang members, just without the gang label. I did this to 
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ensure the control group was as close to the gang members as possible as I wanted to 
make sure I was able to isolate the effects of gang membership as much as I could.  
Table 8. Comparisons between Gang and Non-Gang Members (n = 69) 
 Gang Member  
(n = 41) 
Non-Gang Member  
(n = 28) 
 
M (SD)/ n (%) 
Dependent Variables    
Criminal Career Lengthc 10.80 (2.41) 11.50 (3.56) NS 
Independent Variablesa    
Network Size 57.00 (34.43) 57.29 (57.45) NS 
Constraint 0.06 (0.08) 0.06 (0.07) NS 
Density 0.03 (0.03) 0.06 (0.20) NS 
Betweenness 4531.53 (4573.28) 6519.91 (16585.72) NS 
Control Variables     
Ethnicityb   NS 
White 21 (51.2%) 20 (71.4%)  
Indigenous 13 (31.7%) 6 (21.4%)  
Other 7 (17.1%) 2 (7.2%)  
Proportion Prison Tiesa 0.58 (0.25) 0.56 (0.40) NS 
Age First CJS Contactc 14.80 (1.30) 15.64 (1.91) * 
Nb of Youth Convictionsa 4.67 (3.90) 4.30 (2.66) NS 
Foster Careb 20 (48.7%) 18 (64.2%) NS 
Early Physical Fightingb 29 (70.7%) 22 (78.6%) NS 
Family Criminal Recordb 30 (73.2%) 20 (71.4%) NS 
Drug Usea 1.71 (1.49) 2.00 (1.24) NS 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
a = Mann Whitney U 
b = Chi-square 
c = t-Test 
9.2. Criminal career length 
Gang membership has been labeled as a negative turning point in the life-course 
of members. Gang membership decreases access to prosocial institutions while 
increasing connections to antisocial peers. As a result, gang members have less 
education, higher rates of addictions, and increased involvement in the criminal justice 
system. It would therefore be expected that the criminal careers of gang members will be 
longer than non-gang members. As seen in Table 9, this may not be the case. The 
criminal career length of gang members is not significantly different from non-gang 
members. However, almost every network measure has an effect on criminal career 
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length. Individuals who have larger networks and occupy strategic positions have longer 
criminal careers. Recall constraint is an inverse measure of Burt’s (1992) structural holes 
theory; therefore, the negative co-efficient is what is expected theoretically and is a sign 
of social capital. Of note, the results show that the proportion of prison ties have an 
effect on criminal career length above network size as a whole. This suggests that the 
connections made in prison may have an independent impact. Individuals who are able 
to have a larger proportion of prison connections, have longer criminal careers. 
Important to keep in mind as a potential explanation to this is that more prison ties may 
be a by-product of a longer prison sentence which would increase criminal career length. 
I do not test for this in the current dissertation, but it does show that the connections 
made in prison could be important for shaping criminal trajectories. This does need to be 
fleshed out in future research. As expected, individuals who have more convictions, are 
younger when they first enter the CJS, and have family members in the criminal justice 
have longer criminal careers.  
Table 9. Bivariate Associations between Covariates and Criminal Career 
Length (n = 69) 
Independent Variablesa  




Gang Memberb 0.13 
Control Variables   
Ethnicityc 0.10 
Age First CJS Contactd -0.45** 
Nb of Youth Convictionsa 0.49*** 
Proportion of Prison Tiesa 0.39*** 
Foster Careb 0.23+ 
Early Physical Fightingb 0.16 
Family Criminal Recordb 0.27* 
Drug Usea 0.10 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
a = Spearmans Rho correlation 
b = t-Test; Eta 
c= Anova; Eta 
d = Pearsons correlation 
Presented in Table 10 are the results of the OLS regression. Due to issues with 
multicollinearity, I included one network measure of social capital and one measure of 
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network structure as covariates. Based on model fit, I selected network size as my social 
capital measure and constraint as my network structure measure. Model 1 consists of 
the controls and gang membership. As it can be seen, individuals who have a larger 
proportion of prison ties have significantly longer careers (b = 4.17, p < 0.001). 
Unexpectedly, gang membership has a negative co-efficient - non-gang members have 
longer criminal careers than gang members (b = -1.54, p < 0.01) when controlling for 
other factors. In Model 2, I add in the network variables. The results seen in Model 1 
remain significant. The proportion of prison ties are influencing criminal career length 
even after network size is added into the model. This shows that the connections made 
in prison may be qualitatively different, having a specific impact on criminal trajectories. 
Looking at the network variables, individuals with larger networks (b = 0.01, p < 0.05) 
and more structural holes in their network20 (b = -11.38, p < 0.01), have longer criminal 
careers. This is a sign that individuals with more social capital remain in the criminal 
justice for longer.  
Recall, the main objective of this analysis is to determine whether it is the social 
context or the label of gang member that influences criminal career length. As previously 
stated, there is reason to suspect that it is a combination of the two. Gang members may 
be provided with more criminal opportunities because of their status of gang members. If 
so, then the networks of gang members will reflect this as gang members will utilize their 
position to gain more capital. As a result, gang members will have longer criminal 
careers. In order to test this, I created two interaction terms with gang membership and 
the two network variables. In Model 3, I added in the constraint interaction and it is not 
significant. However, network size and constraint remain significant predictors. The 
interaction with size (Model 4) is significant but negative. This indicates that gang 
members with larger networks have shorter criminal careers (b = -0.45, p < 0.05). Of 
note, when the interaction is added into the model, the main standalone effect of network 
size disappears. Due to proportion of prison ties being a consistent predictor for criminal 
career length, I created an interaction term with gang membership. I wanted to see if 
gang members with more prison ties had longer criminal careers. As it can be seen in 
Model 5, they do not. While the interaction term is significant, the co-efficient is negative. 
                                              
20
 Recall constraint is an inverse measure; therefore, a negative score for constraint is a sign of social 
capital. A higher constraint score is indicative of fewer structural holes. In contrast, a lower constraint score 
is indicative of more structural holes. The more structural holes in a network decreases the amount of 
redundant information  
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This indicates that there is a subset of gang members who have a greater proportion of 
prison ties with shorter criminal careers. Overall, the results from the regression suggest 
that the label of gang member may be too simplistic and there are other factors that are 
important to consider.  
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Table 10. OLS Regression Examining Criminal Career Length (n = 69) 










Prison Ties Interaction 
 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Intercept 24.81 (3.04)*** 22.90 (2.73)*** 22.64 (2.72)*** 23.23 (2.63)*** 22.67 (2.69)*** 
Independent Variables      
Network Size - 0.01 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)* 
Constraint - -11.74 (3.81)** -13.34 (3.88)** -13.71 (3.74)*** -13.13 (3.81)*** 
Gang Member -1.54 (0.53)** -1.36 (0.47)** -1.35 (0.47)** -1.35 (0.45)** -1.35 (0.46)** 
Control Variables      
Age First CJS Contact -0.94 (0.17)*** -0.74 (0.17)*** -0.72 (0.17)*** -0.73 (0.17)*** -0.71 (0.17)*** 
Nb Youth Convictions -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.01) 
Family Crim Record -1.23 (0.57)* -1.15 (0.51)* -1.05 (0.51)* -1.17 (0.49)* -0.91 (0.51)+ 
Proportion Prison Ties 4.17 (0.81)*** 1.76  (0.88)* 1.54 (0.88)+ 1.90 (0.85)* 0.96 (0.96) 
Interactions      
Size x GM - - - -0.58 (0.23)** - 
Constraint x GM - - 0.40 (0.24) - - 
Prison Ties x GM - - - - -0.46 (0.24)* 
R2 0.53 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.67 
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.61 0.62 0.64 0.63 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Chapter 10. The Role of Proximity on Criminal 
Career Length 
As mentioned earlier, the aim of this chapter is to examine whether being 
embedded within a prison gang influences the length of residual criminal careers. The 
group processes of gangs have been argued to be largely responsible for the outcomes 
associated with gang membership, but research has yet to examine this from a network 
perspective. To do this, I use a case study of a youth prison gang that formed while eight 
youth were incarcerated together in one correctional facility. Focusing on the CS gang, I 
was able to extract alters who were connected to the gang members, but at different 
time points (during- and post-CS gang). Expanding the analysis to the CS gang, I am 
able to 1) move past the gang label and focus on the social context surrounding the 
individuals within the network, and 2) examine how being embedded within a gang 
network impacts the criminal careers for the gang and non-gang members. As 
mentioned previously, the resources and opportunities that are believed to be associated 
with gang membership spill through the network. Non-gang associates who are 
interconnected with gang members are exposed to similar opportunities through their 
connections. As such it is hypothesized that it is the proximity of connections that is 
going to influence criminal career length. Furthermore, knowing when alters were 
connected to CS members (during or after the gang), I am able to examine if it is the 
timing of connections that is influential on criminal careers.  
10.1. Does timing of connectivity matter?  
The alters in the during-CS network are connected to gang members in an active 
prison gang, while the alters in the post-CS network are connected to gang members, 
but who are no longer involved in an active prison gang. Thus, the main difference 
between the two groups of alters is whether their tie was to a “prison gang member” or to 
a “gang member that happened to be in prison”. Of note, while the majority of CS 
members remained gang involved after the gang dismantled, they identified as gang 
members in the community, with many being members to different gangs from one 
another. 
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It was hypothesized that the prison gang effect would be greater for CS members 
than individuals simply exposed to them. It is reasonable to suspect CS members would 
be more embedded than the contemporaries of the gang which would increase the 
length of their residual criminal careers. Comparing across the three groups, the results 
suggest that this was not necessarily the case. Looking at Table 11, the alters in the 
during-CS network have the longest criminal careers. They are involved in the CJS for 
1.5 years longer than CS members and 3.5 years longer than alters in the post-CS 
network. Post-hoc analysis revealed these differences are significant between the alters 
in the during- and post-CS networks, but not with the CS members. The alters in the 
during-CS network are also the youngest when they first enter the criminal justice 
system. In fact, they are a full year younger. Not surprising, the CS members are the 
closest in proximity to each other. Yet, there are significant differences between all three 
groups. While the CS members spend the shortest amount of time in the CJS before CS 
contact, there is only a significant difference between the CS members and the alters in 
the post-CS network. Alters in the during-CS network do not significantly differ in the 
amount of time involved in the CJS prior to CS contact than alters in the post-CS 
network or the CS members. As would be expected, CS members have the highest 
proportion of gang membership. Of note, the majority of their gang involvement occurs 
early in their criminal careers, with no CS member having any gang involvement at the 
end of the follow-up period. In contrast, 25% of the alters in the during-CS network and 
post-CS network are current gang members. Importantly, there were no group 
differences for the number of convictions before contact with CS member(s) or violent 
offender, indicating that the level of criminality did not differ between the youth.  
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Table 11. Bivariate Comparisons of CS Members and Alters Connected to CS 
Members (n = 49) 
 CS Members 
 (n = 8) 
During CS 
Alters  
(n = 12) 
Post CS Alters  
(n = 29) 
Eta/ꭓ2  
                            Mean (SD)/ n (%)  
Criminal Career Length 8.88 (2.17) 10.33 (1.23) 6.76 (2.76) 0.56***  
Social Distance 1.43 (0.31) 1.91 (0.23) 2.40 (0.30) 0.80***  
Age of First CJS Involvement 15.25 (1.30) 14.42 (1.17) 15.38 (1.21) 0.33+  
Number of Convictions Pre CS 
Contact 
13.50 (10.76) 8.92 (8.37) 14.80 (12.10) 0.22  
CJS Contact Pre CS Contact 1.38 (1.19) 1.75 (1.66) 3.49 (2.68) 0.39*  
Violent Offender 3.00 (37.5%) 9.00 (75.0%) 22.00 (75.9%) 0.31  
Ethnicity    0.32  
White 7.00 (87.5%) 5.00 (41.7%) 17.00 (58.6%)   
Indigenous 1.00 (12.5%) 4.00 (33.3%) 5.00 (17.2%)   
Other 0.00 (0.00%) 3.00 (25.0%) 7.00 (24.1%)   
Gang Member 8.00 (100%) 7.00 (58.3%) 17.00 (58.6%) 0.32+  
Gang Member Pre CS 3.00 (37.5%) 1.00 (8.3%) 1.00 (3.6%) 0.40*  
Gang Member Post CS 7.00 (87.5%) 7.00 (58.3%) 17.00 (60.7%) 0.22  
Current Gang Member 0.00 (0.0%) 3.00 (25.0%) 8.00 (27.5%) 0.24  
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
The results of the bivariate analysis revealed the difference in criminal career 
length was between alters in the during-CS network and alters in the post-CS network. 
To test this further, I focus solely on comparing the two groups of alters at the 
multivariate level to find out whether the timing of connectivity matters21 (see Table 12). 
Model 1 contains the control variables, with the amount of time spent in the CJS pre-CS 
and age of first CJS contact negatively associated with criminal career length; whereas, 
number of convictions pre-CS is positively associated. The more time individuals spent 
in the CJS before contact with a CS member(s), the shorter their criminal careers (b = -
0.62, p < 0.01). For youth who are younger when they first enter the CJS system (b = -
0.88, p < 0.001) and have more convictions pre-CS (b = 0.11, p < 0.05), have longer 
criminal careers. Model 2 includes timing of connectivity and shows that individuals who 
were connected to CS members while the CS gang was active (during-CS network) had 
longer criminal careers (b = 2.94, p < 0.001). When timing of connectivity was added into 
the model, the age of first CJS contact and number of convictions pre-CS lost their 
                                              
21
 A regression was run with the full sample (n = 49) using the CS members as a control group, and the 
results were the same 
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significant association, while CJS contact pre-CS remained significant (b = -0.56, p < 
0.05). 
Table 12. OLS Regression Examining Timing of Connectivity and Social 
Distance on Criminal Career Length of the CS Gang Alters (n = 41) 








 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Constant 20.00 (5.65)*** 10.01 (5.98) 20.88 (5.31)*** 22.32 (5.01)*** 
Age of First CJS Contact -0.82 (0.34)* -0.29 (0.35) -0.48 (0.35) -0.47 (0.33) 
Nb of Convictions Pre CS 0.11 (0.06)* 0.09 (0.05) 0.11 (0.05)* 0.10 (0.05)* 
CJS Contact Pre CS -0.88 (0.25)*** -0.56 (0.24)* -0.83 (0.23)*** -0.76 (0.22)** 
Gang Member 0.73 (0.95) 1.34 (0.87) 0.58 (0.89) 0.38 (0.84) 
Violent Offender 0.22 (0.99) 0.47 (0.89) 0.61 (0.95) 0.35 (0.89) 
Ethnicitya     
White 0.78 (1.16) 0.89 (1.03) 0.77 (1.08) 0.46 (1.02) 
Indigenous 1.23 (1.21) 0.57 (1.10) 1.08 (1.14) 0.83 (1.10) 
Met Active CS Memberb - 2.94 (0.95)*** - - 
Social Distance  -       - -2.75 (1.16)** -3.21 (1.10)*** 
Social Distance x GM - - - 0.90 (0.38)* 
R2 0.38* 0.52*** 0.47** 0.55*** 
Adjusted R2 0.24* 0.40*** 0.33** 0.42*** 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
a Other is reference category 
b Yes is 1 or alter in the during-CS network 
10.2. Does social proximity matter?  
Why would being connected to CS members during the time the gang was active 
have a greater effect on criminal careers? As seen in Figure 4, the alters in the during-
CS network appear to be more embedded within the networks of the eight CS members. 
This could increase the effect of connecting with active prison gang member. 
Additionally, as seen in Table 2, the number of individuals who were gang members 
post-CS increased, meaning the alters in the post-CS network were more likely to be 
gang members than alters in the during-CS network at the time of connection, 
decreasing the potential influence of connecting with gang members. Being a gang 
member and associating with other gang members may not be as powerful as 
connecting with gangs members would be for non-gang members. To try to answer this 
question, I used a social distance measure of gang embeddedness which was measured 
as the mean geodesic distance of each individual to all eight CS members. 
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When social distance is added to the model, there is a significant change from 
Model 1 to Model 3, with Model 3 accounting for 47% of the variance in criminal career 
length as opposed to 38% in Model 1. Seen in Model 3 of Table 12, the amount of time 
spent in the CJS before CS contact and number of convictions pre-CS are significantly 
associated with criminal career length. Social distance is a significant negative predictor 
indicating that individuals who are closer in proximity to CS members have longer 
criminal careers (b = -2.75, p < 0 .01). From Table 2, we know the alters in the during-
CS network on average were closer to CS members than alters in the post-CS network. I 
created an interaction effect between gang membership and social distance to examine 
if there is an effect of social distance for gang members specifically. The interaction of 
gang membership and social distance added to Model 4 was positive and significant (b = 
0.90, p < 0.05). Gang members who were furthest away from the CS gang had long 
criminal careers. This reveals that there may be a subset of gang members who were 
already headed for a longer criminal career. Importantly, the interaction effect also 
impacted the stand-alone social distance measure, increasing its effect (b = -3.21, p < 
0.001).  
10.3. The inexorable effect of ageing? 
The results show that individuals who were closer in social proximity and were 
connected to active prison gang members had longer residual criminal careers. One 
possibility is that these results are simply a matter of age. The individuals who were 
connected to CS members during the time the gang was active were younger when peer 
influence is stronger. I test this hypothesis by controlling for the age when individuals 
were first connected with a CS member. As seen in Model 1 of Table 13, the age when 
individuals first connect with a CS member(s) is significant (b = -0.76, p < 0.01). The 
younger individuals were when they first connected to CS members, the longer their 
criminal careers. Similar to what was seen from the results in Table 12, Model 4, 
individuals who were closer in proximity to CS members had longer criminal careers (b = 
-3.21, p < 0.001). I created an interaction term between age of first CS contact and 
social distance in order to see if the two co-vary. The main effects for social distance and 
age remained, while the interaction was not significant (see Table 13, Model 2). Model 3 
shows that individuals who were connected to CS members during the time the gang 
was active had longer criminal careers than those who were connected after the 
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dissolution of the gang (b = 3.60, p < 0.001). Age also had a significant effect; youth who 
were younger when they first connected with CS members had longer criminal careers 
(b = -0.56, p < 0.05). As I did with social distance, I created an interaction term with age 
and connectivity. As seen in Model 4, the interaction is not significant and with its 
addition, the stand alone effect for age was lost while the effect for timing of connectivity 
remained.  
Table 13. OLS Regression Examining the Effect of Age on Criminal Career 
Length (n = 41) 22 










 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Constant  23.51 (4.59)*** 23.77 (5.56)*** 12.24 (5.50)* 10.92 (6.43) 
Age of First CJS 
Contact 
0.21 (0.33) 0.21 (0.36) 0.21 (0.32) 0.22 (0.33) 
Convictions Pre CS 
Contact 
0.10 (0.05)* 0.11 (0.05)* 0.10 (0.05)* 0.10 (0.05)* 
Gang Member 0.28 (0.71) 0.42 (0.78) 1.02 (0.74) 1.10 (0.76) 
Age First CS Contact -0.72 (0.21)*** -0.81 (0.23)*** -0.57 (0.22)* -0.51 (0.28) 
Social Distance -3.20 (1.05)** -2.74 (1.17)* - - 
Social Distance x Gang 
Member 
0.96 (0.36)** - - - 
Social Distance x Age 
First CS Contact  
- -0.20 (0.49) - - 
Met Active CS Membera - - 2.82 (0.89)** 3.31 (1.50)* 
Met Active CS Member 
x Age First CS Contact 
   0.31 (0.76) 
R2 0.54*** 0.45** 0.50*** 0.50*** 
Adjusted R2 0.46*** 0.35** 0.43*** 0.41*** 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
a 1 is Yes or alter in the during-CS network 
                                              
22
Due to multicollinearity, length of time spent in the CJS Pre CS was excluded from the analysis. The main 
idea behind this analysis was to determine if age was the determining factor for the results seen with timing 
of connectivity; therefore, I focused on that variable for this model 
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Chapter 11. Discussion 
Gangs are social groups comprised of interconnected members. Gang members 
take on collective identities, and partake in collective behaviors (Papachristos, 2006). 
When individuals become gang members, their networks grow organically. Even if 
connected to only one member of a gang, the gang member is indirectly connected to 
every other gang member in the gang. In addition, they are indirectly connected to all of 
the gang members’ connections. On top of the increase in network size, gang members 
are exposed to more criminal opportunities and resources. As a result, gang 
membership should be associated with an increase in social capital. Whether there is an 
increase in social capital, and how that social capital influences the criminal trajectories 
was the foundation of the dissertation.  
Gang research to date has focused largely on risk factors for joining gangs and 
the consequences of gang membership. It is well-known that gang members have more 
complex risk profiles than non-gang members (Gilman et al., 2014; Hill et al., 1999; 
Krohn et al., 2011; Thornberry et al., 1993; 2003) and the consequences of gang 
membership extend beyond the gang (Dong & Krohn, 2016; Gilman et al,, 2014; Levitt & 
Venkatesh, 2001; Melde & Esbensen, 2011; 2013 Moore, 1991; Thornberry et al., 2003). 
In other words, being a gang member prolongs involvement within the criminal justice 
system even after individuals leave the gang. Yet, the role personal networks play 
remains to be unknown. Criminology has long been interested in the social aspect of 
deviant and criminal behaviors. Key criminological theories assert criminal behaviors are 
learned through social interactions (Akers, 1985; Bandura, 1969; Osgood et al., 1996; 
Sampson & Groves, 1988; Sutherland, 1947). In fact, one of the most robust findings in 
criminology is the role of peers in deviant behaviors (Hayne, 2001; Warr, 1996; 2002; 
Weerman, 2011). The social and criminogenic nature of gangs provides opportunities 
and resources to gang members that can change the size and structure of their 
networks. As such, there are reasons to suspect the personal networks of gang 
members will impact their criminal trajectories. A hypothesis of this dissertation is that 
the personal networks of gang members will be important for their criminal trajectories. 
How youth build their networks will impact their social capital (i.e. the type of 
connections, the number of new connections added) which will influence the length of 
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their gang and criminal career. Chapter 8 examined the influence of personal networks 
on gang careers, which are discussed later in this chapter.  
Another hypothesis of this dissertation is that it would be the combination of gang 
membership and the social context that influenced criminal career length. The increase 
in criminal opportunities and co-offenders that is associated with gang membership 
should provide gang members more chances to grow their networks compared to non-
gang members. The mere “brotherhood” of the gang expands gang members’ networks 
in a way non-gang members do not have access to. As a result, the personal networks 
of gang members should be different than non-gang members. Put another way, gang 
members should have larger networks than non-gang members. Additionally, the ways 
in which they positon themselves may be more strategic (i.e brokers) than non-gang 
members because of their status of gang member. Gang members have an elevated 
status in the criminal world (Augustyn et al., 2019) which can provide them with 
opportunities to broker criminal activities (i.e. drug deals) or between individuals. The 
increase in social capital should result in gang members having longer criminal careers 
than non-gang members. Previous research have used community based samples when 
comparing gang and non-gang members, the sample used in this dissertation a prison 
based sample. By using a more criminogenic control group, the effects of gang 
membership are more isolated. The current chapter discusses the results from Chapter 
9 on the role of networks and criminal careers for gang and non-gang members.  
Additionally, I challenged the main proposition of the dissertation by opening the 
analysis beyond gang membership and examined a prison gang network. I was able to 
move beyond the gang label and examine whether being embedded within a gang 
network influences the criminal careers of non-gang members. The personal networks of 
gang members are comprised of gang and non-gang members (McCuish et al., 2015; 
Reid & Maxson, 2016; Papachristos et al., 2015a). Being associated with gang members 
can be a turning point for non-gang members. This could be especially true for non-gang 
associates who are embedded within the network of a gang. In other words, non-gang 
members who are close with gang members may be at a greater risk of experiencing the 
effects of gang membership. The social capital that may be related to gang membership 
spills through the network via social interactions. Therefore, non-gang members who are 
entrenched within the network of a prison gang are exposed to the same opportunities 
and resources. As a result, their involvement with criminal activities increases which may 
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prolong their involvement in the criminal justice system. No research to date has 
examined this. Based off of previous research (i.e. Green et al., 2017; Papachristos et 
al. 2012; 2015a; 2015b; Pyrooz et al., 2013) it is hypothesized that being closely 
connected to gang members will increase the length of non-gang associates criminal 
careers. The current chapter discusses the impact of social proximity on residual 
criminal careers for non-gang members that was examined in Chapter 10. 
11.1. How and when gang members build their networks 
impacts the length of their gang careers 
The aim of Chapter 8 was to examine whether the personal networks of gang 
members influence their gang career. Gang research has focused a lot of attention on 
risk factors associated with gang membership (i.e. risk factors to become gang 
members) and factors associated with gang desistance (i.e. gang embeddedness), but 
rarely has gang research examined if networks play a role in gang membership. As 
discussed throughout this dissertation is the importance of social capital. It is well 
established that individuals learn through social relations and actions often mirror the 
larger social structure individuals are embedded in; therefore, looking at the personal 
networks of gang members can provide additional information on heterogeneity across 
gang careers. I looked at this in two ways: 1) if the personal networks pre-gang 
membership influenced the time it takes youth to become a gang member, and 2) if the 
personal networks pre-gang membership and during-gang membership impacted the 
length of time spent in the gang.  
There are three main takeaways from this analysis. First, examining changes in 
variables across gang membership status, I found there to be an increase in social 
capital that is associated with gang membership. This is supported by a significant 
increase in both network size and betweenness centrality from pre- to during-gang 
membership. During active periods of gang membership, gang members significantly 
increase the size of their networks as well as occupy more strategic positions. This can 
be seen in the changes in Bruisers networks (see Figure 6). Not only does his network 
grow in size, there are fewer cliques or subgroups with alters. Previous research has 
alluded to gang membership increasing co-offending opportunities and access to more 
antisocial peers (Bouchard & Spindler, 2010; Decker et al., 2013). The changes in 
network size associated with gang membership show that gang members in this sample 
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were able to expand their networks. As a result, they had access to more social capital 
through more opportunities for involvement in criminal activities and brokering relations 
between their connections (Burt, 1992). This may be an indication that gang members 
are able to leverage their status as a gang member brokering opportunities for others in 
their network. This could result in more “weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973), suggesting gang 
members may be able to diversify their personal networks.  
There are reasons to believe the social capital gained during gang membership 
does not completely disappear once individuals leave gang life. Even though there is a 
significant decrease in betweenness centrality during- to post-gang membership, 
betweenness centrality is six times higher post-gang membership than pre-gang 
membership. This indicates that the strategic positioning between connections remains 
after gang membership suggesting some of the capital gained during-gang membership 
remains post-gang membership. Although not significant, network size post-gang 
membership is on average twice the size as pre-gang membership revealing not all 
connections gained as an active gang member are completely lost with the gang label. 
These changes in network size and structure may influence the length of residual 
careers. Hypothetically speaking, after individuals leave the gang, they are able to 
maintain their network position. Through their position and social relations, they continue 
to have access to criminal opportunities which may prolong their involvement within the 
criminal justice system. Drawing from Rowan et al. (2018), they found historical co-
offending experiences resulted in a greater likelihood of offenders reporting illegal 
earnings. The authors concluded this suggests the capital gained from co-offending 
“endure beyond the event” (p.302). The social capital gained from gang membership 
“endures beyond the label”.  
The second main takeaway from this analysis is how and when youth build their 
networks influences their gang careers. There are two parts to this finding. How youth 
build their network pre-gang membership impacts the time it takes to become a gang 
member. On the one hand, youth who have larger networks before gang membership, 
take longer to become involved in a gang. On the other hand, youth who build their 
networks through convictions prior to membership, become gang members more 
quickly. These results indicate for youth who are able to grow their networks on their 
own before gang membership may not benefit from getting into a gang. The access to 
resources and opportunities to expand criminal networks that is associated with gang 
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membership, these youth are able to access on their own. They do not require the label 
of “gang member” to grow their networks. Being in a gang increases the risk of 
victimization and conflict, so the positive benefits of gang membership are not gained for 
these youth, but the negative ones might be. This can make gang membership less 
appealing which may be why they take longer to become involved in a gang. On a 
whole, these youth are able to establish relationships and set up co-offending 
opportunities without being involved in a gang.  
In contrast, there is a subset of youth who built their networks through 
convictions. For these youth, they became gang members more quickly. Youth who built 
their networks through having more convictions by participating in larger crime events 
that are eventually detected, are quick to get into gangs. This reveals that the social 
context of connections may influence gang careers. It is not the size of their network per 
se, but it is potentially how they build their network that is important. It may be that youth 
who generated their networks through convictions have greater exposure to criminal 
opportunities which could be a signal for impeding gang membership. The social capital 
gained through increased exposure to co-offenders and the criminal justice system may 
show a willingness to commit crime. It could be that this subset of youth have a distinct 
criminal trajectory. They are embedded within the criminal justice system before gang 
membership because they have built their networks through participating in criminal 
events and being detected does not stop them. Rather, it pushes them into gang life 
faster. These youth are not deterred by incarceration; instead they seek out membership 
in a criminogenic group. This could be a group of youth who were headed for a “life of 
crime” and gang membership was part of that path. This subset of youth would support 
the premise of the enhancement model (Thornberry et al., 1993). I say premise because 
I am not looking at convictions and gang membership. Rather, it is the idea that there is 
a subset of youth who are naturally predisposed to criminal activity and they “seek out” 
gang membership more quickly. Gang membership may provide this subset of youth 
with increased access to criminal opportunities and status within the criminal world that 
they value. This is an area for future research.  
Once in a gang, things reverse. The size of networks pre-gang membership does 
not seem to influence the length of time spent as a gang member. What does seem to 
be important is the way youth construct their networks during active membership. Youth 
who have larger networks, are gang members for longer periods of time; whereas, youth 
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who require convictions to increase to build their networks, are gang members for less 
time. The reason for these differences could be a matter of detection. For youth who are 
able to build their networks and go undetected, they remain a gang member for longer. 
These youth are able to grow their social capital through expanding their networks 
without getting caught. The increase to criminal opportunities and resources that are 
associated with gang membership appear to be serving this subset of youth. As a result, 
they see gang membership as beneficial which influences the length of time they spend 
in a gang.  
However, for youth who grow their networks through convictions, get out quicker. 
I propose this may be a deterrent effect. These youth may be exposed to too much 
crime and by having the label of gang member they are getting caught too frequently. 
With the label of gang member comes an increased presence and “hassle” by the police, 
so the chances of getting caught, even with something small like drug possession results 
in an arrest23. As a result, they are getting out of gangs quicker. In addition, gang 
members have an expectation to commit violent crimes and are at an increased risk of 
violent victimization. So while gang members are growing their networks through co-
offending and criminal opportunities, they may also be experiencing the negative side of 
gang membership. As such, the benefits of gang membership do not outweigh the costs 
of gang membership, so these youth leave sooner. Gang members have expressed a 
push out of gang life is because of the increased violence that comes with the territory 
(Decker et al., 2014b). The increase in violence can cause disillusionment for gang 
members (Densley & Pyrooz, 2019), leading to them to exit the gang. As seen at with 
the bivariate results, the capital gained during gang membership does not disappear as 
soon as individuals leave the gang. Some gang members may realize they do not need 
the gang to continue to build their social capital. They may have some strong 
connections built, so they can leave the gang sooner and become independent. By 
losing the gang label, the excess attention from law enforcement may also go away 
which makes it easier to conduct business. Drawing from previous research, the size 
and composition of networks individuals are embedded, does impact their risk of arrest 
(Bouchard & Nguyen, 2010; Bouchard & Ouellet, 2011). Therefore, leaving the gang 
may help reduce negative police attention and build stronger co-offending relations. 
                                              
23
 I am referring to a quantity that would be for personal use or consumption, not enough to warrant a 
possession of the purposes of trafficking charge  
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Future research should look into individuals who leave gang life but remain involved in 
the criminal justice system. Examining how their networks change could be informative 
as to whether leaving the gang benefitted them or didn’t. Taken as a whole, this finding 
reveals the personal networks of gang members matter. How and when youth build their 
personal networks influences their gang careers.  
The third main takeaway from this analysis is the importance of prison ties. 
Recall, I did not include the amount of time spent in prison when calculating the 
proportion of prison ties. This is something that should be done in future research. 
Nonetheless, it appears prison ties have an independent effect on gang membership, 
above and beyond network size. This supports previous research which has shown 
inmates are able to form connections in prison (Clarke-Mclean, 1996; Reid & Maxson, 
2016; Reid, 2017; Schaefer et al., 2017). Gang members in this sample are utilizing their 
time in prison by making new connections and continuing to expand their criminal 
networks. As a result, prison appears to be a place for gang members to grow their 
criminal social capital, supporting the school of crime hypothesis (Bentham, 1830; 
Clemmer, 1950; Nguyen et al., 2017). Specifically, the proportion of prison ties 
significantly increases pre-to during-gang membership. Being a gang member in prison 
(while not necessarily an active member) offers an elevated status that non-gang 
member criminals may not receive. For example, gang members in prison have control 
over the flow of contraband (Johnson & Densley, 2018; Lessing, 2010; Skarbek, 2014). 
In addition, their elevated position in the prison may provide them opportunities to 
manipulate or “heavy” other inmates who want to associate with them. This provides 
access to more resources. As a result, gang members in prison have more social 
capital. Looking at females in prison, Owen et al. (2017) noted female inmates who were 
connected to “big baller or shot caller” had higher levels of prison capital (p.86). The 
same rationale could be applied to gang members in prison. They could be seen as the 
“shot callers”; therefore, inmates want to associate with them. These relationships may 
be mutually beneficial. The proportion of prison ties change again, after gang 
membership ends. There is a significant decrease in the proportion prison ties. That 
being said, the proportion of prison ties is significantly greater post-gang membership 
than pre-gang membership. This is the similar pattern seen with betweenness centrality. 
Taken together, the capital gained during gang membership does not dissipate once 
individuals leave the gang. 
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The relationship between the proportion of prison ties pre-gang membership and 
the length of gang membership was a robust finding. The greater the proportion of prison 
ties pre-gang membership, the less time spent in a gang. I propose this finding may be 
linked to what was seen with network size. Youth who have a greater proportion of 
prison ties are able to build their networks on their own. During their time in prison, they 
form new connections and expand their criminal networks. By associating with other 
inmates, these youth may have learned new criminal skills and gained access to more 
criminal opportunities. As a result, being a gang member or having the gang label did not 
benefit them. They were able to grow their criminal social capital on their own, without 
the gang. As stated, gang membership increases risk of victimization and “beefs”, and in 
some cases the “beefs” may not have anything to do with specific gang members. But 
due to the collective identity of the gang, a beef against one is a beef against all. This 
increase in violence may cause youth who can build their criminal networks on their own, 
to exit the gang faster. Future research should break down the prison ties and gain 
information on the alters. It would be interesting to know who youth are connecting with 
and when these connections were formed. This could be informative as to why prison 
ties pre-gang membership impacted length of time in a gang. For example, if youth were 
able to gain a mentor while in prison and expand their criminal skillset, they may not 
need the gang. In comparison, youth who do not have the ability broker or form 
beneficial relations, may need the gang. Prisons seem to be a place for youth to grow 
their networks and these connections have an impact on their gang careers. 
Three other findings from this analysis I want to draw attention to. First, the 
average length of gang membership for this sample was 5.5 years. This is substantially 
longer compared to other studies who have found gang membership to be relatively 
short lived, with two years being the modal length of membership (Esbensen & Huizinga, 
1993; Hill et al., 1999; Thornberry et al., 2003). This could be a by-product of the sample 
used. I used a prison based sample meaning the majority of youth involved are 
entrenched within the criminal justice system. The level of criminality of this sample is 
naturally higher than samples that have used community based samples. While there 
have been studies in the United States that have used adjudicated samples, the 
restrictions of the YCJA make custody the last option for young offenders. A custodial 
sentence is reserved for youth who commit serious and violent offenders or are chronic 
offenders (Roberts, 2003). If this is why, it further supports the importance for research 
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to continue the movement into prison as offenders in prison may be qualitatively different 
than offenders in the community. This could be especially true for young offenders.  
Second, there seems to be a relatively fixed age for gang membership. If youth 
are going to become a gang member, it is going to happen around 16 or 17 years old. 
As such, youth who enter the criminal justice system later are on an accelerated timeline 
to become a gang member. The survival analysis examining time to gang membership 
supports this - youth who are older when they enter the criminal justice system, are gang 
members more quickly. Do youth who enter the CJS later seek out gangs faster, or do 
gangs seek out older youth to recruit? Maybe it is both. This is an area of future 
research. I would like to compare youth who enter the criminal justice younger and take 
longer to become a gang member to youth who enter the criminal justice system for the 
first time when they are a few years old and become gang involved more quickly. I would 
want to examine their networks as well as their traditional risk profiles to determine if 
there are differences between the two groups that can help explain this finding. Even 
without this information, this finding is important for correctional staff and prevention and 
intervention workers as older youth may be more at risk to become gang involved.  
Third, in the additional analysis I separated the network into positive and 
negative networks. The positive network was comprised of co-offending and social ties, 
and the negative network included victimization and conflict connections. Focusing 
specifically on network size, I wanted to determine if the quality of relationships was 
important for gang careers. The original analysis revealed network size impacts the 
length of gang careers, but I wanted to take this one step further to see if it was more 
than size alone. In other words, was it the type of relations that youth were building what 
was important? The results are descriptive, but they suggest the quality of relations do 
not have an independent effect. In other words, it is the size of the network that is 
important. Gang membership was associated with a significant increase in both positive 
and negative ties. This supports previous research that has shown gang membership to 
increase the number of co-offenders (Bouchard & Spindler, 2010), but also an increase 
in violence victimization (Decker & Pyrooz, 2010; Krohn et al., 2011; Pyrooz et al., 
2014a). While the negative connections may not provide new opportunities to grow 
networks the same way positive connections can, gang members who are willing to be 
involved in conflicts and commit acts of violence against others can increase their status 
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within the gang. This may play a role in their commitment to the gang, increasing their 
capital. After youth leave the gang, there is a significant decrease in both types of ties.  
Examining whether the types of ties influenced the length of gang careers, the 
size of the network impacted the time to become a gang member. For both positive and 
negative networks - the larger the size, the longer it took youth to become gang 
members. Again, this is what was seen looking at network size as a whole. Looking at 
length of gang membership, size of the positive network pre-gang membership did not 
matter, but the size of the negative network did. The larger the negative network pre-
gang membership, the less time spent in a gang. A larger negative network is indicative 
of more conflicts. Remember, when an individual becomes a gang member, they bring 
their personal networks with them. As such, their conflicts are brought into the gang. 
This could result in the gang getting involved in more conflicts and having more “beefs”. 
Consequently, the gang member may be kicked out of the gang because they are not an 
attractive member. They are not benefitting the gang by being a member. Again, this 
was done at the bivariate level and needs fleshing out with a larger sample. For youth 
who built their networks, positive and negative, during gang membership, were involved 
in gangs for longer. Overall, these results reveal that is not necessarily the quality of 
relations that impact gang careers, but when. I was unable to determine how 
connections were made (i.e. via convictions, in prison) as the sample was too small. This 
is an area for future research.  
The results from this chapter reveal that gang membership is associated with an 
increase in social capital. Networks do impact gang careers. Future research should 
expand on this finding and examine the personal networks of members of the same 
gang. Mapping the networks of members who are part of the same gang provides the 
opportunity to examine whether networks can determine who will remain involved longer 
than others. Additionally, mapping a whole gang, the role non-gang members play within 
the network of the gang can be assessed. Do non-gang members over time become 
gang members? Do their associations stop? Do these decisions depend on which 
member(s) they are connected with? This will also provide the opportunity to use a 
network measure of gang embeddedness and how embeddedness impacts gang 
careers.  
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11.2. Social context for the win 
In Chapter 9 I examined whether the social context that surrounds gang 
members was related to criminal career length. In addition, I wanted to examine the role 
the label of gang member had on prolonged involvement in the criminal justice system. I 
hypothesized that it would be a combination of social context and the label of gang 
member that influenced longer criminal careers. By adopting the label of gang member, 
the increased access to criminal opportunities and co-offenders can change the social 
structure gang members are embedded in. As a result, their involvement in the criminal 
justice system may be longer. Research has established the group processes of gang 
membership facilitate the increased involvement in the criminal justice system 
(Thornberry et al., 1993; 2003). Additionally, research has shown the social structure 
surrounding gang members to be influential on offending behaviors (Bouchard & 
Spindler, 2010; Papachristos et al., 2012). Taken together, this research suggests that it 
is not necessarily the label of gang member. Rather, it is the increase in social capital 
(i.e. access to more criminal activities and co-offenders) associated with gang 
membership that drives the spike in criminal behaviors.  
In addition, there is research which has shown gang members to be qualitatively 
different than non-gang criminals (Klein, 1995; Moore, 1991; Warr, 1996). The group 
organization and structure of gangs, along with the collective identities separates gang 
members from non-gang criminals. While co-offending is common among non-gang 
criminals, they lack the commitment, label, group organization, and identity that gang 
members have. Yet, we know very little on how the networks of gang and non-gang 
members may or may not differ. It would be expected that gang members’ networks 
would be larger and structurally different than non-gang members. As a result, their 
involvement in the criminal justice system may be longer because of how they have 
established themselves in their networks and the connections they made from gang 
membership. On the flip side, some studies have found few differences between non-
gang criminals and gang members (Battin et al., 1998; Thornberry et al., 2003). In other 
words, for some offenses, non-gang criminals were not significantly different than gang 
members. These results could be a function of the personal networks of non-gang 
criminals. Non-gang criminals who are able to build their networks with co-offenders and 
other criminal associates may be as entrenched within the criminal justice system as 
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gang members. As such, the gang label itself may not be important. Instead, the social 
context of connections may be important because through the connections, individuals 
have access to social capital. Using a matched control group of non-gang members, I 
was able to examine if the personal networks of gang members are quantitatively 
different than non-gang members, and if so, does this influence the criminal career 
length for gang members.  
The results from this analysis revealed interesting insights. Recall, the control 
group used is as criminally involved as the gang members. Even though the control 
group was derived from a convenient sample, the 28 non-gang members selected were 
similar to the gang members on every aspect (i.e. cohort, risk factors, length of time 
spent in CJS, types of convictions) other than gang membership. Comparing the gang 
members to the non-gang members across multiple factors including all four network 
measures (betweenness centrality, size, constraint, and density) and criminal career 
length, there was only one significant difference. Gang members were significantly 
younger when they first entered the criminal justice system. This is consistent with 
previous research (Kreinert & Fleisher, 2001; Ralph et al., 1996; Ruddell & Gottschall, 
2011; Sheldon, 1991). However, there were no differences on the network measures or 
the length of criminal careers between the two groups.  
At the multivariate level, non-gang members had significantly longer criminal 
careers than gang members. This was a robust finding. Across all models, non-gang 
members were consistently shown to have longer criminal careers than gang members. 
Why might this be the case? First, I go back to the sample. Previous research looking at 
long-term consequences of gang membership have use community based samples 
(Dong & Krohn, 2016; Gilman et al., 2014; Levitt & Venkatesh, 2001; Melde & Esbensen, 
2011; 2013; Thornberry et al., 2003). While the samples used in these studies have 
been comprised of delinquent youth, I would suspect their level of delinquency 
compared to the control group used in this dissertation would be lower. By isolating a 
subpopulation like gang members who are already on the most extreme end of the 
continuum in terms of criminal involvement, researchers may artificially increase the 
differences between the two subpopulations. Doing so also runs the risk of 1) trivializing 
important differences among the subpopulations of gang members. That is, not all 
members are involved in serious violent crime; 2) ignoring an important subcomponent 
of the non-gang member population who is heavily involved in violent crime and yet, 
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“lost” in overly broad categories of “non-gang members”. Recall, the YCJA sets out 
custodial sentences as the last resort. Youth who receive custodial sentences need to 
have committed a serious and violent offense and/or be a chronic offender (Roberts, 
2003). This automatically increases the level of criminality in the control group. By using 
a control group of serious and violent youth they can match gang members on the 
severity of offending and the complexity of risk factors, research will be able to get a 
better understanding on the relationship between gang membership and prolonged 
involvement in the criminal justice system. Second, by focusing so much on the label of 
gang members, non-gang criminals who are at risk of becoming career criminals may be 
ignored and slip through the cracks of the justice system.  
Similar to Chapter 8, the proportion of prison ties was significantly associated 
with criminal career length. Specifically, individuals with a larger proportion of prison ties 
had longer criminal careers. This supports research which has shown inmates can and 
do form peer networks while in prison (Clarke-McLean, 1996; Reid & Maxson, 2016; 
Reid, 2017; Schaefer et al., 2017). Prisons provide a place for inmates, who may not 
have connected in the community, to form relations and learn from one another. As a 
result, prisons can expand inmates’ criminal networks, increasing their criminal social 
capital (Clemmer, 1950; Nguyen et al., 2017). Inmates, who use their criminal social 
capital especially once released, may have longer criminal careers. Using the skills, 
knowledge, and contacts gained while in prison can further expand criminal networks. 
Recall from Chapter 2, indirect connections are just as influential as direct connections 
(Lin, 2001). If a friend of a friend is in a prestigious position, being two handshakes away 
has its advantages. For example, inmate A connects with inmate B. Inmate B provides 
inmate A with names of criminal associates. Once inmate A is released, through inmate 
B he can connect with inmate B’s criminal associates. Inmate A’s network grew from 
connections he made while in prison, then by acting on those relations, he grew his 
criminal network even more. The results highlight the importance for research to 
continue the movement into prison as prisons can be a turning point in criminal 
trajectories. Put another way, prisons can be a deterrent. Inmates may able to get 
treatment and have access to prosocial resources and skills, but also, as seen with this 
study, can be a place for individuals to become further entrenched in the criminal justice 
system.  
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Because a goal of Chapter 9 was to determine if gang members have different 
networks than non-gang members, I created an interaction term with gang membership 
and the proportion of prison ties. This provided me the opportunity to determine if gang 
members with a larger proportion of prison ties have longer criminal careers. The results 
from the regression revealed gang members had shorter criminal careers, but individuals 
with a greater proportion of prison ties had longer criminal careers. Could there be a 
subset of gang members with a larger proportion of prison ties who had longer criminal 
careers? As results show, there is not. In fact, there is a subset of gang members with 
more prison ties that had shorter criminal careers. This hints that non-gang members 
may have more prison connections than gang members. In other words, the proportion 
of prison ties compared to overall network size is larger for non-gang members. Again, I 
did not control for exposure time in calculating the proportion of prison ties. With the 
findings from this analysis, it is something I intend to do in the future. I want to rule out 
alternative explanations for this finding. Nonetheless, this raises questions as to how 
non-gang members and gang members build their networks in prison. It is believed that 
gang members in prison would be at the top of the hierarchy. As a result, the positions of 
gang member are more prestigious within the prison which provides them with power 
over other inmates. Therefore, gang members should have more capital, and more 
opportunities to build their networks.  
Research examining the mechanisms of informal social control in prisons has 
found gang members to be largely responsible for the social order of prisons (Johnson & 
Densley, 2018; Lessing, 2010; Skarbek, 2014). For example, Johnson and Densley 
(2018) found prisons in Brazil to be controlled by gang members. The authors noted that 
gang members controlled all aspects of prison life. The spectrum included sleeping 
arrangements to the orchestration of riots. Many studies have shown gang members to 
be in control the flow of contraband24 (Gundur, 2018; Johnson & Densely, 2018; 
Skarbek, 2014). In prison, contraband is power. Controlling the flow of contraband 
provides gang members a source of capital that other inmates cannot achieve. 
Consequently, this elevates their status even more. However, findings by Pyrooz and 
Decker (2019) noted that gang members were not as highly regarded or recognized in 
creating rules, controlling the flow of contraband, and/or maintaining social order by non-
gang members. The authors even noted that gang members themselves described the 
                                              
24
 Contraband can include phone calls, drugs, canteen supplies, cigarettes 
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significance of gangs in prison to be “somewhat weak” (p. 137). These results suggest 
the role gang members play in prison may not be as prominent as believed especially 
from media representations. This supports what was found in this analysis. Non-gang 
members seem to be at an advantage in prison compared to gang members. If they do 
have larger proportion of prison ties, then non-gang members may be utilizing their time 
in prison to their benefit. This increases their criminal social capital which can increase 
their involvement in the criminal justice system. One thing to remember is the gang 
members used in this analysis are not necessarily prison gang members. This could also 
be an explanation for the unexpected findings. However, the results support the recent 
research by Pyrooz and Decker (2019) that gang membership in prison may not be as 
prestigious a status as initially believed.  
The main objective of this analysis was to examine whether the personal 
networks gang members are quantitatively different from the personal networks of non-
gang members with criminal career length as the outcome of interest. Looking first at 
only the network measures, I found size and structure to be important predictors for 
criminal career length. This suggests that social capital may be associated with longer 
criminal careers. Specifically, larger networks with more structural holes are associated 
with longer criminal careers.  
In order to answer the main research question regarding the personal networks 
of gang members, I created two interaction terms with gang membership and the 
network variables. Doing this, I could examine if there was a subset of gang members 
whose networks were structurally different, and if so, did that relate to criminal careers. 
First, the interaction with constraint was not significant; gang members and non-gang 
members do not seem to differ on the structure of their networks. Second, the interaction 
with size was significant. However, the direction was negative. This suggests there is a 
subset of gang members with larger networks that have shorter criminal careers. This is 
interesting because larger networks are indicative of more social capital. Higher levels of 
social capital typically increases the length of time spent in the criminal justice system. 
Yet, for this subset of gang members, the opposite was found. This could be a function 
of the type of ties in the networks. One thing I would like to do is break down the 
networks by positive and negative, as I did in Chapter 8, and examine if the type of 
connections differ between gang and non-gang members. As stated, gang membership 
increases the risk of violence and victimization, maybe the types of ties when compared 
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to non-gang members do matter. In other words, it may be gang members have more 
negative than positive ties which causes them to get out of the game quicker. Non-gang 
members may be able to build their positive networks while keeping their negative 
networks relatively small. By not having the gang label, their exposure to conflicts and 
victimization may be lower. Not having the label of gang member may be advantageous 
for longer criminal careers. This needs to be unpacked in future research.  
There are three main takeaways from this chapter. One, networks are important 
for criminal career length. Both constraint and size were significantly related to longer 
criminal careers. This suggests that social capital does influence the length of time 
individuals spend in the criminal justice system. Two, as seen in Chapter 8, prison ties 
have a unique impact on criminal careers. Three, gang members when compared to a 
highly criminogenic sample, have shorter criminal careers. This finding was unexpected, 
yet important. It suggests it may not be the gang label that drives behavior. It is the 
social context individuals are embedded in. The access to social capital and how 
individuals utilize their position with their networks to grow their capital is what seems to 
be important for prolonged involvement within the criminal justice system. Using 
networks provides us the ability to go beyond the gang label. That being said, the 
samples used for this study are unique and the size of the sample was smaller. Future 
research should expand on these findings. 
11.3. The closer the proximity to prison gang members, the 
longer the residual criminal career 
The focus of Chapter 10 was to examine whether prison networks impact 
criminal career lengths. Chapter 10 was intended to push the boundaries and move 
beyond gang member vs. non-gang member comparisons. As seen in Chapter 9, gang 
members had shorter criminal careers than non-gang members. Additionally, the 
networks of gang members were not advantageous for longer criminal careers. In fact, 
the opposite was found. It could be argued that this finding was a by-product of looking 
at personal networks rather than a gang. Gang research has largely concluded that it is 
the group processes of gangs that are responsible for the outcomes associated with 
membership. So what if I did look at a gang network? For Chapter 10, I changed the unit 
of analysis from personal networks of gang members to a prison gang network. Not only 
did I switch the type of network but I also switched to prison only and what happens in 
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prison. Using social distance as my measure of embeddedness (i.e. social capital), I 
could examine whether the gang label is important for criminal careers. Further, 
expanding research to prison networks, I was able to examine whether the connections 
made in prison play a role on residual criminal careers. Research has shown that peer 
networks are influential on behaviors (Haynie, 2001; Krohn et al., 1988; Krohn & 
Thornberry, 1997; McGloin & Piquero, 2015; Weerman, 2011), and research has shown 
prison to be a place to gain criminal capital (Bayer et al., 2009; Clemmer, 1950; Damms 
& Gorinas, 2020; Nguyen et al., 2017). Therefore, I hypothesized that connections made 
in prison would impact criminal trajectories. The criminogenic nature of gangs and the 
long-term consequences on members is well known (Gilman et al., 2014; Melde & 
Esbensen, 2013; Pyrooz et al., 2013; 2014a; Thornberry et al., 1993; 2003). By using a 
prison gang network, I had to the opportunity to examine whether connections in prison 
had a unique impact on members and non-gang associates.  
I did this in two ways: 1) by measuring the social proximity to every CS member 
for everyone in the network, and 2) through examining the timing of connections. By 
separating the alters of the CS gang into when they were connected to CS members 
(during-CS vs post-CS), I examined whether being embedded within an active prison 
gang network had a greater influence on criminal trajectories than being in a network of 
gang members in prison. Recall, the alters in the post-CS network were still connected 
to gang members, but they were not active prison gang members. Eighty-seven percent 
of CS members remained gang involved five years post-CS, but they did not join a 
prison gang, they were members of gangs in the community. This is an important 
distinction between the two groups of alters. This gave me the ability to examine whether 
connecting with active gang members is different than connecting with gang members 
who are not active. Using social proximity as a measure of gang embeddedness, I was 
able to determine if individuals who were closest or more embedded with CS members 
had longer criminal careers.  
Importantly, and somewhat of a surprise, it was alters who were embedded 
within the during-CS network that had longer criminal careers. The only significant 
difference in criminal career length was between alters in the during-CS network and 
alters in the post-CS network. This raises the question, is the label of gang member 
important? The alters in the during-CS network, from a network perspective, were no 
different from the CS members. They occupied similar positions within the network 
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giving them the same access to the same amount of social capital (see Figure 4). The 
only difference between the 12 alters and the eight CS members was the label of gang 
member. Although speculative, it could be the label of gang member was a 
disadvantage for the CS members. The 12 alters were able to slide under the radar of 
the correctional staff as well as the police once they were released. The names of the 
eight CS members were released to the police for awareness. Therefore, the CS 
members had heavier law enforcement presence than the 12 alters. Because the 12 
alters were structurally equivalent to the CS members, they had the same access to 
social capital as the CS members but without the heat from law enforcement. As such, 
not having the CS label worked to their advantage. They were able to use their network 
positions, gain criminal social capital, and then use the criminal social capital to prolong 
their involvement within the criminal justice system.  
An argument could be made that it was because the 12 alters were embedded 
within an active prison gang that they were able to access resources other inmates may 
not have been exposed to. In other words, the social capital was because of their 
connections with active gang members. But for those connections, the 12 alters may not 
have had the same opportunities. Due to the 12 alters not being identified as gang 
members they were able to learn from the CS members but without the added attention. 
It was a combination of being closely connected to prison gang members and not having 
the label of gang member. Therefore, the gang label to some degree may be important. 
As seen in Chapter 8, there was an increase in social capital during active periods of 
gang membership. Also, studies have found support for the facilitation hypothesis and 
the enhancement hypothesis (see Pyrooz et al., 2016 for an overview) suggesting that 
the group process of the gang does result in more opportunities and resources. 
However, the important point with these findings is the conclusion that is the group 
processes of gangs. It is the social context surrounding gang members and the 
interconnectivity among gang and non-gang members that may be the mechanism 
behind these findings, not the label of gang member. It is the social world that individuals 
embed themselves in that is important for prolonged involvement in the criminal justice 
system. This is supported by the results in Chapter 9.  
Additionally, the results from Chapter 10 potentially reveal a mislabeling by law 
enforcement. Put another way, there were possibly 12 other alters who could have been 
CS members but were not labeled as such, why? What made the eight CS members 
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gang members and the 12 alters not? Was there a bias by correctional staff to label the 
eight and not the 12? This has important implications for the future of these youth. As 
noted, the eight CS members had their names released to the police which can have 
negative repercussions. This also raises the question – how are law enforcement 
labeling gang members? What is the criteria being used to distinguish a gang member 
from a non-gang member especially when they are structurally equivalent. The 
subjective labeling by law enforcement can result in youth being mislabeled. Networks 
could be used as a complementary tool to help law enforcement identify youth who are 
at risk for gang membership, but more importantly, youth who are at risk for 
entrenchment within the criminal justice system. As seen in this dissertation, the gang 
label does not seem to be the main influence for entrenchment within the criminal justice 
system. Therefore, using networks and understanding the position of individuals within 
networks and the interconnections among individuals can provide valuable information. 
This has important policy implications. Prevention and intervention programs can adopt 
a network approach and use it along with other sources of information to prioritize clients 
and conduct targeted interventions.  
Without using SNA and mapping the network of the CS gang, the findings from 
Chapter 10 may not have been possible. As seen in Figure 4, there is not a single CS 
member connected to every other CS member. Therefore, using survey methods and 
asking CS members to name their associates inside, I may not have been able to 
identify every CS member or all of the alters. As a result, I would have lost important 
insights. Decker et al. (2013) noted the importance for gang researchers to unpack the 
black box of group processes that are associated with gangs. Using a network approach, 
research is able to do this.  
Findings from the current analysis resemble the research on social contagion 
from Papachristos and colleagues. The closer one is to a gunshot victim, the greater the 
odds of being shot. Similarly, Pyrooz et al. (2013) found the more embedded gang 
members were within their gang, the longer the length of gang membership. The same 
logic appears to be applicable here. The more embedded an individual is within a prison 
gang network, the longer their criminal career. The group processes underlying behavior 
are a by-product of the associations between individuals within a network. Peer networks 
facilitate the transmission of attitudes and beliefs, ultimately constraining the behaviors 
of individuals to mimic those of the larger network. Prior literature has established the 
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importance of gang embeddedness (Pyrooz et al., 2013; Sweeten et al., 2013) and the 
timing of turning points (Uggen, 2000). The current analysis adds to this literature by 
showing that the timing of embeddedness has important implications for criminal career 
duration. The alters who were connected to active prison gang members were part of a 
peer network with CS members when they were on average 16 years old. Associating 
with active prison gang members not only impacted the length of criminal careers for 
these alters, but 50% became gang members after their associations with CS members. 
It seems that being embedded within a youth prison gang and having exposure to prison 
gang members at a specific juncture in youths’ life had a lasting impact on their criminal 
trajectories.  
While the results focus on the alters in the during-CS network, the CS members 
should not be ignored. Though the long-term consequences of being in a prison gang 
were not as pronounced for the eight CS members, they did have longer criminal 
careers than the alters in the post-CS network. Furthermore, prior to incarceration, there 
were only three CS members who were gang members. Thus, for the remaining five, the 
prison context was an important gateway to gang involvement. As such, the formation of 
the gang itself may have been the result of selection effects. That is, for the CS 
members, their involvement in the gang was not as impactful on their criminal career, but 
the CS members had the largest proportion of convictions pre-CS formation. Although 
not significant, it could be an indication of the selection hypothesis (Thornberry, 2003). 
These eight were entrenched within the criminal justice system by the age of 15, as a 
result, they were well-known within the correctional facility. Their status within the prison 
and the level of interconnectivity with one another may have facilitated the creation of a 
youth prison gang. This highlights the importance of being incarcerated together as who 
one is incarcerated with, and the power of peer association, especially during a 
vulnerable period in development, is critical on decisions and behavior. The interplay 
between individuals and the larger social context in which they are embedded is 
important for fully understanding risk of gang membership and variations in criminal 
career length. These propositions highlight why looking beyond the boundaries of gang 
membership is important. The impact of the gang may be more pronounced on others 
than on specific members.  
The results from Chapter 10 highlight the importance of expanding gang 
research to include gang networks. Using networks, the black box of gang-related group 
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processes can be unpacked. Specifically, the results showed it is more than the label of 
gang member. There were 12 contemporaries of the CS gang who were no different 
from the CS members themselves. They just did not have the label of gang member. 
Additionally, these alters were closer in proximity to the CS members, making them 
more embedded within the CS network than the alters in the post-CS network (see 
Figure 4). Ultimately, it was these 12 youth who benefited the most from being 
entrenched within the CS network. The results from this chapter complement results 
from Chapter 9. Even though the research designs were different, in both chapters, the 
importance of networks was highlighted above and beyond gang status. The social 
structure surrounding individuals play a crucial role on behaviors. Recently, Pyrooz et al. 
(2021) noted “…the power of the group appears to trump individual differences” (p. 37). 
How individuals build their networks and mobilize their connections are the main drivers 
of behaviors, not necessarily individual characteristics such as gang member. The 
application of Chapter 10 is important as it highlights how the group process of gangs 
may be transmitted through networks and can be utilized to help develop criminal 
careers. 
11.4. Limitations 
As with all research, there are limitations that need to be addressed. First, I used 
a Canadian sample of incarcerated serious and violent youth, which limits 
generalizability of the results. However, this is also the type of sample needed when 
seeking to understand whether prisons are a place for offenders to grow their networks. 
Prisons have been labelled the “final frontier” (see Fleisher & Decker, 2001) for research 
on gangs and gang members (also see Pyrooz & Decker, 2019). Therefore, using a 
prison based sample, I was able to examine if the connections made in prison did have 
an influence on criminal careers. Further, this type of sample is important to use when 
examining whether gang membership increases the length of residual criminal careers. 
Comparing gang members to an equally criminogenic control groups better isolates the 
effect of gang membership.  
Second, the sample size used for the dissertation was small, also limiting the 
generalizability of the results. The results should be expanded upon using larger 
samples. With having a small sample, I was limited in the design of the study as well as 
the number of control variables used. For example, it may be interesting to do a group-
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based trajectory model of gang members to see if there are different trajectories and 
how the trajectories are influenced by network measures. Or, using a GEE model for 
Chapters 8 and 9 with network size having a random effect could reveal more nuanced 
insights. Using a larger sample these limitations can be addressed. 
Third, criminal career information was based on official records, which can be 
conservative given individuals’ abilities to avoid detection. The data are based from a 
correctional database, so in a sense, part of the equation to calculate criminal career 
length was because individuals were getting caught. I tried to decrease the impact of this 
limitation by focusing my interest being on length of time spent in the criminal justice 
system, not criminal achievement.  
Fourth, I was unable to directly test or capture concepts in the analyses. This is a 
by-product of the data as well as study design. As noted through the dissertation, I would 
like to extend the personal networks by two or three handshakes. Doing this, I would be 
able to get a better understanding of the social structure in which gang members and 
their associates are embedded. Also, by gathering more information on the alters, the 
social capital entrenched within the network can be better captured.  
Fifth, due to ethical stipulations, I was only able to include the alters who were 
part of the ISVYOS. For example, in Chapter 10, I had to exclude 16 alters because I 
was unable to access their criminal histories. This could have brought the sample from 
41 to 57. While that may not seem like a huge difference, having the criminal trajectories 
of 16 more people could have had an impact on the results. Of the 16, ten were 
connected to CS members during the time the gang was active and six were connected 
post-CS. The results showed the alters connected to CS members during the time the 
gang was active had longer criminal careers, but what about those 10? They could have 
been part of the subsample of gang members who were further away from the CS 
members who had longer careers. Or, they could have been the non-gang 
contemporaries who were in close proximity and benefitted the most of being connected 
to CS members. We will never know which is why expanding on these findings is 
important.  
Sixth, the networks are based off of official records. The networks were created 
from community and prison logs meaning that the connections captured are only those 
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that the probation officer and/or correctional staff witnessed. As a result, there are 
missing connections. By not knowing all of the connections or the information on the 
relations, I do not have complete networks. Future research should look to combine the 
use of survey data and official records. Asking gang members and/or inmates about their 
associates may fill gaps not captured with official records. In addition, using official 
records, connections the gang members forget to mention or neglect to mention can be 
captured. No matter the study design, there will always be missing data, but combining 
the two types of data could help overcome the limitations of using one or the other.  
Seventh, there were 17 gang members excluded because there was not reliable 
information on their length of gang membership. While all were noted to be gang 
members by the gang interview, their official records had little to no information on their 
gang involvement. Even though the gang members self-reported to probation and/or 
correctional staff they were gang involved, this may not have been accurately captured 
in their records. Again, 17 may not seem like a large number, but when the sample size 
is small, having 17 gang members could have had an impact on the results.  
Despite these limitations, I do believe I was able to merge disparate areas of 
gang research by showing the significance of including networks and prison based data. 
There were important insights gained that provide opportunities for future research to 
expand upon. 
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Chapter 12. Conclusion 
Being embedded within criminal social relations is essential for longer criminal 
careers. It provides opportunities to expand one’s network, gain more knowledge and 
skills, all of which leads to an increase in social capital (Lin, 2001; McCarthy & Hagan, 
2001; Warr, 2002). Gang members are a particular subset of offender who seem to have 
plenty of opportunities to build their social capital. The group nature of the gang, the 
collective identity, the criminal opportunities etc. provide gang members with more 
chances to grow their networks and gain more social capital. However, gang research 
has yet to include the personal networks of gang members and whether they play a role 
on criminal career length. Research has shown gang membership does increase the 
length of residual criminal careers (Dong & Krohn, 2016; Levitt & Venkatesh, 2001; 
Melde & Esbensen 2011; 2013; Moore, 1991; Pyrooz et al., 2017; Thornberry et al., 
2003), but the role networks play in this is not well understood. The goal of this 
dissertation was to showcase the importance of including networks into research on 
gang members in order to get a better understanding of whether and how having the 
label of gang member prolongs involvement in the criminal justice system. The results 
from the dissertation reveal three main takeaways that I would like to highlight. I also 
propose a theoretical concept and areas for future research. 
12.1. The importance of personal networks on gang 
members criminal careers  
The three results chapters of the dissertation suggest networks are important for 
criminal trajectories. Albeit in different ways, in each of the results chapters, the network 
variables influenced the length of criminal or gang careers. This should not be surprising. 
One of the most robust findings in criminology is the relationship between peer influence 
and antisocial behaviors (Agnew, 1991; Haynie, 2001; Weerman, 2011). Additionally, 
key criminological theories assert the importance of social relations as behaviors are 
learned through peers (Bandura, 1969; Shaw & McKay, 1931; Sutherland, 1947). This is 
especially relevant for gangs. Gangs are first and foremost social groups. Gangs are 
comprised of interconnected members who share a collective identify and participate in 
collective behaviors. The group process of gangs has been found to facilitate the 
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behaviors that are associated with gang membership. Yet, gang research has largely 
ignored social networks when studying gangs. Understanding the social structure gang 
members are embedded in can provide insights into the heterogeneity of gang 
members. As noted by Pyrooz et al. (2013), gang membership is a different experience 
for every member, with members having varying levels of commitment to the gang. As 
such, the consequences of gang membership will impact members differently. By 
including networks, researchers are able to quantify changes in gang members’ personal 
networks. Knowing how gang membership changes the social structure around 
members can provide information on why some members remain in the gang longer 
than others, and why some members suffer from more negative consequences. For 
example, Bruiser gained a substantial amount of social capital when he became a gang 
member, but Ice Pick did not. In fact, becoming a gang member had an opposite effect 
on Ice Pick. Looking at the length of their gang careers, Ice Pick was a gang member for 
less than a year, whereas Bruiser was a gang member for five years. Ice Pick did better 
without the label of gang member, Bruiser did not. Understanding how networks change 
with gang membership, we can add another depth of knowledge on the heterogeneity 
between gang members.  
A known fact, but one that is often overlooked, is when individuals become gang 
members, their personal networks are now connected to the gang. Put another way, 
when individuals join a gang, they bring their connections into the gang with them. As a 
result, their non-gang friends and family are now indirectly or two handshakes away from 
other gang members. As noted by Lin (2001), indirect connections are just as important 
as direct connections. Everyone has access to the resources embedded within the 
network. How individuals utilize their social relations, they can take on different roles and 
hold more prestigious positions. Morselli (2001; 2003) demonstrated the importance of 
positioning within networks and using social relations to advance criminal careers. This 
information can provide insight into who is more at risk to become further embedded 
within the gang, but perhaps more important, is how the effect of gang membership can 
spillover to non-gang associates. Analogous to the negative effects of gang membership 
reaching to those who are connected to gang members, the opportunities and resources 
that are associated with gang membership also extend to those who gang members are 
connected to. This may influence non-gang members to become gang members. 
Knowing the social structure of gang members, who is at risk for entrenchment and who 
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is at risk for becoming a gang member can be quantified. This has important implications 
for prevention and intervention programs.  
Similarly, using a network approach, we are able to examine desistance from a 
different angle. In the dissertation, I examined criminal career length, but the results can 
be informative for desistance. Research on gang desistance has noted that for some 
gang members, leaving the gang is more of a process than a “knifing off” (Pyrooz et al., 
2014b). The relational ties do not simply disappear for many members. In fact, for many 
gang members who leave gang life, especially in the United States, still have family 
members and close friends who remain gang members. As a result, their connections to 
the gang persist. This can prolong the time it takes to desist fully from gangs and for 
some they never do. Individuals may not identify as a gang member, but their 
connections to gang members remain. Applying a network approach can enhance our 
understanding of why some gang members may always have “one foot in the door”, 
compared to others who are able to completely leave the lifestyle. Additionally, results in 
the dissertation suggest for some gang members, membership was not a positive 
experience. Densley and Pyrooz (2019) found a reason gang members left their gang 
was because of disillusionment. In Chapter 8, results showed there was a subset of 
gang members who built their networks through convictions. On the one hand becoming 
a gang member increased the size of their network. On the other hand, they kept getting 
caught. When individuals become gang members, their access to criminal opportunities 
increases but so does their risk of being caught. The “heat” from law enforcement is 
higher for gang members which can result in more convictions. In addition, when 
individuals become gang members their participation in violence increases as does their 
risk of victimization. Taken together, these “side effects” may cause gang members to 
want to get out.  
One of the reasons often cited by gang members when asked about why they 
entered a gang or their motivations to join a gang is because of a friend (Esbensen et 
al., 1999; Klein & Maxson, 2006; Thornberry et al., 2003). Peers are incredibly important 
in shaping criminal careers but also gang careers. The social structures individuals are 
embedded in have a direct impact on their behaviors. I believe incorporating a network 
approach to gang research will only enhance our understanding of gangs, gang 
members, and the long-term consequences of membership.  
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12.2. The influence of prison ties 
Previous research has found inmates can and do form connections while in 
prison (Clarke-McLean, 1996; Reid & Maxson, 2016; Reid, 2017; Schaefer et al., 2017). 
The results from the dissertation support previous research by showing prisons are a 
place to grow networks, but also the ties made in prison influence criminal trajectories. In 
all three studies, the connections made in prison increased the length of criminal and 
gang careers. This supports the school of crime hypothesis which asserts prisons are a 
place for inmates to learn from one another, increasing criminal knowledge and skills 
(Clemmer, 1950). Prison networks matter, the connections made in prison do extend 
beyond the boundary of the prison walls providing individuals with larger criminal 
networks and access to more criminal opportunities. Future research should include 
networks within prisons to understand how individuals interact in prison (i.e. quality of 
relations), who they are building relationships with, and how these relationships may 
influence criminal trajectories. Morselli et al. (2006) highlighted the importance of 
mentors. Individuals who had mentors had longer and more successful criminal careers. 
Prisons can be a perfect place for young, less experienced offenders to meet and 
connect with older, more experienced offenders. Connecting with and learning from 
more experienced offenders, younger inmates not only gain resources while serving 
their time, but they can take the social capital gained from prison and use it in the 
community (Nguyen et al., 2017). Using networks provides researchers the opportunity 
to examine the types of connections being made in prison and how those connections 
relate back to criminal career length.  
In addition, networks can be an informative tool for correctional staff. Knowing 
who individuals are connecting with could be a place for intervention or moving 
susceptible inmates to different units. Also, mapping the network of a prison, brokers 
between units can be unveiled which may reveal how contraband is spread throughout 
the prison. Network information may also provide insights into connections between 
inmates in different prisons, or with certain people in the community. Through inmates, 
individuals may be connecting with one another unbeknownst to correctional staff and/or 
police. As a result, alliances and/or conflicts may be revealed. Again, this has important 
implications for unit placement and level of access for certain inmates.  
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There has been a recent movement to bring research back into prison (i.e. the 
LoneStar Project, Prison Inmate Network Study) which has renewed the significance of 
prisons and the role of prisons. Prisons are a unique environment that bring together an 
array of criminals—prison gang members, gang members in prisons, former gang 
members, and non-gang members. Research has shown the networks formed in prison 
are not strictly homogeneous (Reid & Maxson, 2016; Reid, 2017; Schaefer et al., 2017). 
Inmates interact across racial, religious, and gang membership status. Yet, we do not 
know much at all on whether or how these relations impact inmates once they are 
released. As shown in this dissertation, non-gang associates benefited the most from 
being connected to active prison gang members. Also, larger proportion of prison ties 
was related to an increase in the length of gang and criminal careers. The exposure and 
proximity inmates have to each other while in prison is unlike any other place. This 
provides inmates the ability to interact and build relations with a variety of offenders 
ultimately changing the size and structure of their personal networks. In addition, the 
fluidity of the prison environment brings with it a constant flow of new inmates providing 
continuous opportunities for inmates to expand and diversify their networks. As a result, 
their criminal social capital is increased. How that criminal social capital is utilized by 
inmates is important avenue for future research. Future research needs to include prison 
networks and the role prison networks play within prison. This can provide important 
insights into prison hierarchy, the role inmates have within their unit, and potential places 
for intervention for correctional staff. But research also needs to extend out of prison 
back into the community to examine how being in prison changed the networks of 
inmates. Doing so, researchers are able to examine whether some inmates (i.e. gang 
members) benefitted more from their time prison than other inmates (i.e. non-gang 
members). 
Prior to the work by Pyrooz and Decker (2019), gang members were believed to 
have an elevated status within prison, sitting at the top of the hierarchy. In conjunction 
with the results from this dissertation, prison may not benefit gang members more than 
non-gang members. In fact, non-gang members may use prison to their advantage 
because they do not have the status on the outside to help grow their criminal networks. 
Being in prison could be a perfect opportunity for non-gang members to expand their 
networks increasing their criminal social capital. Then once released, non-gang 
members leverage their criminal social capital prolonging their involvement within the 
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criminal justice system. I hope the results from this dissertation continue to show the role 
of prisons and how prisons are an important environment for the criminal trajectories of 
gang and non-gang members.  
12.3. The gang label: How important is it? 
Gangs are known to be one of the most criminogenic peer groups (Melde & 
Krohn, 2011). Gang members have consistently been shown to have higher levels of 
criminality, especially violence, than non-gang members (Krohn et al., 2011; Thornberry 
et al., 1993; 2003; Thornberry, 1998). Additionally, researchers have shown gang 
members have longer residual criminal careers (Dong & Krohn, 2016; Levitt & 
Venkatesh, 2001; Melde & Esbensen 2011; 2013; Moore, 1991; Pyrooz et al., 2017; 
Thornberry et al., 2003). As a result, the label of gang member has been associated with 
these consequences. Yet, there has been research which has shown that it may not be 
the label of gang member per se, but the social context in which gang members are 
embedded that is the reason for the myriad of consequences (Bouchard & Spindler, 
2010; Papachristos et al., 2012). In Chapter 9, I examined the importance of the gang 
label for the length of residual criminal careers. Results showed gang members had 
shorter criminal careers than non-gang members, but the size and structure of networks 
(i.e. more social capital) resulted in longer criminal careers. Similarly, in Chapter 10, I 
went beyond the personal networks of gang members and examined a prison gang. It 
was found youth who benefited the most (i.e. longer criminal careers) from being 
embedded within a prison gang were the non-gang members. These findings suggest 
networks not so much “gang member” to be influential on criminal trajectories. It seems 
to be how individuals build their networks, who individuals connect with, and when the 
connections are made that provides them more social capital. Not the label of gang 
member. As stated by Pyrooz et al. (2021) “…there is nothing inherently criminal about 
identifying as a gang member” (p. 14). The authors noted that it was the group 
processes of gang membership and the group context that is important for the outcomes 
associated with gang membership (Pyrooz et al., 2021). This raises the question - how 
important is the label of gang member? I do not answer this question here, but I would 
like to raise it as a discussion point and for future research to examine. Also, I am not 
suggesting we throw out the label of gang member, but I am suggesting that we take it 
further than the label alone.  
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Pyrooz et al. (2013) started this movement with gang embeddedness, but I want 
to take it one step further by adding in networks. Again, youth do not know who they do 
not know. Therefore, using networks provides researchers the ability to understand the 
direct and indirect connections which make up the social structure. As seen with the CS 
network (Figure 4), many individuals within the network were not directly connected, yet 
they were still part of the same network. Also, for many gangs, not all members know 
each other. Being able to construct the social context surrounding individuals more 
nuanced information about the individuals within the network and their positons can be 
revealed. Stated throughout the dissertation is the importance of indirect connections. 
Survey data largely ignores these connections because most youth do not know 
anything about them. As such, a piece of the puzzle in our understanding of gang 
embeddedness has been missing. The findings from the dissertation also raise 
questions or concerns about the age old debate about who is a gang member? What is 
a gang? Do gang members label themselves the same way police and/or correctional 
staff do? This raises another question - which is better, survey or official records? Gang 
members may not self-identify as gang members, yet they are labeled as being 
members in official records and vice versa. This can cause a discrepancy in how 
individuals are labeled and treated within the criminal justice system. It is known that 
gang membership is often used as an aggravating factor in sentencing and gang 
members have a heavier police presence, as they should. But if we are labeling 
incorrectly and/or ignoring the non-gang criminals who are as criminally entrenched, 
there is a gap in the justice system. This also supports using prison based samples or 
equally criminogenic control groups as the effect of gang membership may not be as 
pronounced. Future research needs to continue to build on the work of Pyrooz et al. 
(2013) and the findings from this dissertation to unpack these questions further.  
12.4. Theoretical implications: Gang capital 
Social networks provide a holistic understanding of risk of entrenchment in gangs 
but also the criminal justice system. Individuals who are closely associated to gang 
members have an increased risk of prolonging their embeddedness. As stated by 
Papachristos et al (2015b) “…the hallmark of SNA is the study of peer 
influence…influence is captured through contagion” (p.144). Who individuals surround 
themselves with will impact their overall behavior. It is a network process of becoming 
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“one” with your social environment. The results from Chapters 8 and 10 suggest that 
there is an increase in social capital that is associated with gang membership.  
Recall, in Chapters 8 and 10, I used social contagion theory in combination with 
social capital theory. Specifically, in Chapter 8, I compared changes in the personal 
networks of gang members that occurred with changes in gang membership status. 
There were significant increases in network size and betweenness centrality during 
active periods of gang membership. More importantly, may be the fact that not all of the 
social capital gained during gang membership disappeared post-gang membership. In 
Chapter 10, the concept of gang embeddedness was measured using a network 
approach. Social distance quantified the social proximity of the gang members and non-
gang associates in order to determine if being more closely embedded within an active 
prison gang network influenced the length of criminal careers for the prison gang 
members, but the non-gang associates as well. I found the non-gang associates who 
were more embedded within the networks of active prison gang members had longer 
criminal careers. These results suggest there may be opportunities and access to 
resources that are associated specifically with gang membership. It is only gang 
members and those closely associated to them that have the ability to access this 
capital. This is what I am labeling gang capital. 
Gang capital is an extension of social capital which is an individual’s ability to use 
their personal connections and networks to advance their goals or interests (Lin, 2001), 
and human capital, which is the capital that is embedded within individuals, and is the 
skills, knowledge, and experience an individual gains to make their abilities more 
specialized (Coleman, 1988). More specifically, gang capital is the knowledge, skills, and 
resources about gangs and being in a gang one receives by being connected to gang 
members. As pointed out by Augustyn et al. (2019), gang membership provides 
members and associates access to opportunities and resources which expand their 
networks increasing their criminal competencies. Associating with gang members 
exposes individuals to other gang members, situations, and behaviors as the 
transmission of information occurs naturally through the network. Additionally, individuals 
who are more proximal to gang members receive higher amounts of gang capital as 
being more embedded increases individuals’ exposure. Social capital theory stresses 
the importance of indirect connections. The position individuals occupy within a network 
is directly connected with the resources they can access. Individuals who are more 
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embedded are more efficiently located, meaning they are able to mobilize their 
connections to access more capital. Consequently, individuals who accumulate higher 
amounts of gang capital are at a higher risk of using the capital through increasing their 
co-offending pools, becoming gang members, or both. This in turn, can further entrench 
individuals within the criminal justice system.  
Gang capital as a concept aims to make explicit the transmission of gang specific 
knowledge and skills via social networks. Gang capital is specialized as it is specific to 
gangs and what is learned through connectivity with gang members. Other research has 
used concepts like “criminal capital” to refer to more general types of criminal knowledge 
acquired by people who commit crime (McCarthy & Hagan, 1995; 2001; Nguyen & 
Bouchard, 2013). The relationships individuals have within criminal networks facilitate 
the transmission of criminal skills and resources. Through the exposure to a variety of 
offenders, an individual’s involvement and success within the criminal sphere increases 
(McCarthy & Hagan, 1995; 2001). Criminal capital is a broader construct, capturing the 
skills and resources gained through the connections with other criminals (Nguyen et al., 
2017).  
Similarly, Owen et al. (2017) coined prison capital which is the prison-specific 
type of knowledge acquired by individuals who are incarcerated. The authors looked at 
sources of violence and conflict in female prisons and noted that female inmates who 
connected with powerful and well-positioned inmates survive their prison time more 
easily as they have higher levels of prison capital or “juice”. The authors noted the 
female inmates who are connected to staff, decision makers, and “big baller or shot 
caller” (p.86), have higher levels of prison capital. Having higher levels of “juice” 
facilitates certain opportunities for female inmates. Overall, the authors noted the 
females who had higher prison capital were more easily able to navigate through prison 
as they were “in the know” on informal and formal social control mechanisms, they were 
able to access to more information, forge alliances, and gain status within the prison 
(Owen et al., 2017).  
While gang capital is similar to gang embeddedness, they measure different 
components. Gang embeddedness captures the location of individuals within the gang, 
whereas gang capital captures the skills, knowledge, and opportunities that are a result 
of being connected to gang members. As such, the two complement one another. 
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Understanding the location of an individual within a network, their level of capital can be 
better understood. Gang embeddedness has expanded gang research by capturing the 
heterogeneity of gang members, but it has not explained why embeddedness leads to 
prolonged gang involvement. Being a gang member or being embedded with gang 
members, offers the possibility of learning new criminal skills, increase criminal 
knowledge, access to more co-offenders that can increase an individual’s capital. It is 
known that gang members are not seen or portrayed as average criminals. Being a gang 
member or gang associate provides individuals with an amplified status within the 
criminal world. Even within pop culture, gangs and gang members are often glorified. 
Gang membership is “a type of social currency or credibility” that can be leveraged to 
gain access to new opportunities (i.e. co-offending), skills, and knowledge (Augustyn et 
al., 2019, p. 456). As a result of their status, gang members can arguably expand their 
criminal networks more quickly and with greater diversity of connections. In addition, 
becoming involved with a gang (member or associate), there is a formation of a new 
identity. This new identity is the process of social contagion that occurs with gang 
membership and is another form of capitalization. The change in status to gang member 
is another layer of capital that distinguishes gang members from non-gang criminals. 
This can lead to new opportunities and skills that are not necessarily available to all 
criminals. It is believed that individuals who are more embedded with gang members can 
use their position within the network to accumulate higher levels of gang capital.  
I hope that future studies further develop the concept of gang capital and its 
operationalization. I was unable to measure several important components of gang 
capital. Doing so requires longitudinal data that includes interviews with gang members 
and their associates in order to capture the spillover of specific knowledge and 
resources that are known to accompany gang membership. Questions should address 
changes in gang membership status (e.g. do associates become gang members?), 
changes in the number of criminal opportunities (e.g. have there been more 
opportunities to commit crimes?), changes in the type of criminal opportunities (e.g. are 
there differences in the types of crimes one is exposed to?), and changes in the number 
of potential co-offenders (e.g. has the number of co-offenders increased?). Questions 
regarding changes in beliefs and perceptions about crime and the criminal justice 
system could also be addressed. Beliefs and attitudes are transmitted through networks 
the same way behaviors are; therefore, knowing whether associating with gang 
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members and/or becoming a gang member changes individuals perceptions could be a 
form of gang capital. Interviews with gang members and their associates are required to 
calculate network measures such as social distance to get an understanding of where 
individuals are located in the larger social network. Doing this, research will be able to 
determine if gang capital is a tangible concept and how embeddedness is related to its 
accumulation.  
While I propose a social capital theory of gang membership, the results from 
Chapter 9 can raise questions or critiques as to whether this is needed. The networks of 
non-gang members are valuable and play a role in their criminal careers suggesting that 
social capital as a general theory may be enough. Arguments could be made that 
instead of looking at the transmission of gang capital, research needs to examine the 
transmission of social capital. In other words, it may not be the “type” of capital per se. 
Rather it is the mechanism in which the capital is transmitted that is important. Gang 
members may not be exposed to a specific type of capital. It could be that any 
entrenched criminal is exposed to more social capital because of their networks. Anyone 
who is embedded within a criminal network, especially a larger more diverse network, 
has access to opportunities and resources to expand their networks. It is the position 
within networks that holds the capital (Lin, 2001); therefore, how individuals mobilize 
their connections to gain more prestigious positons may be more important. A non-gang 
criminal who has built their network and positioned themselves strategically will most 
likely have access to more capital than a non-established gang member. As a result, 
their criminal career will be longer. I think this is an area for future research. Through 
examining the networks of non-gang criminals the flow of capital can be captured. 
Knowing who their non-criminal associates are, the type of connections they have with 
them, and if the non-criminal associates eventually become criminally involved can help 
establish if the same “gang effect” is apparent with non-gang criminals. This will help 
determine whether gang capital as a construct is needed.  
12.5. Future research 
Throughout the dissertation I have alluded to areas for future research. There are 
two I would like elaborate on. The first one I would like to highlight is testing the idea of a 
“contagion of gang membership”. I would like to test a contagion model using the 
networks of gang members to understand if there is a contagion of gang membership. 
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Similar to the work of Papachristos and colleagues on gunshot victimization, I would like 
to examine if embeddedness (i.e. social proximity) in the networks of gang members 
increases the odds for non-gang associates to become gang members. In addition, for 
the non-gang associates who do become gang members, is embeddedness linked with 
the length of time to become a gang member? As seen in Chapter 10, the majority of 
non-gang associates who associated with CS members during the time the gang was 
active, did eventually become gang members. I cannot make conclusions that it was due 
to their connections with CS members that influenced them to become gang members, 
but the results do show that this may be possibility. Again, I do not want to infer or over 
interrupt the results from Chapter 10, but I would like to examine this question further. In 
addition, researchers who have examined the motivations for entering gangs have 
shown “my friend was in the gang” to be one of the consistent reasons individuals join 
gangs (Esbensen et al., 1999; Klein & Maxson, 2006; Thornberry et al., 2003). Networks 
are a process of becoming one with your environment; therefore, if non-gang youth are 
embedded with gang members, their chances of becoming gang involved increases. 
This has important implications for prevention and intervention programs. By associating 
with gang members, non-gang members are not only at risk of becoming victims of gang 
violence, they may also be at risk of becoming members. Being able to identify non-gang 
youth within the networks of gang members, targeted intervention strategies can be 
organized to target at-risk youth.  
A second avenue for future research is to breakdown the sample into former and 
current members. Some research has found differences between former and current 
members in terms of risk of recidivism (Pyrooz et al., 2020). Specifically, in this study, 
authors noted current gang members were at a greater risk of being convicted and re-
incarcerated post-release from prison than former members. I think it is important to 
incorporate networks into this line of research. The results of the dissertation do show 
that not all of the capital gained during gang membership disappears once individuals 
leave the gang. Being able to capture how long after membership this increase in social 
capital remains is important to understand. Additionally, by using networks, the types of 
networks can be separated into positive and negative in order to determine if there are 
differences between former and current gang members, and if the make-up of these 
networks influences further involvement in the criminal justice system. I think it is 
important to understand the changes in networks between former and current members 
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and whether these differences can help explain differences in criminal career length. I 
also think it is important for future research to conduct a study similar to the analysis in 
Chapter 9, but include current, former, and non-gang members. As seen in Chapter 9, it 
was the non-gang members that had the longest criminal careers. Therefore, breaking 
the networks down into current, former, and non-gang more nuanced information may be 
available to help explain this finding. I unfortunately did not have a large enough sample 
to do this. 
12.6. Final thoughts 
A common criticism of network research is the claim that networks ignore the role 
of motivation and/or personal characteristics in the decisions on who to connect with and 
why. An argument could be made that I am also ignoring the role of motivations to join 
gangs or personal characteristics that may contribute to longer criminal careers. I look to 
Granovetter (1985) and his concept of embeddedness to try and address this. 
Granovetter noted that actors have agency, but the decisions actors make are refracted 
by the social relations around them. He further notes the actor is not an “atomized 
agent”; rather they are a participant in the continuous flow of interactions surrounding 
them. The actor responds, decides, and acts but this is shaped by the relations around 
them. It is the interaction or combination of individual characteristics and social relations 
that influence behaviors. While networks are focused on the social relations and is 
premised in social relations being the main drivers of behaviors, there is an interaction 
with the personal characteristics that ultimately forms the decisions and behaviors.  
In the dissertation, I called out researchers to get more serious about 
incorporating networks into gang research. The results show that the personal networks 
of gang members are influential on criminal trajectories. The size and structure of 
networks impact the length of gang and criminal careers. In addition, this dissertation 
went beyond the gang label showing the label itself is not necessarily important for 
longer criminal careers. While there are limitations with the sample size and study 
design, I do think the results make a strong argument for the addition of networks in 
gang research. I am not suggesting or claiming in any way research to date is 
inadequate, in fact just the opposite. But I do think networks are complementary with the 
current direction of gang research, and the combination could enhance our 
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Appendix A. Example of a Two-Day Prison Log  
SMITH, John C     CS# 0000362    
Nov 10th-16:32 SMITH (362) was admitted into Surrey Pre-Trial. No noted gang 
affiliations or no contact concerns currently  
Nov 10th-17:35 Inmates first evening on the unit, he was welcomed onto the unit 
by LITTLEFOOT (251), and he seems to be doing well with his 
cellmate JONES (854) 
Nov 11th-08:25 SMITH (362) had breakfast with JONES (854) and LITTLEFOOT 
(251) 
Nov 11th-09:16 SMTIH (362) talked to CO SANDHU about how to get money into 
his account so he could buy food from the canteen. CO SANDHU 
informed him of the process 
Nov 11th-12:25 During lunch, SMITH (362) was overheard making derogatory 
comments to another inmate, DAWSON (745). DAWSON ignored 
SMITH. It seems as though these two inmates know each other 
and may have a negative history. They should be watched 
Nov 11th-14:30 Inmate went outside during yard time. He joined in a game of 
tetherball with JONES (854), LITTLEFOOT (251), GRISHAM 
(561), and HAWKINS (314) 
Nov 11th-17:05 SMITH (362), JONES (854), and GRISHAM (561) were seen 
having dinner together 
Nov 11th-19:14 SMITH (362) was playing cards with HAWKINS (314) and 
ROBERTS (145). DAWSON (745) walked past with CULLEN 
(621) when SMITH (362) started yelling homophobic slurs at 
DAWSON (745). DAWSON (745) turned to SMTIH and told him to 
shut the F up, SMITH then stood up and got in DAWSON’S face. 
COs intervened and told both males to cool off and de-escalated 
the situation before anything else happened. These two need to 
be watched 
Nov 12th 08:30 Inmate did not want to come out of his cell for breakfast. He said 
he wasn’t feeling well and just wanted to sleep 
Nov 12th 12:30 Inmate had lunch with his cellmate JONES (854) 
Nov 12th 15:15 SMITH was seen walking the yard with GENOVA (495) 
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Nov 12th 17:45 SMITH ate dinner with LITTLEFOOT and GRISHAM. When 
DAWSON walked past their table, SMITH stuck out his foot in an 
attempt to trip DAWSON. As DAWSON re-gained his footing, he 
leapt at SMITH and started punching him. LITTLEFOOT stepped 
in to help SMITH, running from the other side of the room was 
DASH (324) who pulled LITTLEFOOT off and the two started 
fighting. The fight was broken up the COs and DAWSON and 
SMITH were sent to their cells 
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